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1. Introduction 
 
“Sometimes the resolution of problems acquires an excessive political 
route. No political considerations based on regional and factional 
ideologies and loyalties can distort the national vision and sense of wider 
collective purpose.” 
              Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2007 
 
“The future lies with the coalition governments and regional parties are 
going to play major role in coalition governments. At the same time, 
regional parties have given better leadership and also fulfilled the 
aspirations of people. This is what is happening. This is because there are 
very strong regional leaders.”  
Chandrababu Naidu (former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh), 2007 
 
There is hardly a phenomenon in Indian politics today, which has been as widely debated in 
journalistic as well as academic writing on India in the last one and a half decades as that of 
the increasing importance and influence of regional parties and the salience of regional 
identity at both the state as well as national levels of politics. This fact has been viewed on the 
one hand as a positive sign potentially indicating a deepening of the democratic process 
through an increased pluralism of political forces and on the other as a potential sign of 
increasing fragmentation of the Indian electorate and as a harbinger of increasingly unstable 
and complex dynamics of electoral competition, i.e. the deinstitutionalization of party politics, 
and subsequent government formation. The two quotations above illustrate these two sides of 
the debate. National leaders like Prime Minister Manmohan Singh naturally take a skeptical 
point of view toward the growth of regional parties. This view which sees regional political 
fragmentation as an obstacle to effective governance and a latent threat to political stability is 
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supported to some extent by studies pointing towards the potential negative consequences of 
party system fragmentation for a country’s development and for its political stability. On the 
other side of the divide are the leaders of regional parties such as Chandrababu Naidu of the 
Telugu Desam Party (TDP), who portray themselves as rightful defenders of regional, caste or 
ethnic aspirations neglected by national parties. But leaders of other national parties, such as 
the Bharatiya Janata Party’s Lal Krishna Advani have recently begun to acknowledge their 
legitimacy within India’s political system. Advani was recently quoted as saying: “Every 
national party has an ambition. But arrangements of the kind we have made with the Akali 
Dal or the Janata Dal (U) or that we make with some other party — if they stabilize and 
endure, there is nothing wrong with it. Their interest is focused on the state and ours at the 
Centre — there is no contradiction, it is a complementary relationship” (The 
Telegraph/Calcutta, 24 April 2009). 
The amount of scholarship devoted to this comparatively recent trend in Indian politics begs 
the question why there is such a strong academic interest in regionalization at different levels 
of the political system and why the Indian media have likewise been picking up on this theme. 
One possible explanation might be found in the prominence which regional political leaders 
have acquired in the running of State governments and in the reporting of politics in the 
various States. Especially in the second half of the 1990s and at the turn of the millennium the 
perception was that regional politicians and regional parties were becoming more important 
while national parties and politicians with a more all-Indian outlook were on the decline. A 
look at the distribution of the most visible and prestigious of political offices at the State level, 
the Chief Ministerships, may reveal how this perception came to be formed. Figure 1.1 below 
shows the percentage of chief ministerships held by representatives of regional parties and 
national parties, respectively. 
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Figure 1.1: Chief Ministerships by Type of Party Affiliation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculation based on information about mid-year office-holders (for sources see Appendix D). 
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reporting and scholarship since the late 1990s has emphasized the new regionalized character 
of politics in India in the post-Congress phase.1 The fact that regional differentiation of 
political processes and actors in India is now the norm rather than the exception has also led 
to the realization on the part of scholarship that comparative research at the level of the States 
is the most fruitful undertaking in analyzing politics in India today. While there have been a 
number of more or less extensive studies focused on regional politics or specifically on the 
extent of the importance of regional parties, either at the State level (Sinha 2005) and at the 
national level (Chhibber/Kollman 2004), a more comprehensive comparative study analyzing 
both levels seems to be lacking to date. In analyzing this phenomenon at both levels, this 
study will contribute to an answer to a number of important questions in Indian politics today, 
namely: 
- "What are the scope and extent of regionalization/regional differentiation of 
politics in the Indian States today and in the recent past?" (ch. 5); 
- "What are likely determinants of this regionalization across the States?" (ch. 5); 
- "Who are the supporters of such regional parties, how do they view their national 
and regional identities and politics in general?" (ch. 5)   
- "In what form and to what extent has regionalization impacted at the national 
level of politics?" (ch. 6). 
As such this study will contribute to two areas of research, namely electoral and party politics 
on the one hand and identity politics on the other. With regard to the area of identity politics, 
this study will study patterns of legitimacy beliefs regarding national and sub national 
institutions and citizens' attitudes towards regional and national frames of belonging, as well 
as the connection between those frames of belonging to one or more territorially defined 
identities and patterns of support for national and regional parties. With reference to electoral 
                                                
1 Many authors have stressed the importance of this trend, among others Butler/Lahiri/Roy (2007: 173), 
Yadav/Palshikar (2006: 73), Sridharan (2003: 135), Dasgupta (2002: 43-44), Wyatt (2001: 388), and Mitra/Singh 
(1999). 
 16
politics in India it will investigate the changing levels of success of regional and national 
political parties and the impact that these have had on the structures and processes of 
government formation at the national level. One aspect of this impact concerns the extent and 
nature of possible interactions between national and State-level processes and party system 
structures.  
A second trend in Indian politics which has been much discussed in the academic as 
well as popular writing about Indian politics is that of a supposed deinstitutionalization of 
politics in general and of party politics in particular.2 This study will address this phenomenon 
of different levels of institutionalization of party politics and party systems as a corollary and 
precondition for regionalization in chapter four, which asks how institutionalized the Indian 
party systems are. This concept refers, in that context, to a kind of de-regularization of 
politics. Frequently, this process is envisioned as comprised of a three-fold shift: from elected 
to unelected party leadership, from ideological political appeals to populist mobilization and 
from mainly conventional to unconventional and extra-constitutional participation (Price 
2005; Kohli 1990). Given the pre-eminent position of the Congress Party during the first 
decades after India’s independence, the level of institutionalization of Indian politics in 
general and party politics in particular crucially hinges on its relative position vis-à-vis other 
political forces in the country (Pye 1999; Candland 1997; Mitra 1994). Secondly, the level of 
political institutionalization generally, therefore, is also intimately connected to the 
institutionalization of party politics beyond only the Congress Party. Thus, the level of 
institutionalization is crucially tied to changes in patterns of party competition, including 
changes in support for different parties or different types of parties, the persistence of parties 
over time and the extent to which parties or individual candidates command support in the 
electorate. This link is a logical as well as an empirical nexus between the processes of 
                                                
2 For contributions to this body of literature see Kohli (1990), Rao (1988), Gupta (1996). For a discussion 
discussion of the (de-)institutionalization and reconfiguration of national party politics, see Weiner (1987), 
Joshi/Desai (1978), Heath (2005), Pai (1997), Sridharan (1997), Gowda/Sridharan (2008), Candland (1997) and 
Chhibber (2005). 
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regionalization and institutionalization. A shift in support away from established national 
parties in a vast and diverse country such as India will inevitably mean an increased 
likelihood of growing support for upstart parties which will usually be regional rather than 
national in nature. 
Before outlining the state of existing research and the theoretical framework employed in this 
study in chapter two, the question of how the stated research questions are important to 
politics and political science generally and in particular with reference to India merits 
attention. 
 
1.1 The Study of Indian Politics 
 
Since India’s independence in 1947, the country’s political system, problems and processes 
have been the subject of numerous studies undertaken in political science. Besides several 
others, four distinguishable themes which are in part also relevant to this study seem to stand 
out in particular. The first theme is that of the democratization of politics in India, the second 
is that of the political economy of development. Thirdly, a further focus has been the study of 
violent conflicts and their determinants, while the fourth one concerns the patterns and 
determinants of electoral and party politics.  
With regard to the study of democratization, much of the scholarship has focused on the 
emergence and the historical roots of democratic politics in India, including class conflict, 
elite behavior and values (Manor 1990, Sarkar 2001, Baxter 1985). The existence of values 
regarding democratic institutions and processes has formed another important topic for study 
(Mitra/Singh 1999). Other studies have concentrated on the status of India’s political system 
as a democracy (Heller 2000) and on its functioning (Ganguly 2007, Muni 1991). Yet others 
have emphasized the importance of institutional design and evolution (Rudolph/Rudolph 
2001, Austin 1999, Lijphart 1996, Bharghava 1999) and the nexus between parties and 
political diversity (Adeney/Wyatt 2004) to the proper understanding of the overall trends in 
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the development of democracy in India since independence. This theme in research on Indian 
politics will be relevant to our understanding of regionalization since the levels of diversity 
vary from region to region. This obviously raises the issue of regional differentiation of the 
political landscape with reference to party-political phenomena. What will also be important 
to consider is the importance which increased support for regional rather than national parties 
might have as an indicator of growing dissatisfaction with the current democratic political 
system. 
Another important theme, the political economy of development, has led to a number of 
studies focusing on regional variations in the socioeconomic development and their roots 
(Sinha 2005) as well as inquiries into inequalities between non-territorial social groups 
(Bardhan 2001). Another subject extensively studied within this overall topic has been the 
political economy of economic policy reforms (Jenkins 1999) as well as the nexus between 
democratic politics and poverty reduction (Varshney 2000a). Aspects of development and in 
particular regional differences in levels for development will enter this study as variables 
potentially explaining part of the variation in support for regional parties. 
The third recurring topic in research on Indian politics has been the inquiry into the roots of 
violent social conflicts, such as communal or caste conflicts. Hindu-Muslim relations and 
their relationship to violent conflict have been particularly prominent in this line of work (see 
e.g. Varshney 2002). Caste conflicts have likewise been a much-discussed theme (Brass 1991, 
Jaffrelot 2003). The correlation of electoral competition and political violence has also been 
under investigation for some time (see for example Wilkinson 2004). Lastly, the relative 
prevalence and determinants of violent versus conventional participation in Indian politics 
forms a further important sub-theme within the study of conflicts in India (Kohli 1990, Mitra 
2006). This strand of research will inform this inquiry insofar as we will treat ethnic diversity 
as one of the explanatory factors which might explain part of the variation in regional party 
support. Thus, the roots of violent social conflict as one form of rebellion against the existing 
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socio-political order are treated as potentially the same which fuel support for regional and 
regionalist parties and candidates. 
The fourth major theme in the Study of Indian politics is that of party and electoral politics. 
The emergence, maintenance and decline of the political dominance of the Congress Party 
were one of the earliest and most persistent topics for research in the study of Indian politics 
(Kothari 1964, Heath/Yadav 1999, Candland 1997, Chhibber 2005). Caste and other 
cleavages and their connection to electoral and party politics have been another staple in 
political science research on India for decades (Bueno De Mesquita 1978, Chhibber/Petrocik 
1989, Vanderbok 1990, Yadav 1999, Hasan 1999, Chandra 2004, Shah 2004, Macmillan 
2005). So also have been regional variations in patterns of electoral politics (Vora 2004, 
Varshney 2000b). An additional theme has been the implication of the structure (or lack 
thereof) of organized civil society on the consolidation of party and electoral politics 
(Chhibber 1999). This theme is quite clearly connected to this study of the regional 
differentiation and overall regionalization of party and electoral politics. 
Especially the themes of cleavages and party politics, as well as the relationship between 
values and politics, both in their relation to regionalization and institutionalization of party 
and electoral politics will be at the heart of this study. 
 
 
1.2 Region and !ation in the Study of Politics 
 
1.2.1 Regionalization's relevance to politics generally 
Regional parties were a relatively under-researched topic for a long time. Before outlining the 
reasoning behind undertaking an inquiry into the sources of regional party and candidate 
support, it seems warranted to ask whether an inquiry into the territorial characteristics of both 
party and identity politics today is a sensible line of investigation at all, especially given the 
oft-postulated de-territorialization of politics under the conditions of globalization. This begs 
the question whether or not territorial politics is on the decline and whether or not politics is 
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becoming increasingly transnational and less state-centered. While this argument may seem to 
question the general approach taken here, it still seems warranted to proceed in the on the 
assumption that a lot of politics is still local or regional. Both in India-related but also in 
cross-national research, it appears that regional political arenas, regional and local identities 
and sub-national political issues reappear more strongly again since the 1990s. Examples from 
European countries include the territorially and identity-based conflicts connected to the 
breakups of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the (re-) 
emergence of regionalist parties in the European Union at all levels of political organization, 
local, regional, national and supranational. 
The importance of sub-national territorial attachments is also borne out by opinion data on 
loyalty to different political territories. When reviewing the attachment which citizens feel to 
different territorial frames of belonging in cross-national perspective, it becomes clear that 
locality and region have strong appeal for large sections in a number of countries, as figure 
1.2 (below) illustrates. This indicates that a closer examination of “territorial layers” of 
identity is warranted even today. 
Figure 1.2: !ations, regions and localities as focal points of identification with territories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Values Survey, Third Wave (latest available data for each country).Question text: "To which of 
these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? And the next? And which do you belong to 
least of all? First: 1 Locality 2 Region 3 Country 4 Continent 5 The world". 
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With the exception of Pakistan, in all other countries there are sizeable sections of society 
which feel that their primary loyalty belongs to some form of sub-national political territory 
and identity, either local or regional. Thus, the connection between peoples' attachments to 
sub-national territories, the design of the electoral system and party competition would seem 
to be a highly relevant link to study in a range of those countries. 
In more recent years increasing decentralization and federalization of government in a number 
of advanced democratic systems have focused attention anew on the territorial nature of 
decision-making, political competition of parties and the role of citizens' attachments to 
particular territorially defined identities. A number of things regarding the importance of this 
rise of regional parties and regional political identities to prominence in politics across 
political systems seem obvious. The increase of the number of competitive parties, in 
particular the advent of smaller regionally-based parties which contest and win elections in 
only part of the country, has implications for the governability of countries. Such an increase 
can lead to greater complexity and necessitate greater coordination of actors to build 
majorities in national and regional legislatures. Consequently, one of the impacts which have 
been highlighted in recent studies is the relationship between the levels of regional party 
support and the stability of governments (Brancati 2005).  
Quite conceivably, a "de-nationalization" of politics in multi-level systems of government can 
create the potential for a destabilization of political processes on account of new, less 
institutionalized entrant parties to the electoral game. As one consequence such a 
destabilization has been hypothesized to possibly lead to a shortening of the political time 
horizons of politicians and in consequence to the focusing on short-term personal rather than 
long-term strategic public interests. Thus, the importance of a growing regionalization of 
politics lies in large part in its impact on the process functions of political systems, i.e. on who 
makes politics, how it is made and what policies are adopted.  
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Another area on which this phenomenon is likely to impact is the change and stability of 
recruitment patterns of different relevant new and established parties upon the advent of new 
regionally-based parties in a political system. Additionally, it can be expected that such new 
parties with predominantly regional support bases, agendas and linkages to groups in society 
will likely have a shaping and questioning effect on the identity-related underpinnings of 
political competition in a multi-level system. In non-Western, post-colonial contexts, this can 
raise questions about issues of nation-building and a possible fragmentation or alternatively a 
composite nature of national political identities. Thus, the ties of such newly emerging 
regional parties to identity claims and structures will likewise be of great interest to scholars 
of political culture as they shape the system functions and input functions of politics. In how 
far institutional factors such as decentralization improve or worsen the level of conflict and 
secessionism is another focus of concern (Brancati 2006b) 
To do this, chapter 2 (below) will outline the theoretical framework used in this study and the 
terms employed to conceptualize the theoretical links between candidates, parties, identities of 
voters, party systems and the consequences of the structure of competition between national 
and regional parties. Just like feelings of attachment to subunits of national states are not 
unique to the multi-level, multi-cultural political context of South Asian countries, the social 
scientific debate on this issue and that of its connection to political processes is not unique to 
that context either. Much of the literature on regional identities and regional and regionalist 
political parties has developed in connection with the study of Western political systems as 
the following section will demonstrate. 
 
1.2.2 The debate about regionalization of politics in advanced Western democracies 
A first distinct field of inquiry into the regionalization of politics concerns the role of regional 
versus national identities and attachments to different cultural and political spaces. In recent 
years a number of studies have investigated different layers of identity and attachments and 
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their respective roles vis-à-vis each other for cases such as the issue of being “English” in 
Great Britain (Jones 2004, Jones/McLeod 2004), a regionalized conception of French identity 
(Dimier 2004), and the coexistence of regional and regionalist tendencies with a pan-
European public sphere in an era of European integration (Jolly 2007, Spektorowski 2003, 
Longo 2003).  
Besides identity issues the impact of regional versus national political territory is also felt in 
the area of party and electoral politics in Western countries. Key questions, which are related 
to the territorial bases of politics, touch on the wider research on party politics, territorial 
politics in general, and regional parties and political processes within countries in particular. 
In the scholarship on the relationship of territorial characteristics of politics to parties and 
party competition, existing scholarship can be categorized according to two criteria: levels of 
analysis (national or subnational political systems) and units of analysis (parties or party 
systems). Additionally, a distinction can be made between single country studies and cross-
national studies (small- or large-N). Figure 1.3 (below) illustrates the categorization along the 
aforementioned criteria. 
 
Figure 1.3: Classification of Scholarship on Regionalization 
 
Unit of Analysis 
Parties Party Systems 
Level of Analysis 
National a b 
Subnational d c 
 
Studies focusing on the studies of single or groups of national parties in multicultural settings 
often attempt to descriptively assess their relative electoral performance in regional as 
opposed to national elections. Studies in this tradition (d) include for example the 
investigation into the electoral strategies and success of national parties such as the Socialist 
Party in regional elections compared to national-level elections in Spain (Roller/van Houten 
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2003), the regionalization of support bases of support for national parties in Mexico (Baker 
2009) or multiple national parties in various countries’ subnational party systems (van Houten 
2003). Another interest (a) centers on the support bases of national versus regional parties in 
different countries and on the strength of regional parties in national elections (Brancati 
2006a). As a corollary to these themes the issue of the nature of regional parties as opposed to 
national parties is a much discussed topic in research. Lastly, ideologies and programmatic 
profiles of both types of parties play an important role in scholarship on the regionalization of 
party politics (Strmiska 2002). A second approach focuses on studying party systems instead 
of individual or groups of parties and in the case of multi-level systems the possible 
interaction of lower level and higher level party systems. At the national level (b), these 
studies deal with the impact of the regionalized structure of the party system on government 
stability (Brancati 2005), as well as with the local determinants of voting patterns and across 
types of parties (Morgenstern/Swindle 2005) and the influence of party system structures on 
the vote for secessionist parties (Sorens 2005). Finally, with regard to subnational party 
systems (c), one line of inquiry has addressed the connection between regional identity and 
the structure of regional party systems (Hepburn 2008). This study will touch upon some of 
these and related themes in the course of the theoretical elaboration of the research questions 
asked in chapter two. It is concerned with questions relating to (b) and (c). However, it will 
necessarily draw on ideas from (a) and (d) to explain the configuration of party systems. 
 
1.3 The Design of the Study 
In chapter two we will introduce the most important terms and concepts employed in order to 
establish a basic understanding of how this study proposes to deal with the terminological 
diversity in the literature on regional identity, regional parties and the institutionalization of 
parties and party systems. Chapter two will also provide a general overview of previous 
research and findings regarding the questions at hand, while also highlighting existing 
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theoretical blind spots and remaining puzzles in existing scholarship. Lastly, the same chapter 
will also lay out the theoretical frame for the study and critically evaluate the usefulness of 
studying party system change at the subnational level. Chapter three gives an introduction to 
the institutional set-up of Indian politics in the setting of its multi-level democracy. It also 
showcases the relative differences of social and economic diversity across India’s States and 
their impact on politics. The fourth chapter will deal with the institutionalization of party 
politics in India. After a brief theoretical introduction to the debate on party and party system 
institutionalization (PSI) generally, the operationalization of the concept in this study and the 
hypotheses which will be evaluated are then discussed. This will be followed by an overview 
of the levels of institutionalization across India’s states. Finally, chapter four will provide a 
discussion of the extent of and possible determinants of party system institutionalization based 
on aggregate-level data and based on individual-level data and through a case study analysis. 
Having established the importance of different levels of institutionalization of party politics in 
the previous chapter, in chapter five we will turn to the issue of regionalization of party 
politics and of identity. After an overview of theories on the importance and determinants of 
political identity, the operationalization of the key variables and the main hypotheses to be 
evaluated, the chapter will give a descriptive account of the extent of regionalization of 
identity and politics in India. The determinants of regional identity attachments and regional 
party support will be analyzed through individual-level data. An aggregate data analysis will 
also profile States and detail the characteristics common to those States where regional parties 
have been particularly successful or unsuccessful. Chapter six will present a study of one of 
the consequences of the regionalization of party politics as it presents itself at the national 
level of politics: the necessity to forge coalitions incorporating both national and regional 
parties in order to be able to form national governments. It will also evaluate the claim that 
regional parties have acquired disproportional power at the national level over the past two 
decades through analyzing government formation processes and the sharing of offices with 
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references to three case studies. Finally, chapter seven will summarize the main findings of 
this study and suggest additional questions and themes warranting further investigation. 
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Chapter Two: 
Conceptual and Theoretical Aspects of This Study 
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2. Conceptual and Theoretical Aspects of the Study 
This chapter outlines the main theoretical framework for understanding the differential 
appeals of national versus regional political parties India. Based on assumptions about the 
perspectives of parties and candidates, as well as voters in single-member simple plurality 
(SMDP) voting systems, it is argued here, that in socio-economic conditions such as those in 
India messages based on local and regional networks of interdependence, identities and issues, 
rather than national issues, can be expected to dominate the mobilization efforts of parties. 
Chapter two also discusses in greater depth theories about regional/regionalist parties and 
party systems (in India as well as in comparative political research generally), and regional 
versus national identities. In this context, the chapter develops a theoretical perspective in 
contradistinction to previously conducted research into Indian national and State-level party 
systems, highlighting similarities as well as dissimilarities compared to those approaches. 
This chapter further introduces and problematizes key concepts used in this study, such as 
"regional party", "national party", "regionalization" and "subnationalism", as well as their 
operationalization in empirical research on politics in India. 
 
2.1 Regionalization of Party Politics – Two Views 
This section will briefly discuss two of the main perspectives on nationalization and 
regionalization of party politics before outlining some of the key terms used in the course of 
this study. These different perspectives are important as a background to the definition of 
terms used here because especially in terms of the idea of regionalization and regional parties, 
they inform the choice of terms and the advantages and disadvantages that this choice brings 
for the respective views. In principle, there are two views on the regionalization (or (de-
)nationalization) of party politics, one focusing on socio-structural and another one focusing 
on organizational-institutional aspects of politics.  
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2.1.1 The Socio-structural Perspective 
The socio-structural approach centers on two types of factors impacting the process of party 
emergence, party system stability and party system change. The first factor concerns 
cleavages, i.e. conflict fault lines within society based on individual or group characteristics 
that divide people into different “camps”. Early exponents of this view of party politics were 
Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967). From their theory of party systems and voter 
alignments it follows that regional party development marked an early phase in the 
development of Western party systems and that for regional parties to emerge a strong center-
periphery cleavage would have to exist in society, i.e. a conflict between rural areas 
dominated by landed elites and urban industrial areas (1967: 10-11). That cleavage and the 
concomitant formation of regional parties constitute a potential (often temporary) challenge to 
the political integration of a given territory. This is particularly true when parties demand 
autonomy for particular groups or regions to the exclusion of larger national concerns. 
Another type of social conflict fault line impacting political processes is that of ethnicity with 
ethnic parties as the ostensible representatives of diverse ethnic groups. They are 
distinguished, in the eyes of their members, by a variety of cultural, racial or linguistic 
characteristics. Oftentimes, these parties will concentrate on running candidates mainly in one 
region of a larger country (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 23) because especially in less 
dynamic, primarily agricultural societies, important ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated 
in particular areas of the country to which these particularistic parties then appeal.3 While this 
type of mobilization and party system is mostly discussed with reference to developing 
countries, this appeal to ethno-regionalist sentiments also exists in scholarly debates about and 
mobilization strategies by parties regarding voters in Europe today (Tronconi 2006; 
Spektorowski 2003: 112; Strmiska 2002). The programmatic ethnicist appeals of parties like 
the Vlaams Belang in Belgium or the Lega Nord in Italy speak to this line of arguments (see 
                                                
3 Chandra (2004) has shown the importance of ethnic parties and the relevance to particular regional contexts 
within countries for the case of India. 
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the examples in Appendix C). The other approach commonly found in the literature on the 
socio-structural underpinnings of regional differentiation of subnational party systems deals 
with economic differences across regions. Jones (2004) illustrates how regional economic 
planning structures can aid in catalyzing latent identities into mobilizational resources. In 
another vein, building on the idea that unequal development of subnational economies might 
influence the development of secessionist tendencies in people (instead of many see Hale 
2000 for an overview of these debates), scholarship in this tradition claims that shifting 
strength from the economic core regions to other subnational peripheral economies might 
prompt new regional aspirations which can serve as a backdrop for political mobilization 
(Gourevitch 1979: 319; Hale 2000). Others (Hechter 1992; Mitra 1995) have argued that 
developmental disparities between rich and poor regions in conjunction with differences in the 
ethnic makeup of regions may paradoxically lead to regionalist or secessionist tendencies in 
the populace despite the fact that poor regions usually benefit from being part of a larger 
national economic (and political) market. Both views on the issue of secessionism could 
mutatis mutandis be extended to the reasoning about the generation of regionalist political 
parties. One might thus theorize that in regions which are economic laggards, regional parties 
might spring up more frequently hoping to exploit grievances based on a feeling of falling 
behind the rest of a country (or less frequently because people there have an incentive to 
retain influence at the national level through national parties). Conversely, another view might 
be that regions which are national leaders might see the more frequent creation of regionalist 
parties either out of a feeling of people there that they do not wield influence in federal 
politics proportional to their contribution to overall wealth, or out of a desire to secure greater 
autonomy or even independence in order to exercise greater control over the wealth generated 
in those richer regions (Sorens 2005). In sum, it can be argued, that for work based on these 
models, there is an assumption of a real and substantive difference between regional and 
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regionalist parties and other parties based on their issue concentrations, rhetoric and support 
groups.  
Socio-structural explanations of regional party generation and success have both strengths and 
weaknesses. On the one hand there is greater variation in economic conditions across states 
and time and in social structures across states to help explain the varying fortunes of regional 
parties in different parts of the same country. This is not the case for within-country 
comparison with regard to institutions. Also, social and economic characteristics are also 
more easily measured than institutional variations. Among the weaknesses, however, we can 
count the difficulty in explaining relatively short-term fluctuations in support for regional and 
regionalist parties by recourse to social differences which are far more stable over time. 
Another question which this line of research often under-specifies is that of how political 
elites and parties decide which cleavage becomes emphasized and why it appears to them 
worth instrumentalizing. It is also not always clear which role, according to these models, the 
organizational capacities of parties, attitudes of voters, which are presumably much more 
amenable to change over time, and which role the media and structure of the political media 
establishment play in determining the relative importance of regional identities and issues 
(beyond economic grievances).  
Some of these shortcomings are addressed by the scholarship which emphasizes 
organizational-institutional factors in explaining regional party creation and persistence. 
 
2.1.2 The Organizational-Institutional Perspective 
The second broad theoretical perspective on the proliferation of smaller regional and 
regionalist parties and the consequent differentiation of subnational party systems from each 
other and from the national level party system, places organizational aspects and institutional 
characteristics of politics at the heart of its explanatory models. These often more elite-based 
models focus to a greater extent than the previous literature on the characteristics of parties 
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and party elites as strategic actors and on the rules (institutions in the sense of North 1990), 
which structure the competition of parties for votes and power. It deals among other things 
with nationalization or regionalization as an issue of party aggregation (thus adopting a micro-
level perspective from which to explain macro-level differences) and the institutional 
incentives which lead to higher or lower levels of aggregation. One institutionalist view 
(Filippov et al. 2004) deals with the influence of systems of government (presidentialism 
versus parliamentarism) on party aggregation. This view holds that presidential systems of 
government, due to the requirement of building electoral majorities for winning this highest 
office, incentivize the building of national parties which can ensure electoral victories in 
direct presidential elections. Another view (Brancati 2005) argues that within the category of 
parliamentary systems of government, countries with bicameral legislatures will likely see 
lower levels of party aggregation and the existence of more and possibly stronger regional 
parties since the second chambers, even or especially if indirectly elected by a state legislature 
as in the case of India, can offer regionally strong parties a way of influencing national 
policies without having to try and establish a national support base and winning legislative 
majorities in the lower chamber of the national legislature. A third argument often advanced is 
that plurality-based voting systems encourage the formation of cross-district formation of 
parties and actually encourage the formation of nationwide party platforms while list-based 
voting systems enable regional parties to capture seats in the national legislature by focusing 
on narrow, regionally concentrated support bases.  
Another view synthesizes explanations based on economic, social and institutional factors. 
This perspective, applied to the Indian case by Sarangi (2005) following the theoretical work 
by Scholte (2000), holds that globalization and economic liberalization have eroded the 
capacity of states to steer some of the more important developments in society. This, in turn, 
reduces the incentives for parties to focus their mobilization efforts on a message emphasizing 
national policies related to economic growth. Instead it is suggested that they had greater 
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incentives to target regionalist and ethnicist sentiments (Sarangi 2005: 78). Organizationally, 
this view argues, this change would be underpinned by a decreasing reliance on traditional 
intermediary organizations like trade unions for mobilizational support and greater reliance on 
primordial groups such as caste and religious organizational networks (ibid.). We will argue 
below (2.6, 2.7) that economic wealth and along with it the timing of the formation of a 
national government composed of regional parties are crucial to the explanation of 
regionalization and institutionalization of politics in India. Hence, we stress the importance of 
both socio-economic factors as well as institutional factors in the explanation of 
regionalization. 
 
2.2 The Importance of Party System Institutionalization 
This study is based on the assumption that the relative level of regionalization of party politics 
is crucially linked to the level of institutionalization of parties and party systems. This 
assumption is not to imply that Chhibber and Kollman (2004) are wrong in their assessment 
of the incentive structure and the dynamics of changing party competition. Instead one of the 
underlying assumptions in this study is that incentives do indeed change over time. Secondly, 
we also assume that different regions in India may require different explanations. However, 
we also assume that the changes in the incentive structure in some regions have as much to do 
with variables related to the political process itself as they do with the changing structure of 
government in the form of increased decentralization as Chhibber and Kollman assume. Such 
changes in the process include, among others, changes in the frequency of breakups of 
political parties and in the frequency of successful campaigns of independent candidates. The 
following stylized model captures the essence of the idea that the level of the (de-
)institutionalization of politics (such as the institutionalization of parties and party systems) 
constitutes one discernible nexus between characteristics of the social sphere (like changing 
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social structures and processes) and characteristics of the political sphere (as for example the 
regionalization or nationalization of party politics). 
 
Figure 2.1: Linking Regionalization to Social Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relative institutionalization of party politics is conceptualized as influenced by the social 
sphere in the form changes or stability in the informational, demographic, economic and 
attitudinal context of society. It, in turn, influences and is influenced by the relative levels of 
regionalization, i.e. the regional differentiation party politics and the increasing support for 
regional rather than for national parties. “Informational context” refers to the way in which 
political news and information are disseminated in a society. Parties and individual candidates 
may find themselves in a context of relative monopolization or plurality of sources of 
information. Likewise, the types of outlets for information can have significant influence over 
the amount and type of political communication which takes place. Changes in the media 
landscape, such as among other things that from print media such as newspapers and political 
magazines to audiovisual media like radio or television and finally to the internet as a new 
type of delivery platform have profoundly changed party-society relations in many countries 
where they have occurred (Wolinetz 1988b: 312; Carson/Hood 2008; Nair 2003). 
 “Demographic context” incorporates characteristics of the populations in the States in 
which parties and candidates compete. These include features such as urbanization levels, 
Social Change 
Relative 
Institutionalization Regionalization 
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levels of migration (immigration, emigration), size of the population, age structure etc. When 
we recall the basis of the “Congress system” (close ties to local elites, vote banks etc.), it is 
relatively easy to see how changes in the demographic make-up of populations could break up 
the established patterns of institutionalization and also lead to a regionalization of party 
politics. To take but one example, it seems reasonable to assume that in more anonymous 
urban settings the traditional patterns of caste-based voting, common to more rural areas and 
an essential ingredient of Congress dominance, would be less regularized. Hence, more 
urbanized States might show less regularized voting behavior which opens up opportunities 
for newly emerging candidates and parties, thus also contributing to a possible regionalization 
of party competition. Other links are, of course, conceivable as well. Chapters four and five 
will deal with these in the respective theoretical overviews and reviews of working 
hypotheses.  
 The term “economic context” describes the characteristics of a States’ economy at the 
macro- as well as at the micro-level. It could be measured by reference to such traits as 
poverty levels, levels of income inequality, size of the economy and income per capita. People 
in poorer States might vote differently compared to voters in richer regions in order to protest 
against their perceived lower quality of life. Or voters in rich regions might want to vote for 
newly emerging protest parties because they feel exploited by the poorer regions within a 
country. Both ways of reasoning might lead voters to stray from established national parties to 
newer more regional political forces. 
 The concept of an “attitudinal context” defines the range of dispositions which voters 
share within the context of one particular region and which may well differ across various 
regions. These dispositions concern attachments to different levels of territorial political 
organization (locality, region, country etc.), attachments to specific political parties or the lack 
thereof, levels of national pride as well as levels of trust in different levels of government or 
in political parties. Parties have to take these attitudinal dispositions of voters into 
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consideration when tailoring their messages to specific audiences in the various regions. 
Depending on whether stark inter-regional differences exist or not, parties, which will almost 
always emerge out of a local or regional context rather than be national phenomena from the 
outset, will be able to repeat and adapt their message to render them competitive across 
different regions, or not. 
 On the basis of the linkage between institutionalization and regionalization as 
distinguishing characteristics, several models of party competition are conceivable. Figure 2.2 
illustrates these below. 
 
Figure 2.2: Models of Party Competition 
 Predominant Political Forces 
 National Mixed Regional 
Level of Institutionalization 
High 
I. Stable 
National 
Party 
Competition 
II. Stable 
Mixed Party 
Competition 
III. Stable 
Regional Party 
Competition 
Low 
VI. Unstable 
National 
Party 
Competition 
V. Unstable 
Mixed Party 
Competition 
IV. Unstable 
Regional Party 
Competition 
 
 
Stable party competition between mainly national parties is the first type (I). This type of 
competition can be found in States such as Gujarat today where the Indian National Congress 
and the BJP are the main competitors for votes in national and regional elections. The same 
type of competition exists in West Bengal between the Communist Party of India and the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) in a government coalition and the Congress Party as the 
main opposition party. Though both communist parties have in recent years occasionally been 
classified down to State party status, both have almost always been national parties according 
to the classification used by the Election Commission of India. The national pattern also 
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prevails in Madhya Pradesh with the BJP and INC as the main competitors. The second type 
of competition (II) is constituted by stable competition between national and regional parties, 
such as is the case in Andhra Pradesh, where Telugu Desam Party and Indian National 
Congress compete, or as it has developed in Manipur with contests between the Congress and 
the BJP as national parties competing with MSCP and Manipur People’s Party. Stable 
exclusively regional party-based party systems (type III) are a rarity in the early 1990s in 
India, but are found in Tamil Nadu (with the DMK and the AIADMK) where no national 
party has headed a State government since the 1970s. Type IV party systems show patterns in 
which predominantly regional political forces, such as regional parties or independent 
candidates, undergo frequent changes and are thus relatively less institutionalized. The case of 
Mizoram shows this, where initially independent candidates fared strongly initially, but were 
soon replaced by unstable regional parties, first by the PPC, then the Mizo National Front, to 
be followed by the MNF(N) and lately the MZPC. Meghalaya is another example of this 
phenomenon. On the other hand, Maharashtra is an example of shifting competition between 
national (INC, BJP) and regional parties (NCP, Shiv Sena) (type V), as is Arunachal Pradesh 
with a volatile competition between independents and first the Janata Party and the INC in the 
1970s, then Arunachal Congress and PPA. The emergence and demise of the JD caused 
considerable change in the configuration of party competition in Rajasthan. Comparable 
developments are discernible in Bihar and Orissa, but with opposite effects. The breakup of 
the national Janata Dal into regional constituent successor parties has lead to increased 
regionalization in those two states, moving party competition from type VI to type V 
competition, while Rajasthan moves from type VI closer to type I.  
 The extent to which there is a confluence or disjuncture of institutionalization and 
regionalization will depend on a number of factors which are in part immanent to the political 
system and in part determined by the social context in each State. As mentioned earlier, these 
different perspectives on the relative nationalization or regionalization of parties and party 
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systems in part guide the choice of terminology which each of those studies’ follows. To 
clarify what will be understood by these and other terms, the following section will provide a 
summary of the most important terms and concepts. 
2.3 Terminology 
The following terms and concepts will guide the subsequent discussions on the regionalization 
and institutionalization of party politics in India. They are meant as working or nominal 
definitions rather than as real definitions aimed at accurately capturing reality. As such, they 
serve the very specific purpose of aiding the inquiry at hand rather than providing a general 
framework for the study of these and other issues in cross-national comparisons. 
Consequently, they should be seen as tools aiding in the structuring of our thinking about 
party politics rather than ends in themselves. The drawbacks as well as the advantages of this 
approach to conceptualization and terminology as well as possible alternatives to the 
framework used here are obvious and the following comments will address them in turn 
where necessary. 
 
2.3.1 Parties 
Numerous definitions have been advanced by equally numerous scholars for what we refer to 
in conventional shorthand as “political parties”. As an example of earlier work in political 
sociology, Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 5) see in parties “alliances in conflicts over policies and 
value commitments within the larger body politic”. It emphasizes the socio-structural 
dimension in societies (“parties in the electorate”) and conflictual dynamics. However, it 
under-emphasizes the modes of conflict resolution and the specific nature of issues parties 
concern themselves with as opposed to other collective actors. Alan Ware echoes this 
sociological view of political parties to some extent. However, he also departs from it, saying 
that they are “bodies that intend to exercise some control over a state, and that its members are 
not simply the representatives of a single interest in society” (Ware 1987: 16). He thus 
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acknowledges that it would be simplistic to mechanistically equate parties with individual, 
somehow organic interests or cleavages in society. Schultze (2001:350) defines political 
parties as “groups of like-minded citizens united by the goal to implement common political 
ideals” (own translation). This is a relatively open definition which can consequently 
accommodate a variety of temporal, regional and functional settings. On the other hand, 
unlike most definitions, this one does not make any reference to the instruments which these 
groups use to advance their goals, in democratic systems, of course, most commonly 
elections. Carles Boix has defined parties as “vote-seeking and governing teams of candidates 
and parliamentarians” (2007: 500). This definition does incorporate implicitly the notion of 
elections to win office and governing as the most important and central activities of parties. 
However, Boix’s definition is similar to that of Giovanni Sartori (Sartori 1976: 64), who 
defined parties as “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing 
through elections, candidates for public office.” It is also open to an inclusion of non-
programmatic parties characteristically found in many non-Western political systems. 
Sartori’s view, while otherwise useful, seems to be too narrow in that he argues for restricting 
the study of parties to only those entities which are “relevant”, i.e. those which have an 
influence on actual government policy-making. Too narrow a definition would also not be 
desirable since it thus excludes nascent organizations (Pedersen 1982). Our working definition 
will understand parties to be groups of individuals (members, candidates, legislators), most 
often though not always united by common ideologies, identities or other modes of linkage 
with sections of the electorate, seeking to place candidates into public office through 
competitive (or non-competitive) elections. As will be highlighted later, in some instances 
independent candidates, i.e. candidates who are not affiliated with any political party when 
contesting elections, will be treated as “parties of one” (or proto-parties) for the sake of 
convention in the existing literature (see for example Chhibber/Kollman 2004), e.g. when 
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calculating the levels of fragmentation of political systems. Where this apparent inconsistency 
with the mentioned definition obtains, this will be highlighted and justified as appropriate. 
 
 
2.3.2 Party Systems 
It is a truism that much of politics is ever changing and much of the change is ephemeral 
(Niemi/Weisberg 2001: 371). What is true about politics more generally is equally true about 
party politics in particular. Similarly, just as not only party politics changes over time and 
across space, so do the common definitions (Nohlen 2004: 65). To us, the concept of a “party 
system” describes the salient characteristics of party competition, cooperation and other inter-
party relationships, such as the absolute number of parties competing in a given political 
system, the relative strength of parties in terms of seats or votes, patterns of ideological 
distance between parties or groups of parties in systems where ideology is an important 
distinguishing feature.4 Thus, shifting the focus from parties to party systems allows one to 
move from analyzing organizational actors to analyzing structures or relationships between 
actors (Kitschelt 2007: 523). The emphasis on structures does not, however, imply an undue 
insistence on the invariant patterns of inter-party relations over time. Stability does not 
necessarily imply stagnation. Rather, party systems when properly understood, allow us to 
discern the relatively more enduring features and patterns in relationships, also across political 
systems, amid a sea of change and idiosyncrasy.  
 
2.3.3 Regionalization 
Contrary to the approaches discussed above (section 2.1), we will take “regionalization” (or 
“de-nationalization”) to refer to the process and current state of increasing (or decreasing as 
the case may be) levels of electoral support for regional/non-national parties and their 
                                                
4 See Nohlen (2004:65) for an even more exhaustive list of elements that characterize party systems. 
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candidates. This process is most easily discernible from the vote shares which such candidates 
and parties receive in elections. Our understanding of regionalization or de-nationalization is 
therefore somewhat different from that of Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Chhibber and 
Kollman (2004). They see nationalization (the logical pendant to regionalization) as a state of 
congruence between national structures of party competition and disaggregated structures of 
competition at the level of states or even districts. Since one of the main objectives of this 
study is to find out under which conditions small parties with mainly regional support bases 
receive votes in regional-level elections, a narrower and more specific definition such as those 
used in these other studies seems unduly restrictive.  
 
2.3.4 Regional Parties 
A variety of definitions for the term “regional party” have been proposed over time. Some 
studies simply do not explicitly address the issue of what exactly distinguishes regional from 
other parties at all (Jolly 2007). The studies which do address the distinction essentially fall 
into three camps: Those, which define “regional” as referring to the contraction of electoral 
support to a few regions, those looking to the types of issues advocated by parties and to 
whether they use regionalist rhetoric and concentrate on issues relevant only to specific 
regions of a country, and those which are characterized by both concentrated electoral support 
and regionalist ideology. Most studies use the concentration of electoral support in one or a 
few regions as a point of departure, thereby linking these parties to an essential element of 
their activities (elections) (van Houten 2001: 10; Ziegfeld 2007). Some studies based on party 
documents such as manifestos center their definitions (at least in part) on the issues advocated 
and on whether they are tailored to specific regions, or even overtly regionalist or even 
secessionist (e.g. Müller-Rommel 1998: 19). Empirical studies often combine the 
concentration of electoral support with issue concentration on regionally confined issues or a 
regionalist ideology, for example by defining regional parties as competing in one or more 
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regions of a country, but not in all, and as those parties, whose agendas focus on regional 
issues (Brancati 2005: 149-150). Demands by those types of “regional parties” include, 
though not exclusively, those for regional autonomy. By incorporating the issue orientations 
of parties into their definition, these studies acknowledge that the importance of the “regional 
dimension” transcends the realm of competition and the boundaries of decision-making 
power, which in this conception actually become an issue in themselves. Thus, the latter 
approach distinguishes between regional as “regionalized” parties, and regional as 
“regionalist” parties. 
The approach taken here is somewhat closer to the first variant in relying on the extent to 
which parties are competing and are receiving support in elections, however, for a variety of 
reasons it departs in a very important way from it. The present study will employ the 
distinction between “national parties” and all other parties, as used by the Election 
Commission of India, laid out in the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 
1968, as it applied from 1977 to 2000, the period of investigation. The diagram below situates 
our understanding of the term “regional party” in the context of the Election Commissions 
terminology. 
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Figure 2.3: Types of Parties in India (ECI Classification) 
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Criterion: continuous involvement 
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Criterion: recognition as a State 
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Criterion: State-level electoral 
success 
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latest Lok Sabha or State 
Assembly election from 
State in question, or 
- four percent of seats in 
Lok Sabha from State in 
question, or 
- one in thirty MLAs in 
State Assembly. 
 
Regional Parties 
Parties 
 
Source: Own visualization based on definitions in Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 
(as in force between 1977 and December 2000). 
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Hence, we will consider candidates of regional parties to be those candidates not affiliated 
with national parties as defined by the Election Commission of India. This means that national 
parties (the counterparts to the parties under consideration here) are by no means parties 
which contest elections in all States, which would be the requirement for example under 
Brancati’s definition, but rather a special case of State parties, namely those State parties 
which have achieved recognition as such in four or more States.  
 
2.3.5 A ote on Alternative Terminology 
Alternative measures for classifying political parties and party systems as regionalized or 
nationalized have been proposed. Unfortunately, they are mostly not transferable to analyses 
of subnational elections since the top-down cross-national view taken by the studies in 
question have led them to employ national-level election data to classify subnational parties 
and party systems as regionalized/nationalized or not. However, for the present purposes it is 
the subnational elections and party systems, and not regional variations in national elections 
which are of interest and hence a classification based on national aggregate results could be 
misleading. Based on data from Indian national elections, Ziegfeld (2007) employs a 
normalized version of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index to first calculate the relative 
dispersion of votes for each party across subnational districts (at the State level) to then 
calculate the average regionalization score of parties in the given party system, ranging from 0 
to 1. He then chooses cut-off points to classify parties into the two categories “national” and 
“regional” (Ziegfeld 2007: 3). Thus, a regional party is a party which has a normalized 
Herfindahl score of 0.18 or higher. Semi-national parties have scores higher than 0.1 and less 
than 0.18, while national parties are defined as having a score lower than 0.1. Similar 
approaches, although primarily restricted to the analysis of entire party systems rather than 
individual parties, have been taken on the basis of indices rooted in the Gini coefficient 
(Bochsler 2005; Jones/Mainwaring 2003; Croissant/Schächter 2008). 
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There are clear disadvantages to the definition of regional parties (and in consequence 
regionalized party systems) as used in this study. One drawback of this context-dependent 
institutional definition is the low comparability of the detected levels of regionalization 
(measured here by vote shares of regional parties), since they depend on the present Indian 
definition of what regional parties are. This poses an impediment to the easy comparison of 
this study’s findings to other cross-national studies’ findings. Another problem is the fact that 
this notion of regional parties allows parties to change labels over time, thus allowing for 
relatively drastic changes in regionalization scores when a successful regional party is 
reclassified by the Election Commission as a national party in a subsequent election, thus 
moving its vote shares into that category’s column. Over time, since 1968 the definition used 
by the Election Commission of India has also changed. After recent amendments in 2000 and 
2005, according to the Symbols Order, parties looking to be classified as national parties now 
need to win six instead of four percent of the votes in four or more States, making for 
complicated re-classification if one wanted to extend this analysis beyond the year 2000. 
However, for the period under consideration here (1977 to 2000), the criteria remained 
constant. Since there are also advantages to this classification scheme into “national” and 
“non-national” (or “regional”) parties, it will be used here. For example, since the research 
interest here is not whether national aggregate party systems mirror party systems based on 
disaggregated national level elections, but rather under which conditions parties which are 
primarily regionalized in their support bases contribute an increasingly large (or, conversely, a 
decreasing) share of votes in elections, the present definition seems sufficient. Other 
definitions relying on party ideologies for classification, such as speeches or manifestos, are 
impractical for this purpose in the Indian context due to a lack of availability of such 
documents for a sufficiently large number of India’s many hundreds of present and historical 
parties. Additionally, with regard to the assessment of the level of regionalization, the present 
approach is, rightly or wrongly, more conservative than those of both van Houten or Brancati 
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and also Ziegfeld. Van Houten does not strictly employ a criterion related to ideology as 
necessary to define a party as “regional”, but rather contends that those parties are 
characterized by not contesting in all subnational units of a country (van Houten 2000: 8). For 
India, this would mean that all parties except the Indian National Congress are regional parties 
by those standards. Such a dichotomy which excludes all but one party from one of the 
categories seems less than helpful since this would in effect amount to a study of the 
determinants of the Congress vote more than anything else. Compared to Ziegfeld’s 
trichotomous classification of parties into regional and (semi-)national parties and the 
consequent results for the extent of the nationalization of the national party system in India 
over time (Ziegfeld 2007: 26) based on his normalized Herfindahl indicator, the present 
approach tends to overestimate the nationalization and underestimate the regionalization of 
the vote in national elections. Across national elections, fewer parties are usually classified by 
Ziegfeld as “national” compared to this study’s approach based on the criteria of the Election 
Commission of India. Ziegfeld’s approach yields vote shares for national parties 
approximately two-thirds of the approach used here, while the vote shares for non-national 
parties are about 1.5 times higher for Ziegfeld. Nevertheless, as figure 2.4 (below) shows, 
there is a high correlation between the vote shares classified as belonging to national parties 
according to the two approaches (r-square=0.98).  
 
Figure 2.4: !ational Parties in India (1977-99) according to Ziegfeld (2007) and Pehl 
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While the criteria used by the Election Commission of India naturally have no roots in any 
empirical considerations, and may therefore seem somewhat arbitrarily chosen, such tradeoffs 
in terms of choosing cut-off points to determine which parties are sufficiently nationalized in 
their support bases to warrant labeling them “national parties” is by no means unique to the 
approach chosen here. Other studies, such as that of Ziegfeld (see the discussion above) also 
have to make such choices to come to a classification. The cut-off points are to some extent 
always arbitrary since the goal is to classify the cases, which are located on a continuum of 
degrees of nationalization into two or three mutually exclusive categories. Finding logical or 
convincing generally accepted standards is therefore always challenging. The approach of 
employing the Election Commission’s distinction on the other hand has the added advantage 
of connecting very closely with the established literature on regional parties and the 
regionalization of party politics generally in India, which also draws on the same distinction. 
Lastly, political actors, such as political parties or leaders actually see the classification of 
parties into national, regional and unrecognized parties as supremely important since it allows 
parties (depending on the respective classification) to monopolize election symbols on ballots 
within States or even nationally. In a country with forty percent illiterate people, this issue 
carries major importance for parties since these symbols are part of their “brand recognition” 
strategy to allow voters to find their preferred candidates on the ballot paper. Using this 
classification scheme thus provides the additional benefit of actually linking a social scientific 
term to the ground-level reality of the institutional framework of party competition within 
which the actual organization we intend to study work.5  Overall, therefore, the use of the 
ECI’s classification seems a sensible strategy to employ since the alternatives, as shown 
above, are much more labor intensive while not yielding vastly different results and since the 
official classification is actually meaningful not only to observers, but rather to the actors on 
the ground as well. 
                                                
5 See Butler/Lahiri/Roy (1995) for an overview of cases and debates surrounding the issue of party labels and 
how much importance Indian parties attach to them and therefore to the official classification scheme. 
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2.3.6 Institutionalization 
Since Huntington (1968) provided the first more comprehensive approach to defining and 
stating the importance of institutionalization as a dimension of party systems, a number of 
definitions have been provided. Most of the more recent studies (Mainwaring/Scully 1995; 
Kuenzi/Lambright 2001, 2005; Basedau/Stroh 2008; Croissant 2008) have taken a multi-
dimensional approach to conceptualizing party and party system institutionalization. A variety 
of criteria have been proposed over time to distinguish institutionalized from non-
institutionalized parties and party systems. Rose and Mackie (1988: 535), emphasizing mainly 
organizational continuity as evidenced from electoral data, propose calling those parties 
institutionalized which operate through cross-local organizational structures, run candidates in 
national elections and exhibit a sufficient level of continuity in doing this over successive 
electoral cycles. In an earlier formulation, Huntington (1968: 420-423) had focused on the 
adaptability of party organizations and systems as a key criterion of institutionalization of 
parties in rapidly changing societies. He contended that the older and stronger parties were, 
the more adaptable they and the party system would have to have been, and the higher the 
level of institutionalization would have to be. To assess this adaptability he classified party 
systems according to whether the average age of parties exceeded 30 years or not. Similarly, 
Mogens Pedersen (1982: 14) also emphasizes the importance of the age and lifespan of parties 
in the analysis of party system change. Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 5-14), in their now 
classic reformulation of earlier scholarship, define the term through recourse to five criteria: 
stability of party competition, stable roots of parties in society, stability in the ideological 
positioning of parties vis-à-vis each other, the publicly held belief that parties are legitimate 
and the development of sufficient organizational capacity by parties. Stability of competition 
is measured by Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 6) through analyzing volatility rates of parties 
and party systems, i.e. the rates of change in seat or vote shares of parties from one election to 
the next. Their study also proposes to track organizational capacity with reference to the 
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membership and available resources of parties. They also propose to take the vote share won 
by political parties which were founded before a certain date (in their case 1950) as indicative 
of the extent to which parties had formed stable roots in society by winning the more or less 
durable support of certain sections within society. A number of ways in which the age of 
parties can be used to measure the degree of institutionalization have been discussed. Table 
2.1 (below) provides an overview of the different ways in which party age has been used to 
define the level of institutionalization of party systems. 
 
Table 2.1: Party Age and Party System Institutionalization – A Conceptual Overview 
Parties 
Considered 
Avg.  Absolute Age Avg. Age 
Relative to 
Independence 
Age Relative 
to First 
Election 
Percentage of 
Votes Won 
All (no cut-off) Huntington 1968; 
Maguire 1983 
Basedau/Stroh 
2008 
Basedau/Stroh 
2008 
 
Top Vote 
Getters (2-5) 
Kuenzi/Lambright 
2001, 2005 
n.a. n.a.  
Parties 
Exceeding 
Certain Vote 
Shares 
Mainwaring/Scully 
1995; Croissant 
2008; Kuenzi/ 
Lambright 2001 
n.a. 
Schneider 
2009 
 
Parties 
Founded by a 
Specific Year 
   
Mainwaring/Scully 
1995; Kuenzi/ 
Lambright  2001, 
2005 
 
For the purpose of this inquiry, we will employ three dimensions to characterize levels of 
institutionalization. They will be introduced in greater detail in chapter four. Previous studies 
have in part used similar labels for different dimensions. Chapter four will discuss the 
divergence of this approach from previous approaches. The first dimension to our 
understanding of institutionalization is the “rootedness” of political parties, i.e. the 
development of stable roots of parties. Unlike previous studies we will understand this to 
mean the extent to which parties have acquired stable levels of support from particular support 
groups over time. This broad concept encompasses also issue areas which other studies have 
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subsumed under the label “stability of party competition”, such as electoral volatility, 
undoubtedly the result of changes in political support between two elections. The second 
dimension will be labeled “organizational continuity”. It encompasses characteristics of the 
party system which include the continued availability of particular parties or party-backed 
candidates over time as well as a new indicator measuring the weighted relative age of 
different party systems over time. We will specifically follow Schneider (2009), building in 
part on Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) and employ a modified age indicator to measure 
relative levels of institutionalization along this dimension over time. A third dimension we 
will investigate is that of “partyness” or partisan penetration of elections. It speaks to the 
importance of voters in SMDP electoral systems putting their faith in party-backed rather than 
in independent candidates and has two empirical prongs to it: Trust in parties as institutions 
and actual voting for party-less as opposed to party-affiliated candidates. This last dimension 
will in part be operationalized in the form of an indicator (vote share of independents) not as 
frequently used due to its comparative irrelevance in other SMDP electoral systems, which 
however is particularly useful for the comparative analysis of party systems in India. The 
relative infrequency of its use indicates the declining role of independent candidates versus 
party-backed candidates in simple plurality elections around the world. In most electoral 
systems independents over time register declining voter support. To the extent that the 
backing of successful candidates by political parties is empirically frequent and party-backed 
candidates outperform non-partisan candidates in elections, we will take this to indicate that 
party backing is increasingly necessary for electoral success and hence will take the 
penetration of elections by parties as indicative of an institutionalization of parties and the 
party system.  
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2.4 Regionalization in Indian Party and Electoral Politics: Relevance and Literature 
The debate over the growing importance of regional parties in politics is intimately connected 
to the longstanding discourse on the nature of Indian national identity. As the more recent 
controversies surrounding issues such as the depiction of Indian history6 and the role of 
minorities in school textbooks as well as the conversion of tribals and other disadvantaged 
social groups to Christianity (Frykenberg 2003: 17-18) illustrate, identity issues are part and 
parcel of political discourse and mobilization by certain parties in India today. Some would 
also argue that regional identity is constitutive of Indian national identity as a whole 
(Mitra/Singh 1999; Linz/Stepan/Yadav 2007: 103). We will take up this argument again in 
chapter five when analyzing regional identity and party support. Astute observers such as 
Rajni Kothari (1970: 9-10) saw India’s nation-building process as driven by two simultaneous 
trends: administrative-political re-structuring and the inter-penetration and growth of multiple 
power centers as well as new elites through a re-configuration of social and economic 
structures. The history of India’s federalization and multi-cultural identity construction, of 
course, predates its independence from the British Empire (Rothermund 1995: 391-393). As 
much as India is home to multiple nationalities, it is home of multiple officially sanctioned 
types of nationalism (Nanda 2006: 59-60), a political-secular type at the national level and a 
more openly cultural type at the regional level. Interestingly, as a number of examples like 
that of the fruitless competition of the Akali Dal against a then-dominant Congress Party in 
the Punjab in the 1950s and 1960s indicate, one should be careful to note that the increased 
importance which regional variants of socio-political identities have played through the 
decades does not automatically translate into support by adherents of regional identities for 
regional or regionalist parties (see also Fickett 1971: 196-197). In the early decades, only the 
most militant Sikhs, but certainly not all Sikh voters placing importance on Sikh identity 
supported the Dal in Punjab elections (Jalal 1995: 170-171). This only changed after a change 
                                                
6 See Jaffrelot (1998: 287) for an overview of the roots of this controversy.  
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in leadership in both the Akali Dal and Congress Party in the Punjab in the 1960s. 
Nevertheless, for better or worse, examples such as that of the Akali Dal and its militant 
regionalist supporters have shaped much of our thinking about the nexus between regional 
identity and regional party support. While we can not investigate this point further here, but 
chapter five will return to the issue of this seemingly natural nexus. 
The scholarship on the growing importance of regional parties and regionalization of politics 
as a general trend in India has increased substantially since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, 
regional party ascendance is not new, but rather part of an ongoing process of party system 
change in India since 1967 (Fickett 1971: 193). In the early phase of post-Independence 
politics India’s party landscape was dominated by the Indian National Congress. This phase 
was characterized by the Congress Party’s winning the largest vote shares and seat shares in 
both the national and State level elections. During this period, voters had no strong incentives 
to vote for opposition parties since in most districts the opposition candidates received 
significantly lower vote shares than most Congress candidates, making it unlikely that they 
would ever be elected. This division ensured that the Congress remained the winning party 
across the States throughout India, a characteristic of Indian politics which Riker (1982) 
attributed to the INC being a Condorcet winner, i.e. the second-most preferred party of many 
strategic voters as well as the first preference of many sincere voters. Talented politicians also 
had no incentives to run as opposition candidates since the status of the INC as the party of 
the freedom struggle and its effective political machines throughout the regions made running 
against Congress candidates a risky strategy. In consequence, opposition politicians frequently 
joined the Congress party between elections or even during election campaigns to avail 
themselves of this Congress advantage (Spiess/Pehl 2004). The fluidity of the party system 
increased significantly after the 1967 national and State elections. In the Lok Sabha elections 
of that year the Congress Party suffered losses in both seat and vote shares. In the State 
assembly elections of the same year, it lost power in seven of the eight States holding 
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elections that year. Most of the parties winning the State elections in 1967 were splinter 
factions of the Congress, however. These parties did not have a long history or distinctive 
support base or ideology. 
In earlier decades the dominance of the Congress Party, which was challenged in 1967 for the 
first time, was seen in two different ways by comparative political scientists, almost as an 
oddity in the theorizing about parties and party systems (Pempel 1990) and about democracy 
and democratization (Vanhanen 1981). On the other hand, scholars specializing in the study 
of Indian politics came to accept the “Congress system” (Kothari 1964) as the prism with 
which and natural point of departure from which to analyze party politics in India. Changes in 
the configuration of party systems and electoral dynamics were consequently seen as 
aberrations from the norm of one-party dominance instead of natural trends in pluralist 
politics. This latter view also led to the emphasis on the decline of Congress dominance rather 
than on natural regional differentiation in party system development in an extremely 
heterogeneous social context. This theme of decline became the keyword for many 
subsequent studies on party system change in India at the national or State levels (Candland 
1997; Chhibber 2005; Herring 1988; Manor 1978).  
In recent years, however, there have also been numerous studies placing the development of 
party system regionalization and nationalization in a more firmly comparative context. Thus, 
the change and stability of the party system structure, in particular at the national level, have 
recently been discussed from the perspective of the comparative study of party politics. This 
has been done using insights from cleavage theory (Chhibber/Petrocik 1989: 207-208; 
Yadav/Palshikar 2006; Sridharan/Varshney 2001: 234-235). Patronage and clientelist linkages 
have also been drawn on to explain party-voter connections over time (Chandra 2004; Mitra 
1991; Krishna 2002: 152-162). Lastly, as was mentioned before, candidates’ and parties’ 
institutional incentives to aggregate (or not) beyond certain territorial levels of electoral 
competition in order to win power and office through generating majorities in legislatures has 
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also been emphasized in previous research (Chhibber/Kollman 1998, 2004; Sridharan 2003). 
Three themes have pervaded these studies in terms of important changes to the configuration 
of Indian party systems: the already mentioned decline of the INC, the rise of the Bharatiya 
Janata Party as an India-wide Hindu-nationalist alternative to the Congress Party, and the 
growth in number and strength of regional parties as alternatives to the national INC, BJP and 
the Left Front. The questions most often posed in this context are: Why no longer Congress 
and why the fragmentation into so many parties? One explanatory approach to answering this 
problem is advanced by Biplab Dasgupta (2002: 43) who essentially sees the genesis of so 
many regional parties as a direct reaction of voters to the over-centralization of government 
and of the Congress Party. This view is echoed somewhat differently by Christopher 
Candland (1997) who contends that through this negative trend within the Congress Party the 
traditional leadership structures and linkages with voters became weakened in the long-run. 
Chhibber and Kollman (2004) on the other hand see the springing up of so many regional 
parties as a strategic response to a new incentive structure due to decentralized governance 
after 1989 and essentially as a failure to aggregate beyond the district level. The activation of 
previously relatively dormant cleavages in North India and the consequent ethnification of 
party politics since the 1980s through the mobilization of lower caste voters have also been 
used frequently to account for the proliferation of small and regionally concentrated parties.7 
Other possible explanations, which however have been comparatively less frequently used to 
explain regional party proliferation, can be derived from the literature on secessionism and 
uneven development. Given that some regions of India are developmentally well below the 
all-India average, one way in which this uneven socio-economic development might play out 
is through a resentment in poorer regions leading to the proliferation of parties purporting to 
work for the mitigation of this inequality. Alternatively, the literature on secessionism in 
multi-cultural societies suggests that the more advanced regions might seek to advance their 
                                                
7 See Hasan 2002, Subramanian 2002, Chandra 2004, Gowda/Sridharan 2007, Brass 1997 (162-163) for accounts 
of the development of this new form of mobilization.  
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interests more forcefully feeling that poorer regions of the country are a drag on their 
development (Hale 2000). This, in turn might lead voters in those wealthier parts to vote for 
exclusionist and regionalist parties claiming to better be able to protect those regions’ interests 
than national umbrella parties would. A final view is provided by those studies of party 
system change emphasizing modernization aspects such as urbanization, changes in 
technology and ways of communicating and disseminating information (for the role of media 
see Mair 1997: 106). Chapter five will take up some of the approaches once more when 
developing hypotheses regarding the determinants of regionalization of party support at the 
aggregate and individual level. 
 
2.5 Institutionalization in Indian Party and Electoral Politics: Relevance and Literature 
Studies about the institutionalization of the Indian party system and individual parties have 
focused on a number of dimensions. We already referred to the literature on the “Congress 
system” of one-party dominance. Apart from comprehensive assessments of the reasons for 
Congress dominance, studies have been conducted analyzing levels of volatility between 
national and State-level elections. Some of these studies have shown that aggregate volatility 
has declined remarkably over time (Betz 2005). This decline to single-digit levels of volatility 
in national elections is low even by the standards of European party systems which have in 
many cases even longer histories than that of India. The decline in aggregate volatility, at first 
glance, seems to suggest that there is growing stability in the support for political parties and 
in their competition with each other. However, these results are misleading to some extent, 
because the decline is somewhat an artificial construct because splinter parties were re-
constituted at each election to calculate their vote shares as if they had not split or merged 
between elections (Betz 2008: 623). Other studies have analyzed seat-based volatility to 
investigate the extent of seat retention in Indian legislatures. This was particularly interesting 
since throughout the 1990s only around 50 percent of seats in the Lok Sabha were won by the 
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same party in two successive elections (Kumar 2004: 368). Throughout the 1990s, the INC’s 
seat retention rate went down from 74 percent to 36 percent; the BJP’s remained relatively 
solid between 51 and 63 percent, while the Left Front’s also remained comparatively steady 
between 44 and 37 percent. More recently, the connection between electoral volatility and the 
fiscal health of States has been investigated as well (Chhibber/Nooruddin 2008). The results 
of this research suggest that States with more limited fiscal resources experience greater 
electoral volatility over time. The explanation advanced by Chhibber and Nooruddin is that 
fiscal resources allow State governments to absorb economic shocks and thus help incumbent 
parties stabilize their support over time unlike resource-strapped incumbents. 
Another strand of scholarship, taking the idea of potentially contradictory pulls between 
aggregate volatility and individual-level volatility seriously (cf. Mair 1983) has focused on 
volatility in Indian electoral behavior at the level of the individual voter. Schneider (2009: 34) 
demonstrates the variation across States of the average level of partisanship from as low as 
31.7 percent in Chhattisgarh in 2004 to 67.3 percent in Tripura. The stability in voting from 
one election to the next likewise varies enormously across States, from as low as 11 percent in 
Mizoram to 68.2 percent in Tripura, both interestingly neighboring States in India’s northeast. 
With approximately 48 percent partisan attachment India is comparable to the median of the 
sample of West European and other OECD countries contained in Huber et al.’s comparative 
study of partisanship. Another study based on public opinion data by Oliver Heath (2005) 
showed relatively high individual-level levels of volatility in Haryana, Punjab and Tamil 
Nadu (50+ %), and relatively lower levels in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan (< 20%). Based 
on a controversial method of ecological inference from aggregate data based on a “most 
possible estimator”, which is similar to “maximum likelihood estimation”, Vanderbok (1990) 
estimates that, for the previous decades’ national elections, only about 50 percent of voters 
across all States vote for the same party in two successive elections. Heath (2005: 190, 196) 
also shows that volatility in national elections declines with sharper polarization across States, 
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that volatility increases with a more fragmented party system context in which voters live and 
that volatility is significantly influenced, unsurprisingly, by party disappearance between two 
elections. We will deal with this and the other factors again in greater detail in chapter four. 
Overall, the tenor regarding the institutionalization of Indian politics and electoral behavior is 
fairly unanimous in emphasizing the discontuities in party and candidate fortunes and vote 
choice. The other dimension of interest to us, the ratio of independent versus party-backed 
candidates in elections, has received less attention in comparison. We will outline the 
importance of these factors in greater detail in chapter four. One important school of thought 
on that importance and that of India’s institutional setup for the relative levels of 
nationalization stresses the changing incentive structure for party aggregation due to 
increasing decentralization measures. This is the view taken by Chhibber and Kollman (2004).  
 
2.6 Theoretical Framework of the Study 
As mentioned before, one of the most important contributions to the debate has come from 
Pradeep Chhibber and his collaborators (Chhibber/Kollman 2004; Chhibber/Murali 2005). 
The key questions which this line of work has asked are:  
- Why does a country’s (national) party system consist of national and/or regional 
parties? 
- Which role does federal power-sharing play in structuring a national party system? 
 
The rationale underlying it is the goal of exploring a cross-national puzzle (the structure of 
national party systems) by way of a small-n comparative and diachronic study, thus holding 
many institutional and social variables constant within each case, but providing variation 
across the macro-contexts (countries). Within each case however, quantitative data are 
gathered and analyzed statistically to test the overarching arguments. The argument they 
develop connects them to similar work done on the nationalization of electorates (see for 
 58
example Caramani 2004). According to Chhibber et al. (2004) the development of parties 
under a common label is a process central to the account of the formation of national 
electorates in North America and Europe. Following Cox (1997), and deviating from a 
cleavage-based theory of the emergence and stabilization of parties, the underlying theory in 
Chhibber’s and Kollman’s analysis explains inter-district coordination and the development of 
party labels by reference to the rules that structure the selection of executives and distribution 
of decision-making power. The nationalization (and by implication regionalization) of party 
and electoral politics, preliminarily defined as an increase in the support of national or 
regional parties coupled with the choice of regional party labels instead of national party 
labels by voters and elites, is conceptualized by Chhibber and Kollman (2004) and others as 
incentivized or disincentivized depending on the structure of the respective political system’s 
setup. One of their most important assumptions is that party aggregation of district-level 
candidates across different regions into national parties is incentivized by a system of 
centralized spending and decision-making power (Chhibber/Kollman 2004: 72-73). They 
postulate that “[p]arty aggregation up to the national level occurs with the mutual 
reinforcement of these two functions. […] national parties require these necessary conditions: 
national policy-making power by the parliament, and voters’ having a stake in which policies 
are adopted. Party loyalties by both candidates and voters reinforce each other and line up 
neatly” (Chhibber/Kollman 2004: 73). Put simply, they posit that the voter’s utility from 
voting for a national party (UN) exceeds the utility from voting for a regional party (UR) if the 
political power is concentrated in the national level government (UN > UR). Thus, they explain 
nationalization and de-nationalization as strategic responses to incentives provided by the 
location of authority at different levels of government. By comparison, this actor and strategy 
focus yields a more narrow argument than that in Caramani’s study of nationalization of party 
systems in Western Europe (2004). 
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Instead of incorporating the role and changing nature of cleavages into their analysis, 
Chhibber and Kollman attempt to control for them. They focus on party system change over 
time within their cases. They are thus able to isolate the effects of changes in centralization 
while variation in the electoral system and social cleavages appears to be minimal. Using 
long-term district-level data on national elections from the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom and India they construct the fairly convincing argument that the ebb and flow of 
governmental authority in periods of centralization and “provincialization” explains temporal 
variations in party aggregation. When the national governments have more authority – 
including taxing and spending power, larger sizes of governments, wider constitutional 
competences and control over economic planning and the development of the economy – 
candidates will have an incentive to coordinate to influence policies by grouping under a 
common party label, and voters are more likely to support candidates with a national party 
label. On the other hand, “decentralization or provincialization creates the space for local or 
regional parties to form and survive” (2004: 172). Figure 2.5 maps the design of Chhibber and 
Kollman (2004) in the wider context of the study of multi-level party and electoral politics. 
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Figure 2.5: Theoretical Framework of Candidate-Party System Linkage: 
 
 
 
 
Despite its solid and elegant construction, a number of issues remain outside the purview of 
Chhibber and Kollman’s study. Their study addresses questions related to the incentive 
structure influencing the choice of regional versus national party labels in federal democratic 
polities (the logic of aggregation), the relative importance of different levels of politics for 
elites to compete at (the logic of contestation), as well as to the performance of regional and 
national parties in national-level elections (the logic of structuration). The logic of 
aggregation and contestation are particularly important for their theoretical framework 
explaining party formation and strategies. However, they restrict themselves to analyzing 
cross-national differences at the national level of electoral politics and party systems. This 
leaves several questions open for further investigation. What remains understudied in their 
framework, for example, is the regional variation of regional party participation, success and 
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maintenance at the subnational level of elections. Also, the extent to which there are regional 
differences in each of their observed national elections is measured across elections due to the 
composite nature of their indicator, but due to their specific research interests, the reasons for 
these differences remain relatively underdeveloped. This study seeks to rectify this to some 
extent by examining both the levels of elections as well as opinion about parties and identity 
simultaneously. Why, however, should we address the sub-national level of elections and 
party systems given the relatively convincing argument Chhibber and Kollman make based on 
the cross-national analysis? The following section addresses this important issue in more 
detail. 
 
2.7 An Alternative Approach to Understanding Party Choice in Federal Systems 
An important assumption of Chhibber and Kollman’s (2004) study is that increased 
decentralization of power over decisions and spending provides incentives for both voters and 
elites to focus on subnational units as important arenas of political competition. In turn, this is 
supposed to further the use of regional rather than national party labels and lowers the 
incentives for the formation of cross-regional parties competing in multiple subunits and in 
national level elections. According to this view, the respective regionalization or 
nationalization of party systems (as observed in national elections) presents itself merely as an 
issue of failed party aggregation. This invites the question of whether this assumption holds 
equally across various regions within multicultural federal democratic countries or whether 
important boundary conditions impinge on this logic and determine the extent to which 
different regions’ electorates respond in the expected manner to the incentives provided. This 
question also arises from the fact that Chhibber and Kollman assume that changes in the 
economy and its governance accompany and reinforce this trend in the political incentive 
structure. It would appear that considering the disparity in wealth across different regions 
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within a federal democratic country would be crucial to our understanding of such modifying 
boundary conditions. A simple stylization can illustrate this problématique. 
Let SDE= {a, b, c, d} denote a set of four possible configurations of the allocation of power 
(decentralization) and fiscal equalization between a central government and regional 
governments. Political and administrative decentralization are taken to mean the allocation of 
substantial types and amounts of decision-making power to governments below the national 
level. Fiscal and economic equalization are understood to mean the deliberate attempt of 
governments to devise policies aiming at lessening gaps in economic development and 
financial resource wealth between various regions of a country, e.g. through economic 
planning and redistribution of revenues from richer to poorer subunits. Such equalization 
would therefore imply greater interference of the central government in regional affairs. For 
sake of simplicity, let us assume that two stylized scenarios are conceivable: political and 
administrative decentralization can or can not obtain and fiscal and economic equalization 
mechanisms can or can not obtain. The configurations are illustrated in a 2x2 format in table 
2.6 (below).  
 
Figure 2.6: Possible Configurations of Decentralization and Equalization 
 
Political and Administrative 
Decentralization 
Yes No 
Fiscal and 
Economic 
Equalization 
Yes a d 
No b c 
 
It seems fairly reasonable assumption to make that voters in a genuinely democratic system 
generally would prefer political decentralization to be in place, since this would presumably 
enable stronger transparency and responsiveness of politicians who would be accountable to 
smaller constituencies compared to decision-makers far removed from local realities in a 
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national capital.8 It also stands to reason that political elites would prefer such a decentralized 
setup since this would downsize their constituencies which they have to groom for their own 
re-election and would minimize the need for them to deal with issues related to parts of the 
country which they do not know or care about. At this point, however, it seems reasonable to 
assume that views of voters as well as elites in rich and poor regions would diverge. 
 
2.7.1 Rich Regions 
It seems plausible that voters in a rich region of a country would prefer greater regional fiscal 
and economic policy autonomy since this would likely enable regional elites to keep wealth 
generated in the richer parts of the country within those regions instead of re-allocating that 
wealth to poorer parts of the country. Hence, they would in principle be more averse to fiscal 
and economic equalization lessening their relative advantages over poorer regions. Richer 
regions, unlike poor regions, stand to lose through a leveling of economic wealth differences 
on the one hand and are more likely to be able to meet the challenges of public goods 
provision on their own without the help of outside financial sources such as transfers from 
other States. We assume for voter i in rich regions that the following preference relations (Pi) 
regarding the outcomes hold: 
  1. b Pi a    2. b Pi c   3. b Pi d   4. a Pi  c   5. a Pi  d   6. c Pi  d 
The derived utilities from the different scenarios for voter i would be as follows: u(a)=2, 
u(b)=3, u(c)=1, u(d)=0. The consequence therefore is that voters in a rich region of a federal 
democratic country would prefer a combination of political and administrative 
decentralization with fiscal and economic autonomy over all other possible configurations, 
and would prefer a system with fiscal and economic equalization coupled with no political 
decentralization the least, i.e. to none of the other configurations. Expressed in terms of their 
                                                
8 This theoretical assumption has some empirical support in the findings regarding trust in and allocation of 
responsibility to subnational level governments in India as well (cf. Chhibber/Nooruddin 2004; Mitra/Singh 
1999). 
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respective utility (u) for a voter in a federal democratic political system, who is living in a rich 
region within a country the relations between different outcomes would be:  
u(b) > u(a) > u(c) > u(d). 
 
2.7.2 Poor Regions 
Turning to voters in poor parts of a country, the utility calculus would conceivably look 
somewhat different. For a voter in such a region, especially in a region with a low overall 
level of socio-economic development and significant disparities between that region and other 
regions, the improvement of her material well-being would likely be the gravest concern 
regarding political issues. It is reasonable to assume that voter j in a poor region of the same 
country would also prefer decentralization to centralization for the above stated reasons. 
However, the same voter would prefer some sort of equalization mechanism to be in place 
which could mitigate the adverse effects she would experience on account of residing in a 
poor part of the country. Since wealth disparities would likely be the most important concern 
for this voter, we assume that given the choice between either political decentralization or 
fiscal and economic equalization, voter j would prefer the latter. We can thus assume the 
preference relations over the various possible outcome configurations to look as follows: 
  1. a Pj d    2. a Pj b   3. a Pj c   4. d Pj b    5. d Pj c   6. b Pj c . 
 
Therefore, u(a)=3 , u(b)=1, u(c)=0 and u(d)=2. This preference relation is stylized in order to 
simplify the comparison between the alternative scenarios. It is not intended to suggest that 
since u(c)=0, voter j would derive no benefits from living in a system such as that of scenario 
c), or that her benefits from scenario b) would be worth exactly double those of scenario d). It 
is nevertheless intended to illustrate in a simplified fashion the overall preference relations 
and the ranking of utilities derived from these scenarios. In consequence, it is assumed that 
voter j would prefer a decentralized system with an equalization mechanism to any other 
 65
possible configuration and would prefer a system with no decentralization and no equalization 
to none. Expressed in terms of individual utility, the relations would look as follows:  
u(a) > u(d) > u(b) > u(c). 
 
2.7.3 Empirical Implications 
There are a number of empirical implications based on our theoretical model of political 
choice in federal polities. For the Indian case, of course, not all of the scenarios contained in 
SDE are historically realized. Instead, India’s development is best characterized by a change 
from a system with political centralization and fiscal and economic equalization (scenario d) 
until the late 1980s to one with increased decentralization and much less fiscal and economic 
planning and equalization (scenario b) today. Thus for voters in rich States, the situation in 
terms of their preferences over decentralization and equalization has improved over time, 
while for a voter in a poor State, the overall situation has worsened. In pre-1990 India, voters 
and elites in rich States found themselves in the least preferred scenario and would 
conceivably be relatively unsatisfied with the institutional set-up and the consequences it 
produces. As such, voters as well as elites might conceivably be the most likely to look for 
alternative political options relative to the dominant Congress party and might turn to regional 
parties to advance their goals. In the post-1990 scenario, the configuration of decentralization 
combined with decreased equalization would actually be akin to the most preferred option for 
voters and elites in rich States, affording them greater political control over regional matters 
while decreasing the transfers to other poorer States and allowing for greater autonomy over 
regional economic planning and the fallout of increased growth. Voters and elites in poor 
States, on the other hand, find themselves in their second-most preferred situation with regard 
to decentralization and fiscal and economic equalization in the pre-1990 political system in 
India where the Finance and Planning Commissions ensured some measure of comparable 
development and when economic growth was sluggish across most of the States still. This 
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would suggest that the best strategy for these voters and elites to influence national politics 
where most of the important decisions were made at that time would be through national 
parties which wield influence at the Union level and can use their electoral leverage to 
influence redistribution in the interest of poor regions. For voters in poor regions the post-
1990 configuration of Indian politics represents the second-least preferred scenario and would 
conceivably leave them less satisfied compared to before. In this situation, regional parties 
could conceivably seem to be an attractive option for dissatisfied voters, who are no longer 
convinced by the INC’s claim to represent their best interests and for voters who feel their 
stake in national politics is decreasing with decreasing federal and cross-States transfers 
alleviating their local and regional problems.  
At the same time, the fact that regional parties from the 1990s onwards play a much greater 
role in Union level politics as well suggests that voters also might vote for them in greater 
number irrespective of their regional economic and political contexts since the disincentives 
of voting for regional parties which wield no influence nationally are thus lessened. Overall, a 
number of expectations arise from this theoretical view of party choice in India’s multi-level 
setting: 
1. We expect a greater level of support for non-national parties and candidates 
after 1990 due to the already existing support for those in rich regions and 
newly arising support in poor regions, 
2. We expect to see an greater presence of non-national parties and candidates 
in rich regions compared to poor ones prior to 1990, 
3. We also expect to see a greater presence of non-national parties and 
candidates in poor States after 1990 compared to before 1990. 
Chapter 5 will employ these expectations and other related ones as assumptions in testing 
hypotheses regarding the regionalization of party systems. 
 
 67
2.8 Subnational Comparison, Case Selection and Time Frame of the Study 
As a final point to this preliminary conceptual outline of the study, the question why the 
subnational comparative method should be used to analyze party system characteristics, such 
as regionalization and institutionalization, merits a brief discussion, as well as which cases 
should be included and which time period seems appropriate for the study.  
 
2.8.1 Level of Analysis.  
Studies of the institutionalization and regionalization of party systems have so far mainly 
focused on cross-national comparisons of the levels of nationalization or institutionalization.9 
Given the natural draw exerted by the successive waves of democratization in a multitude of 
countries following World War II, in the 1970s and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
especially the interest in the consequences of institutional design on process characteristics 
such as the consolidation and institutionalization of party politics in comparative perspective 
is not surprising and has produced many interesting and influential studies relevant to the 
Indian example as well. Nevertheless, the question of a “nationalization” or a 
“regionalization” equally naturally implies a possible focus on intra-state comparison of these 
phenomena. After all, the (dis-)aggregation and the (de-) institutionalization of patterns of 
voting behavior for parties or candidates and party organization are multi-level and multi-step 
processes, especially in federalized political systems. This somewhat logically implies the 
question of regional variations of these processes within countries after dealing with inter-
country comparisons of national-level patterns, as many previous studies have done. A brief 
comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the two types of comparative inquiry can 
help to establish some caveats relevant to this study.  
A distinct advantage of the cross-national approach is the greater generalizeability of the 
findings to other national contexts since the findings are already derived from comparisons 
                                                
9 See the literature review on the subjects in sections 2.3 and 2.4 for relevant examples from the cross-national 
literature. 
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across countries. The cross-national approach, when conducted within a large-N design, also 
allows quantitatively oriented researchers to incorporate more variables and hence allows 
them to make stronger statements about the relative causal importance of these variables than 
within-country designs at the regional, rather than the local level, where degrees of freedom 
issues can quickly occur. Despite these strong points, however, there are also clear 
disadvantages to the cross-national study of party politics. Often, data (on parties or 
otherwise) lack comparability across countries due to different methods of data collection and 
organization being employed by different national agencies or researchers. It is often also 
difficult to integrate longitudinal aspects into cross-sectional research designs due to the often 
extremely varied background of cases (countries) with regard to historical developments 
(Shalev 2002: 5; Tarrow 1996: 389). Conversely, holding certain factors constant to examine 
other causal variables’ importance independently from these is much easier to accomplish in 
an intra-state comparison. Also, as was mentioned earlier, theories developed at the national 
level of comparison leave important blind spots and can have logical implications 
necessitating an analysis of intra-country dynamics (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 30-31). 
These implications may or may not be easily testable cross-nationally. In this case, the 
assertion that decentralization brings new opportunities for States and State-level politicians 
and leads voters to place greater emphasis on State-level elections, logically begs the question 
whether this is true across all regional contexts in countries which undergo political and/or 
economic decentralization and differentiation. Subnational comparison therefore seems a 
plausible method of investigating the theoretical propositions of prior cross-national research 
developed at the national level further. 
Although cross-national research thus seems to have some limitations, a premature focus only 
on regional-level dynamics could be equally detrimental. Trading the advantages of cross-
national analysis of many countries for an analysis of comparatively few regions within a 
country quickly leads to problems of combining too many variables with too few cases 
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(degrees of freedom problem). Similarly, treating regions within countries as separate cases 
under investigation is also ridden with problems since (particularly in more centralized 
polities) regions are not truly independent of each other and hence cross-case correlation 
poses problems in the analysis (Snyder 2001: 95; King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 222). Finally, 
situating an inquiry at the subnational level between national and local politics further 
complicates the modeling of causal dynamics since both local and national factors will likely 
influence regional dynamics. On the other hand, subnational comparisons of party (system) 
institutionalization and regionalization offer a number of advantages compared to cross-
national studies. Firstly, it is a truism that aggregates always obscure lower level relationships 
to some extent (Snyder 2001: 98), as the contrast between the views of Duverger’s Law and 
Indian party politics based on national-level and constituency-level data shows (Duverger 
1954; Chhibber/Murali 2006). Hence, breaking down the assertions regarding national 
patterns into their regional or even local constituent parts will always seem to be a worthwhile 
test of their validity. Subnational comparisons can aid us in increasing the visibility of the 
masked variation obscured by national aggregates. Furthermore, some countries, such as 
China, India and the United States, are internally so diverse and geographically so large that 
regional variation masked by national aggregates is likely to be even larger than in the cases 
of much smaller countries, all of which are usually treated as equally important cases due to 
the logic of cross-national research design. Another feature of more recent methodological 
debates, the triangulation or “mixed methods” design, is easier to accomplish and particularly 
likely to yield solid findings when applied to a single country since especially the qualitative 
part thrives on in-depth knowledge of a particular political context which is likely to be 
deeper the smaller the number of cases under investigation.10 Kohli (1987) has argued and 
Jenkins (2004: 3-4) has echoed this position, that such countries as India constitute quasi-
laboratories in which comparisons across different regions can act almost ideally as 
                                                
10 See Lin/Loftis (2005) for an overview of a variety of debates on the uses of mixed methods designs. 
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experiments played out by real world political actors, thus allowing for rather controlled 
environments in which such things as institutional, historical and developmental differences 
are greatly minimized between units of analysis when compared to cross-national 
comparisons.  
While the specific methods used to analyze the pertinent questions regarding the 
institutionalization and regionalization of politics will be dealt with in the subsequent 
chapters, overall, subnational comparison seems to offer enough advantages and sufficient 
ways of dealing with its dangers to make this study a valuable case study contribution to the 
comparative literature concerning party and electoral politics in developing countries. 
 
2.8.2 Case Selection.  
This study will analyze party politics in 25 of India’s 35 States and Union Territories, 
including Delhi. It will thus cover over 90 percent of India’s total population. We have chosen 
to exclude two important cases from our analysis here. The first is the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. As is well known, Jammu and Kashmir is part of the ongoing territorial dispute over 
the status of the territory of the former princely state of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. 
It is also a State with a special constitutional status in India and has been plagued by electoral 
corruption and intervention of the central government in State-level affairs since the first 
elections were held there. As such, for the period between 1977 and 2000 it does not seem 
advisable to include this case in the analysis since it merits separate treatment. Punjab has also 
been troubled with civil strife and in particular in the 1980s the neutrality of the elections 
merits doubt, not least because of the political violence between Akali supporters and the 
State and central governments which impeded regular democratic processes in the State for 
protracted periods of time. As such a meaningful comparison between pre-1990 elections and 
post-1990 elections in Punjab seems useless. 
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2.8.3 Time Period.  
We choose to investigate the time period from 1977 to 2000. According to most analyses so 
far, 1977 marks an important turning point in Indian electoral and democratic history and thus 
forms the starting point of a new era in Indian party politics. In 1977 for the first time a party 
other than the Indian National Congress, namely the umbrella-like Janata Party, was able to 
win a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha and to form a national government. Also, 1977 
marks the end of the authoritarian phase of emergency government under Indira Gandhi who 
had forced the Emergency in June of 1975. This experienced helped to galvanize the 
opposition parties into a more united front in an attempt to oust the INC from power in 1977. 
We also choose to end our investigation in 2000 since three of the most important States in 
India underwent a territorial reorganization with the separation of Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and 
Chhattisgarh from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively. This reorganization 
marks the first important break in the configuration of politics since the 1970s. 
Contemporaneously with it came changes in the rules for the recognition of political parties 
(Nikolenyi 2008) and significant changes in the demographic composition of the now smaller 
States of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh which make a comparison especially of 
the socio-demographic factors influencing politics in India to the pre-2000 period difficult. As 
such the cut-off point of 2000 appears acceptable. A third temporal consideration in 
conducting this study is that of the division of the period from 1977 to 2000 into two separate 
phases, that from 1977 to 1989 and that from 1990 to 2000. As already alluded to above, India 
has undergone significant changes since the 1970s which have affected the conduct of politics 
in manifold and important ways. Three reasons make the division into these two time periods 
appear sensible. Most importantly, in 1989 a coalition of regional political parties, the 
National Front under the leadership of V.P. Singh won a sizeable share of votes and seat in 
the general elections and was able to form a government with the outside support of the BJP. 
This fundamentally altered the incentive structure for regional party leaders who no longer 
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had to aim at aggregating smaller parties to larger Congress-like parties in order to be able to 
have a say in national government. Regional allies such as the AGP from Assam, TDP from 
Andhra Pradesh and DMK of Tamil Nadu were now able to influence national policy making 
in a coalition with the Janata Dal, a newly formed umbrella party made up of mainly 
regionally based formerly independent parties under the new label. Secondly, 1989 is also the 
year in which for the last time the Prime Minister of India was a member of the Nehru-Gandhi 
family since Rajiv Gandhi was subsequently assassinated in 1991. Moreover, from 1990-91 
onward, the financial situation of State governments worsened progressively throughout the 
1990s (see chapter three below). The year 1989 seems an important breaking point also 
because in 1990, the V.P. Singh government announced its intention to implement the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission (1978) regarding the necessity of reservations 
for disadvantaged social groups. On the one hand this move prompted a renewed era of 
opportunity for lower caste people to advance their own interests in a society where the odds 
against their social advancements were generally stacked against them, and on the other hand 
it allowed a party such as the BJP to use this pro-poor, pro-lower caste policy to shore up 
increased support among upper caste Hindus infuriated at this policy change. The importance 
of this nation-wide change in policy and the “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot 2003) which it 
sparked among the lower castes in North India can hardly be overstated. Lastly, it was in 1989 
that the Bharatiya Janata Party made the first really significant gains in seat share at the 
national level with 86 seats, up from just two in the 1984 general elections. Lastly, splitting 
our investigative period into two time periods also seems sensible since in 1991, the 
Congress-led government of Prime Minister Rao initiated a significant restructuring of India’s 
governmental setup by introducing the Seventy-third Amendment Act (1992). This 
amendment to the constitution formalized village government and accelerated decentralization 
of decision-making in certain issue areas. Coupled with increased liberalization of the private 
and public sectors of the economy and a scaling back of planning since 1991, this is certainly 
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another major change occurring in the early 1990s. All in all, therefore, dividing our analysis 
into a pre-1990 and post-1990 phase makes sense. 
Chapter three will now outline some of the pertinent institutional and socio-demographic 
features relevant to Indian politics and society without which any understanding of both 
would necessarily remain incomplete. 
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3. The Institutional Framework and Socioeconomic Context of Multi-level Politics in 
India 
 
In order to be able to understand the functioning of party politics and opinions about 
government as well as strategies of actors in the pursuit of power, acquiring an overview of 
the multi-level landscape of Indian politics is needed. This chapter will outline some of the 
central features of Indian government and politics within which candidates and parties operate 
and thus contextualize the process features within the salient structural framework of politics.  
The institutional roots of India’s federal political organization predate its independence 
by several decades. Both before, as well as during the colonial era, multiple centers of power 
had been in existence parallel to and competing with each other.11 India’s federal constitution 
has equipped national-level institutions with extraordinarily expansive powers. This design 
dates back to the reasoning of the drafters of the constitution which deemed a strong central 
government indispensible in the face of the prevailing political turmoil of the immediate pre- 
and post-independence period (Brass 1994). The basic structure of the political system is 
detailed in Appendix A. 
 
3.1 India’s Federal Political System 
India’s system of government is divided between the central level and the federal units 
(currently 28 States and seven Union Territories, including the National Capital Territory of 
Delhi).12 While the States and the National Capital Territory enjoy considerable freedom in 
political decision-making, Union Territories are administered directly by the central 
                                                
11 For more detailed accounts of the history of the idea of “shared rule” and federalism in the Indian context, see 
for example Asher/Talbot (2006: 247-251), Bhattacharya (2005) or Rothermund (1995: 391-393).  
12 The difference between States and Union Territories is the stronger control exercised by the Union government 
over the, mostly comparatively small, Union Territories. Although some Union Territories have an elected 
assembly, the executive function is exercised by an appointed Governor and not an elected Chief Minister as 
would the case in the States. Delhi was conferred a special status by amendment of the Indian Constitution in 
1991, being jointly administered by the Union, the three local municipal corporations, and the elected NCT 
government as the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Jammu and Kashmir enjoys a special status among the 
States in accordance with Article 370 of the Constitution of India, in that it is guaranteed its own constitution and 
that Article 356 regarding the imposition of President’s Rule does not apply to that State. 
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government through a Lieutenant-Governor. The Constitution of India provides for a 
relatively clear vertical division of powers between the central legislature (referred to in 
Indian usage as the Union government) and the State legislatures, both constituted through 
direct elections, respectively, in the Seventh Schedule (see Table 3.1 below). The Union 
controls the ‘Union list’ consisting of areas which involve inter-State relations, national 
security and foreign affairs. Subjects of primary interest to the regions, called the ‘State list’, 
encompassing law and order, culture and education, are under the jurisdiction of the states. 
The ‘Concurrent list’ contains subjects of overlapping interest like land reform, or issues 
related to the cultural or religious minorities where both center and state can make laws with 
the understanding that in case of conflict the central laws will take precedence. Subjects not 
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, called the residuary subjects, come under central 
legislation. Each list also mentions how the two governments can raise income through 
taxation. In case of a conflict of jurisdiction, the center or the State can move the Supreme 
Court to have the point of law in question authoritatively interpreted.  
 
Table 3.1: Constitutional Allocation of Important Legislative Competences 
Level Competences Enabling Provision 
Center Defense, Atomic Energy, Foreign Affairs, 
Citizenship, Transport Infrastructure, Currency, 
Postal Service, Banking/Insurance, Electoral 
Laws, Organization of the Supreme Court, 
Taxation in various areas, Natural Resources, 
Union Territory matters, Residual Competences 
Art. 246 + Seventh 
Schedule (List I), 
Constitution of India 
State Public Order/Police, Public Health, Local 
Government, Agriculture, Water, Land, State 
Public Services, Taxes (on agricultural income, 
on land etc.) 
Art. 246 + Seventh 
Schedule (List II), 
Constitution of India 
Local Economic Development, Social Justice (subject 
to State laws allocating powers of local self-
government to village councils) 
Art. 243 G + 
respective State 
legislation 
Center + States 
(Concurrently) 
Criminal Law/Criminal Procedure Law, 
Marriage and Divorce Law, Transfer of Non-
agricultural Property, Civil and Commercial 
Law, Economic/Social/Family Planning 
Art. 246 + Seventh 
Schedule (List III), 
Constitution of India 
Source: Constitution of India and Basu (1985). 
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A number of formally constituted organizational units execute the responsibilities 
allocated to them under this constitutional framework, thus sharing power over the affairs of a 
political territory in two senses, namely having joint or competing powers over the same 
matters on the one hand, and having separate powers over separate matters on the other. Ideal 
typically, in a multi-level system of government, such as a federal political system, the 
sharing of powers of this kind can be conceived of as involving three types of sharing (in the 
sense of separation, but also fusion): vertical power-sharing, horizontal power-sharing, and 
transversal power-sharing. The term vertical power-sharing describes the allocation of certain 
issue areas and competences in decision-making to be handled by the central, subnational or 
the local level of government, denoting the division-aspect of the allocation of powers, rather 
than the fusion-aspect. Thus, the vertical division of powers is depicted in Table 3.1, 
allocating specific matters to either one of three levels of government. The term horizontal 
power-sharing describes the sharing of competences at the central and at the subnational 
levels between the branches of government, denoting the fusion- as well as the separation-
aspect of sharing mechanisms, but also the sharing of powers between subunits in a federal 
political system in its separation and fusion variants. Transversal power-sharing refers to, 
among other things, a structural and processual sharing of powers between levels of 
government, be it that it involves in addition to the superior-level unit one or more or all 
lower-level units (such as the States in the Indian case) in its fusion-variant. The non-
hierarchical and informal modes of joining levels and units through coordinating mechanisms 
are part of the phenomenon which has been described in another regional context as “political 
interlocking” (Scharpf) in cooperative federalism.13 These three types of sharing power 
involve, respectively, both hierarchical, as well as non-hierarchical modes of coordination of 
action, as represented in Table 3.2 below, and also both formal and informal institutions. 
                                                
13 Scharpf (1976) has thus described the German political system as one of political interlocking 
(Politikverflechtung) between levels of federal government and separate units at the same level by virtue of more 
or less non-hierarchical and informal coordinating institutions.  
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Table 3.2: Typology of Power-sharing Arrangements in Multi-level Systems 
 
Type Mode of Coordination Levels/Units Involved 
Vertical Non-hierarchical Center-State levels 
State-Local levels 
Horizontal Non-hierarchical Center (branches) 
States 
Transversal Hierarchical and Non-
hierarchical 
Center-State levels 
Source: Authors’ depiction. See also Mitra/Pehl (2010). 
 
At the Union level, a tripartite sharing out of power, referred to here as a horizontal 
allocation of powers, allocates different functions of government to the executive (President 
and Council of Ministers/Prime Minister), the legislative (Union Parliament, consisting of Lok 
Sabha and Rajiya Sabha), and the judicial branches of government (Supreme Court of India), 
although there is significant overlap in personnel between the legislative and the executive 
branches, with the requirement being that the Prime Minister and all other Ministers must be 
Members of either House of Parliament or lose their office after a period of six months (Art. 
75, Constitution of India). This division is mirrored to some extent at the State level with the 
institutions of Chief Ministers and their Cabinets, State legislatures (unicameral in most, 
bicameral in some States) and the respective High Courts (although High Courts apply Union, 
as well as State laws, and their organization is highly centralized).  
Another set of units, such as the Finance Commission, the Inter-State Council, the 
Inter-State Tribunals, the National Development Council and a number of informal fora serve 
as bridging mechanisms between the levels of government and between States, thus enabling 
transversal, as well as horizontal power-sharing. The Inter-State Council, which was set up 
for the first time in accordance with Article 263 in 1990, is a body, which aims, though it does 
not have legislative or administrative powers, at enabling consultation between governments 
at the State level and at the Union level. It is constituted, according to the Presidential Order 
of 1990, under which it was set up, by the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers of States and of 
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those Union Territories which have Legislative Assemblies, Governors of States under 
President’s Rule and eight Union Cabinet ministers.14 Although its primary function has to 
date been the debate on reforming Center-State relations, the Inter-State Council also 
functions as an important policy forum for informal discussions on other political issues 
affecting the States.  
The Finance Commission is an organizational unit performing the task of giving 
recommendations to the President of India regarding the distribution of taxes between the 
Center and the States and between the States (Article 280, Section 1, Constitution of India). It 
is appointed regularly by the President of India every five years and consists of five members. 
Its importance in the process of regulating intergovernmental fiscal relations is enhanced by 
the fact that the recommendations, although not formally binding, have quasi-binding 
character, and by the fact that many of the most expensive tasks of government, such as social 
matters or public order are, directly or indirectly (through local government programs which 
are financed from State funds), State-level matters. This issue will be taken up once more in a 
later section. The Inter-State Tribunals are ad hoc bodies infrequently constituted under the 
Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 in order to solve disputes over the use of water 
resources which cross the boundaries between States, such as rivers. In the past, these 
tribunals had been slow in their decision-making and ineffective in the area of implementation 
of decisions. With the Amendment Act of 2002, the period within which decisions now have 
to be reached has been shortened to a combined maximum of six years. Due to the increase in 
the need for and the depletion of freshwater resources on account of increasingly rapid 
agricultural and industrial expansion, as well as urbanization, and the more frequent disputes 
arising from inter-State competition for this resource, these bodies can be expected to acquire 
an increasing importance and visibility in the future.  
                                                
14 Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, http://mha.nic.in/AR01CHP7.htm (accessed on 12/04/2006). 
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Another institution which served informally as a mechanism for the coordination of 
political action between the central and subnational levels of government in the past was the 
Indian ational Congress during the period of its electoral and administrative dominance.15 
Through its internal processes of decision-making and channels of communication, this 
system facilitated coordination between the leading politicians at the center and in the regions 
until the second half of the 1960s, thus joining decision-making elites at the national and State 
levels and enabling some degree of transversal power-sharing. Figure 3.1 below illustrates 
the areas of issue-overlap in decision-making by the Union and the State governments and the 
location of the various formal and informal institutions and coordinating mechanisms serving 
as instruments of policy coordination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 See Kothari (1964) for the description of the ‘Congress system’ and its working until the mid-1960s. 
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Figure 3.1: Issue-overlap, Power-sharing, and Coordination of Action of Center and 
States 
 
 
 
Source: Mitra/Pehl (2010). 
 
 
 
3.2 Evolution of Federalism: The Changing !ature of Center-State Relations 
 
The framers of the Indian constitution, as mentioned above, were keen on federalism as a 
functional instrument for the creation of an Indian nation and a strong, cohesive state (Brass 
2000). The leading politicians of the immediate post-Independence state were besieged by 
threats to India’s security both from outside and inside, and faced the challenge of 
development by having perceived and chosen centralized economic planning as an optimal 
method to reach that objective. Thus, both for constitutional and political reasons the 
institutionalization of a strong federalism in the Indian system appears to have been seriously 
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compromised from the outset. Nonetheless, the political process was able to adapt to this 
design and in many, though not all cases, mollify it when necessary to safeguard regional 
interests. 
 
3.2.1 Historical Phases of Evolving Center-State-Relations 
The first phase of federalization of the political process lasted from the time of Indian 
independence to the mid-1960s. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru took democracy seriously 
enough to face the enormously expanded Indian electorate (in 1951, in the first general 
election held, both to the national Parliament and the provincial Assemblies), providing for 
full and free participation in the election. The Indian National Congress, which had already 
embraced the federal principle back in the 1920s by organizing itself on the basis of 
Provincial Congress Committees based on linguistic regions, institutionalized the principle of 
consultation, accommodation and consensus through a delicate balancing of the factions 
within the ‘Congress System’.16 It also practiced the co-optation of local and regional leaders 
into the national power structure,17 and the system of sending out Congress ‘observers’ from 
the center to mediate between warring factions in the provinces, thus simultaneously ensuring 
the legitimacy of the provincial power structure in running its own affairs, and the role of 
central mediation.  
The second phase of development of Indian federalism began with the fourth general 
elections (1967), which drastically reduced the overwhelming strength of the Congress party 
in the national Parliament to a simple majority and saw nearly half of the states moving out of 
Congress control into the hands of opposition parties or coalitions, caused a radical change in 
the nature of center-state relations. No longer could an imperious Congress Prime Minister 
afford to ‘dictate’ benevolently to a loyal Congress Chief Minister. But, even as the tone 
became more contentious, the essential principles of accommodation and consultation held 
                                                
16 See Kothari (1970). 
17 See Lijphart (1996) for a theoretical exploration of this consociational strategy. 
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between the crucial 1967-69 period of transition. The Congress-dominated center started 
cohabiting with opposition parties at the regional level. The balance was lost once the 
Congress party split in 1969 and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi adopted the strategy of radical 
populist rhetoric and strong centralized personal leadership. In consequence, the regional 
accommodation, which had been possible by way of the internal federalization of the 
Congress party, was subsequently eroded. However, after the authoritarian interlude of 1975-
1977, which, in both law and fact reduced India's federal system to a unitary state, the system 
reverted to the earlier stage of tenuous co-operation between the center and the States.  
With the prolonged period of coalition governments at the center, the third phase in the 
federalization of Indian politics began at the end of the 1980s. Regional parties, such as the 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of Tamil Nadu, or the Rashtriya Janata Dal of Bihar, have 
asserted their interests more openly over the past one-and-a-half decades of coalition and 
minority governments. This increased assertion of regional parties also at the national level 
had forced even the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which led the ruling coalition in 
the thirteenth Lok Sabha until 2004, to be solicitous in its, at least symbolic, adherence to the 
norms in center-state relations established by its predecessors, including hallowed principles 
of the Indian Union as the three-language formula which exists more on paper than in reality 
of educational planning, but is treated as sacrosanct by most political parties, in spite of its 
advocacy of Hindi as India’s national language during the long years in the opposition.18  
 
3.2.2  Fiscal Federalism and Center-State Relations 
Another area in which relations between the center and the States have changed is that 
of the availability and allocation of fiscal resources. The process of resource allocation as it is 
relevant to the present discussion in this study involves two types of revenue, tax revenue and 
                                                
18 See the telling quotation by the then president of the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, regarding this strategy of 
moving towards the middle of the political spectrum for the sake of recruiting coalition partners quoted in Arora 
(1999: 206, Fn 54). 
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transfers in the form of grants. Based on the levy, administration and accrual of revenue, total 
tax revenue can be divided into four types:  
- Union taxes (levied, collected and retained by the center), such as corporation tax and 
customs duties, 
- Joint taxes (levied and collected by the center, but may be shared with States), such as 
income tax and proceeds from Union excise duties, 
- State taxes (levied and collected by the center, but appropriated by the States) like 
estate taxes, railway passenger and freight taxes, and consignment taxes, 
- State duties (levied by the center but collected and retained by the States), such as 
State excise duties.19 
 
In the area of borrowing, the Finance Commissions of India have traditionally been 
one of the most important institutions. Table 3.3 (below) highlights the dramatic shift which 
has occurred in terms of fiscal autonomy of Indian States. As column one indicates, during the 
four-and-a-half decades since the mid-1950s the States’ ability to meet current expenditures 
through current revenue generation declined substantially. 
 
Table 3.3: Key Figures of Center-State Fiscal Relations 
Time Period Percent of States’ 
Current Revenue 
to Current 
Expenditure 
(1) 
Percent of States’ 
Current Expenditure to 
Total Expenditure 
(2) 
Center Revenue 
Surplus/Deficit 
to GDP (Ratio) 
(3) 
States’ Revenue 
Surplus/Deficit to 
GDP (Ratio) 
(4) 
1955-56 68.9 61.7 0.38 -0.41 
1960-61 63.9 56.8 0.29 0.15 
1965-66 63.5 53.3 1.16 -0.12 
1970-71 60.6 53.9 0.36 -0.04 
1975-76 70.4 47.6 1.07 1.14 
1980-81 60.1 56.0 -0.54 0.63 
1985-86 57.7 52.6 -2.00 0.20 
1990-91 53.1 51.7 -3.26 -0.90 
1995-96 58.6 55.8 -2.50 -0.74 
2000-01 (RE) 48.7 57.1 -4.04 -2.38 
(RE) refers to revised estimates regarding columns (1) and (2) only. 
Source: (1) and (2) are reproduced based on Rao (2004: 9). (3) and (4) are based on Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India. Indian Public Finance Statistics, 2005-2006 
(http://finmin.nic.in/reports/IPFStat200506.pdf, accessed 14 November 2008). 
 
                                                
19 This ordering is taken from Rao (1999: 272). 
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What is also obvious from column two is that from 1990-1991, the last fiscal year before the 
comprehensive economic reforms which commenced in 1991, the ratio of State expenditures 
to total government expenditures has increased from 51.7 percent to 57.1 in 2000-2001. Both 
developments are a direct consequence of the increased decentralization of certain 
infrastructure-related policy areas to the State level and the greater burdens which this has 
imposed on the States. Consequently, while the central government’s expenditures increased 
throughout the 1990s as well, they were outpaced by the rising State-level expenditures (Rao 
2004: 9-10). As columns three and four illustrate, due to a number of parallel developments 
the fiscal health of both the central as well as the State governments declined substantially 
during the 1990s. While both the center’s as well as the States’ surplus/deficit to GDP ratio 
were still roughly comparable in the mid-1970s, the center’s position worsened considerably 
since the 1980s. By the 1990s this development had caught up with the States. In 1990-1991, 
the States’ ratio of revenue deficit to was still approximately one third that of the central 
government’s. By 2000-2001 that ratio had worsened for the States and was now more than 
half that of the central government’s. All these trends are all the more remarkable since the 
GDP at the all-India level (avg. growth rate: 5.58 percent) as well as for most States rose 
considerably throughout the 1990s after the introduction of market-oriented reforms in 1991. 
In consequence, States (as well as the central government) have had to increasingly rely on 
borrowing from the central government as well as private banks throughout the 1990s to 
finance ambitious modernization projects aimed at improving infrastructure crucial to 
economic growth and on improvements in social welfare (Rao 1999: 276-277). This has had 
the net effect of a pronounced vertical fiscal imbalance with increasing the dependency of 
States on central government transfers. Since States are increasingly under pressure to finance 
their expenditures through borrowing, this will increase the leverage of the central 
government over decision-making at the State level. Those States which are more dependent 
on central government transfers to meet their expenditure requirements will hence have a 
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heightened interest in having influence over the allocation of central government resources to 
different States. This links this debate problematically back to the argument already stated 
earlier as formulated by Chhibber and Kollman, who contend that decentralization will 
increase the incentives for focusing on regional government. The question which remains is 
that of the differentiated nature of incentives across the States. Any understanding of India’s 
federal system, its historical origins and its contemporary functioning, however, would remain 
incomplete without considering the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity of the 
socioeconomic context within which it operates and the relevance which that context has for 
the political process at the national and subnational levels. Each of these complexes will now 
briefly be examined in turn. 
 
3.3 Linguistic Diversity across Regions 
 
For the 1960s political landscape of India, Rajni Kothari described dynamics which one might 
subsume under the label “competing diversities”. In his now classic study of India’s political 
system (Kothari 1970) he emphasized the pan-Indian role of caste, religious, linguistic and to 
a lesser extent regional cleavages and their relevance to the political process. What Kothari 
anticipated as early as the 1970s has come to play out in a major way over the past decades in 
Indian politics. To accurately describe the political landscape today, a reformulated view also 
needs to also take into consideration the regional differences of the States’ economies, caste 
relationships, public expenditure capacities and linguistic landscapes as well. As in the case of 
the other characteristics of demographic diversity, India’s linguistic diversity is more akin to 
continental proportions than to those of a more familiar nation state (Berger 1995: 101). The 
language most commonly spoken in India, although not much outside the Northern part of the 
country, is Hindi, India’s official language. Map 3.1 (below) illustrates the geographic extent 
of the area where Hindi (and its Rajasthani and Bihari variants) is the main language spoken. 
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Map 3.1: Geographic Distribution of Indo-Aryan Languages in South Asia 
 
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1c/Indoarische_Sprachen.png. 
 
Table 3.4 (below) shows the relative strength of the most important languages spoken in the 
Indian population, i.e. languages spoken by more than one percent of the total population. As 
was mentioned before, Hindi is the most widely spoken language in India, but a number of 
other languages also have a large number of native speakers. It becomes fairly obvious that no 
majority of Indian citizens speaks any single language.  
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Table 3.4: Major Languages in India (Census of India 2001) 
Language o. of Speakers % of Total Population 
Hindi 422,048,642 41.03 
Bengali 83,369,769 8.11 
Telugu 74,002,856 7.19 
Marathi 71,936,894 6.99 
Tamil 60,793,814 5.91 
Urdu 51,536,111 5.01 
Gujarati 46,091,617 4.48 
Kannada 37,924,011 3.69 
Malayalam 33,066,392 3.21 
Oriya 33,017,446 3.21 
Punjabi 29,102,477 2.83 
Assamese 13,168,484 1.28 
Maithili 12,179,122 1.18 
 
As table 3.5 (below) indicates, many Indian States have quite different language profiles. The 
majority of the States’ respective populations often speak languages other than Hindi or 
English, the country’s official languages. This diversity in the main languages spoken in the 
different States is the result of successive reorganizations of territories along linguistic lines in 
the 1950s and 1960s.  
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Table 3.5: States/!CTs and their Main Languages 
 
State Language(s) 
Andhra Pradesh Telugu, Urdu 
Arunachal Pradesh Monpa 
Assam Assamese, Bengali 
Bihar Hindi 
Goa Konkani, Marathi 
Gujarat Gujarati 
Haryana Hindi 
Himachal Pradesh Hindi, Pahari 
Jammu and Kashmir Kashmiri, Urdu 
Karnataka Kannada 
Kerala Malayalam 
Madhya Pradesh Hindi 
Maharashtra Marathi 
Manipur Manipuri 
Meghalaya Khasi, Garo, English 
Mizoram Mizo, English 
Nagaland Naga, English 
Orissa Oriya 
Punjab Punjabi 
Rajasthan (Rajasthani), Hindi 
Sikkim Bhuta, Nepali, Lepcha 
Tamil Nadu Tamil 
Tripura Bengali, Kakbarak 
Uttar Pradesh Hindi, Urdu 
West Bengal Bengali 
Delhi Hindi 
Source: Census of India, 2001. 
 
The relevance of this linguistic diversity is fairly obvious. Language is relevant in the context 
of identity formation, social mobility of individuals, as a medium of communication and as a 
tool for political mobilization. It is commonly perceived as a tool for national integration, 
especially in countries where a majority of people adhere primarily to a cultural conception of 
nationhood. Language diversity has often been perceived to pose a challenge to national 
integration (see Mitra 2001), as the examples of Spain, Canada and Belgium can attest to. 
Similarly, conflicts over linguistic diversity and national identity have historically existed or 
continue to exist in France, Italy and the United States with its emergent debate over the use 
of Spanish, as the controversy over Samuel Huntington’s provocative 2006 book Who are 
We? shows. Although India faces related controversies as well, the situation with regard to 
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linguistic diversity is nevertheless quite different (Kothari 1970). In India a multiplicity of 
languages exist with diverse scripts and the frequent occurrence of diglossia, the coexistence 
of a purer and a more dialectic version. Linguistic diversity and the problems it poses are an 
integral part of the discourses on identity. In particular, Hindu nationalist rhetoric like that of 
the Bharatiya Janata Party used to emphasize the importance of elevating Hindi to the status 
of a “national” language instead of a mere “official” language to further solidify national 
unity. In addition to other processes of language differentiation, a move towards the 
Sanskritization of the Hindi (Berger 1995), i.e. the elimination of loan words from non-
Sanskritic languages such as Persian, and the reaction to the introduction of the Census of 
India and its requirement of self-identification of Indians as native speakers of a variety of 
languages have led to greater linguistic consciousness among the wider public in India. These 
developments and the view of a natural preeminence of Hindi among Indian languages in the 
early decades of the republic only fuelled the “official language problem” further (Brass 1994: 
158). In the same vein, regional chauvinist political ideology emphasized regional identity 
through regional languages and, in the case of Tamil Nadu in particular, non-Brahminical 
Hinduism. A similar process was at work in Punjab before its partition in 1966 into the Sikh 
Punjab and Haryana with a Hindu majority. In India language presents a tool for social 
mobility grating or denying access to government employment in the public sector which 
requires either knowledge of English or a regional majority language (Brass 1994: 162). The 
linguistic diversity found across the Indian States often presents itself as an obstacle or 
complication in the process of mass communication. This is, of course, relevant to 
government, political parties and media outlets since it potentially limits the reach of their 
communication. To deal with these complexities, the Indian state has institutionalized a rule 
called the “Three-language formula” which mandates that in schools students should be taught 
three languages, the respective regional language, English and a modern language which is 
either not South Indian or North Indian, depending on the geographic location of the State. 
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More than sixty years after its independence, English still functions as an important link 
language in India especially among economic and political elites today. The reorganization 
process of federal States in the early decades according to language boundaries mentioned 
earlier created a fortuitous federation, especially since it was a unitary feature of the Indian 
constitution which made this reorganization possible without the consent of State 
governments (Ratnapala 1997: 131). Linguistic loyalties will be taken up again later as one of 
the possible factors driving differential levels of regional party success. The reasoning behind 
this is the idea that in States where Hindi is not the main language, e.g. in the South of India, 
the linguistic landscape as it presents itself in the population, but more importantly in the 
regional media, might structure the opportunities to emphasize the advocacy for increased 
respect of the central government for the distinct regional culture prevalent in that State as 
part of an electoral platform. Also, this effect might be even further enhanced in combination 
with a relatively low level of linguistic fragmentation in that non-Hindi speaking State. 
Chapter five will address this issue in greater detail in connection with the structuration of the 
regional media as a sounding board for regionalized political messages. 
 
3.4 Religious Diversity across Regions 
 
India is also extremely diverse in religious terms. This diversity has had a multitude of effects 
on the link between religion and politics throughout its long history. Table 3.6 (below) breaks 
down the composition of the Indian population along the most relevant religious lines. 
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Table 3.6: Religious Communities in India (Census of India 2001) 
Religious Composition Population *               (%) 
Hindus  827,578,868 80.5 
Muslims  138,188,240 13.4 
Christians  24,080,016 2.3 
Sikhs  19,215,730 1.9 
Buddhists  7,955,207 0.8 
Jains  4,225,053 0.4 
Other Religions & 
Persuasions  
6,639,626 0.6 
Religion not stated  727,588 0.1 
Total *  1,028,610,328 100.0 
Note : * Excludes figures of Paomata, Mao Maram and Purul sub-districts of Senapati district of Manipur state. 
 
One thing that requires emphasis is the fact that contrary to popular belief Hinduism is not a 
monolithic religious community or belief system but rather a considerably fragmented and 
localized group of sects and systems of belief and practice. Nevertheless, as the success of the 
BJP over the past two decades have shown, targeted political mobilization can and does 
benefit from an overarching consciousness of what being a Hindu as opposed to a member of 
any of the religious minorities means and that this Hindu-non-Hindu distinction can be 
politically linked to other cleavages to win ground-level political support (Jaffrelot 1998). 
Considerable variation in religious diversity exists across the Indian States as table 3.7 below 
indicates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93
 
Table 3.7: Religious Diversity across Twenty-five Regions 
 
State Largest Group (%) Second Largest Group (%) REL 
Andhra Pradesh Hindu (89.01) Muslim (8.09) 1.24848 
Arunachal Pradesh Hindu (34.60) Christian (18.72) 4.78093 
Assam Hindu (64.89) Muslim (30.92) 1.930479 
Bihar Hindu (79.63) Muslim (15.87) 1.515181 
Goa Hindu (65.78) Christian (26.68) 1.966091 
Gujarat Hindu (89.09) Muslim (9.06) 1.246777 
Haryana Hindu (89.23) Sikh (6.29) 1.512677 
Himachal Pradesh Hindu (95.43)  Muslim (1.97) 1.097213 
Karnataka Hindu (83.86) Muslim (12.22) 1.391375 
Kerala Hindu (56.16) Muslim (24.16) 2.423539 
Madhya Pradesh Hindu (92.06) Muslim (5.24) 1.175984 
Maharashtra Hindu (80.37) Muslim (10.60) 1.512677 
Manipur Hindu (46.01) Christian (34.04) 2.931634 
Meghalaya Christian (70.25) Hindu (13.27) 1.924823 
Mizoram Christian (86.97) Buddhist (7.93) 1.308727 
Nagaland Christian (89.97) Hindu (7.70) 1.226059 
Orissa Hindu (94.35) Muslim (2.43) 1.121941 
Pondicherry Hindu (86.77) Muslim (6.95) 1.313268 
Rajasthan Hindu (88.75) Muslim (8.47) 1.25751 
Sikkim Hindu (60.93) Buddhist (28.11) 2.196639 
Tamil Nadu Hindu (88.11) Christian (6.07) 1.276985 
Tripura Hindu (85.62) Muslim (7.95) 1.348676 
Uttar Pradesh Hindu (80.83) Muslim (18.18) 1.456994 
West Bengal Hindu (72.47) Muslim (25.24) 1.697748 
Delhi Hindu (83.82) Muslim (7.16) 1.404166 
Source: Census of India, 2001. NREL was calculated on the basis of data in Census of India, 2001 as well. For the 
calculation of the effective number of religious groups (NREL ) see the explanation of ENP in footnote 24. 
 
Some States like Jammu and Kashmir, the Punjab and some States in India’s northeast have 
non-Hindu majority populations. Overall, Hindus represent the largest religious group in 
India, as seen above. The actual share of the population who is Hindu in the sample of States 
under investigation here varies from Manipur with 46.01 percent Hindus in 2001 at the lowest 
end of the spectrum to Himachal Pradesh with 95.43 percent at the highest end. Within our 
sample, the second largest group overall, Indian Muslims, range in their share from as low as 
1.97 percent in Himachal Pradesh to as high as 30.92 percent in Assam. Purely in terms of 
abstract diversity without giving consideration to which religious groups make up the largest 
and next largest groups within a population, in our sample the ratio of the second-largest to 
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the largest group ranges from as low as 0.02 in almost homogenous Himachal Pradesh to as 
high as 0.74 in Manipur in India’s Northeast. Generally, the diversity within our sample of 
States is greater in the smaller States on the Indian periphery than in the large Hindu-
dominated States of the “Hindi-Hindu heartland”. In addition to these differences in religious 
diversity, what is important to note are the differences across States in the traditional linkages 
between religion and rule. While much of pre-independence India was ruled either by Hindu 
princes or directly by the British colonial administration, in areas such as Hyderabad (now 
Andhra Pradesh) Muslim rulers held the political reigns for centuries. These differences 
complicate generalized statements about the nexus between religion and political cleavages as 
well as group dynamics across States. The variation in religious diversity levels and the nature 
of majority-minority relations have traditionally carried some weight in the interpretation of 
politics in India. This is not least due to the conventional view that the partition of British 
India into India and Pakistan was rooted in the conflicts between Hindu and Muslim political 
elites. The violence during the partition process with large numbers of deaths and large 
numbers of refugees on both sides of the India-Pakistan border accentuate this perception of 
the religious cleavage which remained important throughout the last decades in India. 
Nonetheless, considerable variation exists regarding the salience of the Hindu-Muslim or 
more broadly the Hindu-minority cleavage or antagonism (Varshney 1998: 5-7). Some 
regions remain overwhelmingly peaceful while others regularly witness ethno-religious 
conflict, including sometimes violent clashes. While for a long time Muslims were the 
primary target of anti-minority political mobilization efforts of some parties, Christians have 
more recently joined Muslims as that target. In one of the traditional centers of sectarian 
political conflict in India, Jammu and Kashmir, the trifurcation of the State into a Hindu-
dominated part, a Muslim-dominated valley and a mixed area is frequently emphasized in the 
analyses of political dynamics there (Nanda 2006: 77). Yet, despite its large Hindu majority 
but because of the significance of its religious minorities, India, unlike Pakistan, opted for an 
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explicitly secular constitutional design which accorded equal status to all religious faiths and 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. Despite this formal separation of 
the political institutions and religion, soon after independence linkages emerged between 
parties and followers of certain religious groups within the population. The Congress party for 
example traditionally enjoyed strong support among Muslims and Christians (Mitra/Singh 
1999: 134-135). On the other hand the BJP due to its explicitly pro-Hindu platform enjoyed 
support almost exclusively from Hindus. The various Dal parties in the Punjab, for example 
the Akali Dal, the Shiromani Akali Dal and others, have their voter bases among Sikhs. We 
will return to the implications of these linkages between the religious affiliation and political 
opinion, behavior and cleavages in chapter five. 
 
 
 
3.5 Economic and Developmental Diversity across Regions 
 
As in the case of language and religion, the Indian States show a remarkable variation in their 
respective levels of economic development as well. Table 3.8 provides an overview of the 
different States’ economic and developmental diversity at the beginning of the 21st century. 
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Table 3.8: Economic and Developmental Diversity across India’s States (2000-2001) 
State Poverty Rate (%)a Literacy Rate (%)b SDP pcc 
Andhra Pradesh 18.1 60.47 16622 
Arunachal Pradesh 25.5 54.34 15003 
Assam 27.4 63.25 12447 
Bihar  47  
Goa 14.2 82.01 38989 
Gujarat 19.5 69.14 17227 
Haryana 18.0 67.91 24328 
Himachal Pradesh 16.7 76.48 21824 
Karnataka 28.0 66.64 17405 
Kerala 18.8 90.86 19724 
Madhya Pradesh    
Maharashtra 32.9 76.88 22151 
Manipur 23.3 70.53 12157 
Meghalaya 25.6 62.56 15200 
Mizoram 17.3 88.8 16635 
Nagaland 25.9 66.59 15746 
Orissa 47.2 63.08 10211 
Pondicherry 27.9 81.24  
Rajasthan 24.0 60.41 12840 
Sikkim 27.9 68.81 15305 
Tamil Nadu 27.1 73.45 20249 
Tripura 26.2 73.19 14933 
Uttar Pradesh    
West Bengal 28.7 68.64 16184 
Delhi 14.7 81.67 39817 
All India Average   16172 
Sources: a. Government of India 2006; b. Government of India 2002; c. Government of India 2008. NSDP: Net 
State Domestic Product. 
 
The economic leaders among the Indian States as measured by the net state domestic product 
are Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. This list 
gives one a handle on the strength of the largest economies among the subnational units. If 
one measures economic strength according to net state domestic product per capita the picture 
changes quite drastically. In that case, Goa, Delhi, Pondicherry, Haryana and Maharashtra 
constitute the top-5 States and Union Territories. On the other hand, if one were to measure 
socio-economic development by way of the literacy rate of the population, the leading entities 
would be Kerala, Mizoram, Goa, Delhi and Pondicherry. On some indicators which have a 
natural ceiling such as literacy, the gap between the lowest ranked States (Bihar, Arunachal 
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Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh) and the highest ranked States is slowly 
narrowing. Nevertheless a large gap between them remains. On other indicators (NSDP, 
NSDP per capita) the gap between leaders and laggards is actually widening over time. It is 
also remarkable that the best-performing States as far as development indicators are 
concerned (literacy, life expectancy) are not necessarily the economically most advanced and 
conversely that, as the case of Haryana shows, relatively well-to-do States are not always 
leaders in levels of social development. This suggests a gap between States in terms of their 
capability to transform economic wealth into improved living conditions for citizens, making 
this a highly policy relevant observation. It is also useful to remember the differences in the 
structures of the States’ respective economies. In Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh wealth is 
generated mainly from modern industrial and service sectors of the economy. In States like 
Bihar and the Punjab on the other hand agriculture is the mainstay of the economy. The 
political relevance of these differences is readily apparent. In the poorest States (like Orissa, 
Bihar, Assam and Madhya Pradesh) poverty alleviation will be the most important concern of 
voters but especially also for policymakers (Dev 2002: 51-52), making economic growth, 
especially agricultural growth a priority concern for regional governments there. Also 
important will be, as in other parts of India, basic and advanced education infrastructure and 
the access to it as well as health infrastructure. In more advanced States like Maharashtra, 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, the development of infrastructure supporting 
modern industries and the service sector, like the expansion of the capacity for power 
generation, road, railway, airport and sea port infrastructures, as well as expanding the 
infrastructure for advanced post-secondary education would be priority areas for State 
governments. With these different socioeconomic profiles also come different constraints on 
the various States (Dreze/Sen 2002: 168-170) and influence on and by the central government 
on process and policy dynamics in the respective States. As was shown above and will be 
taken up again in chapter five below, these differences in socioeconomic development would 
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have an impact on the incentive structure of voters and political elites across the States as to 
how big a stake they would have in either exercising control over governmental decisions 
made at the national or regional level, respectively. In the following chapter we will see some 
of the different socio-demographic profiles impacting levels of institutionalization of party 
politics. 
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4. The Institutionalization of Party Systems 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive and analytical overview of the 
multidimensional phenomenon of party system institutionalization and not so much to account 
for the determinants of party system institutionalization in India. The overarching goal is 
rather to show the interlinked character of the different dimensions of institutionalization 
processes as they unfold in Indian politics. As outlined briefly in chapter two, the 
institutionalization of party systems is in fact a multidimensional phenomenon. It involves 
individual and group-level phenomena and attitudinal as well as agency-related characteristics 
of politics.  This chapter will first conceptualize this multi-dimensional and multi-level 
structure of institutionalization as it relates to party systems and detail the ways in which this 
study tackles the analysis empirically. It will then analyze the state of party system 
institutionalization in India at the level of national public opinion as well as at the level of 
State-specific electoral trends. The State-level analysis will provide an overview and analysis 
of most of the major States on the one hand and an in-depth look into four chosen cases in 
particular to illustrate commonalities and differences in these discernible trends. Due to issues 
regarding the availability of data we will assess the three dimensions only in so far as possible 
at the different levels of analysis (individual vs. system vs. case studies). In the last section of 
this chapter, the likely determinants of different levels of party system institutionalization will 
be analyzed for our four cases. 
 
4.1 Conceptualizing and Hypothesizing Institutionalization 
Many previous studies have operationalized “institutionalization” based on a 
multidimensional conceptual framework (Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Betz 2008; 
Kuenzi/Lambright 2001, 2005; Lindberg 2007). It is submitted here that at its core, party 
system institutionalization involves the belief in the legitimacy of parties as primary 
institutions of politics and as intermediaries between citizens and the state and other feature 
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related to the preeminence of parties in the electoral process (“partyness”), “organizational 
continuity” in order to stabilize the tableau of electoral choices for voters and to guarantee the 
electoral availability of parties, and lastly the stability of political support (or “rootedness”) as 
a consequence of trust in parties generally and of the availability of known entities whose 
electoral cues (programmatic or otherwise) become routinized and known to voters over time. 
This study thus departs somewhat from previous studies’ terminology (notably 
Mainwaring/Scully 1995 and works drawing on them) in calling the characteristics concerned 
with the stability of parties’ existence “organizational continuity” instead of “stable roots” as 
do Mainwaring and Scully. They see age as a proxy for stable linkage between groups of 
voters and parties. However, it then seems more sensible to restrict the use of the idea of roots 
to that and related areas instead of conflating them with the issue of parties’ continued 
existence, the end of which might have nothing to do with a lack of connect between parties 
and voter but rather with intra-elite dynamics leading to party failure or with legal restrictions 
imposed on the party in question making its continued existence impossible. Figure 4.1 
(below) illustrates the triangular relationship between trust, organizational continuity and 
stable support in the form of a tiled triangle with n=2.  
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Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Party System Institutionalization – A Conceptual Map 
 
The interior triangle links partisanship, accountability of parties and the idea of linkage, i.e. 
the mechanism by which political parties over time create reliable support bases through 
providing tangible as well as intangible resources to their support groups as well as to the 
community at large. These three act as transmission belts linking the core dimensions of 
institutionalization to each other. Through organizational continuity party systems are able to 
foster trust in parties when they acquire a certain level of predictability and provide 
accountability allowing parties to acquire the necessary credibility as the “only game in 
town”. The continued existence of parties as organizations ensures a measure of name and 
personnel recognition which allows voters to associate merits and demerits with these 
organizations or the persons representing them. This possibility of allocating blame and merit 
for performance, either in office or in the opposition, and of enabling a measure of 
accountability of office holders to parties and through them to the public at large, will foster 
trust in parties as organizations or not over time, depending on the respective evaluations. 
Trust in political parties, on the other hand, can facilitate a stabilization of political support 
both in terms of numerical support levels for individual parties (volatility), but also in terms of 
Rootedness 
Partisanship 
Organizational Continuity Effective Linkage 
Accountability/Predictability 
Partyness 
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linking political parties to particular demographics (alignment). It can do so by channeling 
that generalized trust towards parties as institutions of politics into more concrete forms such 
as partisan attachments, which thrive on trust in a specific party or certain specific parties. 
When general trust in parties as institutions of political institutions exists, parties have the 
opportunity to form stable support bases through linkage mechanisms by offering ideological 
homes, programmatic goals and concrete patronage opportunities when they have access to 
office or financial resources. A considerable debate exists around the issue of whether 
established party systems can persist amid substantial re- or dealignment. Whereas Lipset and 
Rokkan (Lipset/Rokkan 1967) had still held that party systems in 1960s Europe were 
essentially frozen along certain cleavages, Dalton and Flanagan and many others 
(Flanagan/Dalton 1984; Pedersen 1979) had by the 1970s come to the conclusion that this 
state of affairs was rapidly changing and that support structures were (becoming) rather fluid 
and not frozen. The questions is, of course, whether one needs to pre-suppose at all the 
necessity of stable support groups being aligned with certain parties to call a party system 
institutionalized. As far as parties on their own are concerned it is probably fair to say that at 
least initially such long-term stable alignment is not necessary and can be substituted by ad 
hoc coalitions of support groups. However, in the long run if a party wishes to persist and 
expand such stable links between the party and certain groups are helpful and necessary. 
Spatial models of party competition, such as Downs’ median voter theorem (Downs 1957), 
suggest, of course, that the more a party expands the more its formerly distinctive profile in 
contrast to large established parties will be “banalized” and it will progressively look more 
and more similar to the “old comers”. For party systems as a whole, however, we would 
submit that stable alignment is neither logically necessary nor sufficient for the semblance of 
institutionalization. At the aggregate level, stability can and often does mask individual-level 
volatility. Thus, the patterns of stable party competition for example do not on their own 
necessitate the close alignment of all parties with specific interests so long as there are some 
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groups at each election who will vote for the parties in question. Whatever the view of the 
necessity of stable alignment ultimately may be, the stability of these support bases and 
linkages presupposes, of course, a certain level of continuity among the competing parties 
with regard to their existence since that stability of alignment by definition takes time to 
establish. Constant reshuffles of leadership personnel, programmatic orientation or low 
organizational cohesion impede such stability from being established by making it difficult to 
link entities enduringly to support groups on account of party appearances and disappearances 
or party-switching of leadership personnel. All of these make it difficult for voters to develop 
lasting expectations from parties and their candidates or to at least identify certain parties with 
their own in-group whenever parties are based on ethnic headcounts rather than programs or 
ideologies (Chandra 2004). In the following section we will operationalize these dimensions 
and outline the sources for the different data used in this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Data and Measurement 
We will use a number of indicators in the operationalization of our three core dimensions of 
party system institutionalization. The sources and codings for these indicators are contained in 
Appendix D. 
 
4.2.1 Partyness of Politics 
The first dimension to institutionalization concerns the extent to which the attitudinal context 
of politics is favorably disposed to the function of parties as intermediaries between citizens 
and the state and the extent to which this disposition is borne out in actual voting behavior 
which favors (certain) parties over non-party candidates (partyness). A favorable attitudinal 
context means that in general and more specific ways large sections of voters believe that 
parties are valuable institutions performing this linking function. Much of the writing about 
citizens’ attitudes has centered on the attachments of citizens to particular political parties (or 
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the lack thereof) as a characteristic of party systems (Green et al. 2001; van Deth/Janssen 
1994). More recently, studies have sought to link partisanship with levels of trust 
(Dalton/Weldon 2005, 2007; Mitra 2005), seeing higher levels of partisanship as indicative of 
and correlated with higher levels of trust in parties as institutions and thus linking the 
institutionalization of individual parties to the institutionalization of party politics more 
broadly through the idea of partisanship (Rose/Mackie 1988). For the purpose of this study, 
we will treat the confidence of citizens in parties as political institutions as an indicator of the 
relative legitimacy of parties in a party system. This is in line with other previous studies on 
party system institutionalization (Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Kuenzi/Lambright 2001). As such, 
the legitimacy of parties as a characteristic of institutionalized party systems will be measured 
by the question related to respondents’ level of confidence in political parties from the four 
waves of World Values Surveys (see Appendix D for details). Secondly, we will assess at the 
macro-level in how far non-party candidates have been able to win votes. By definition, 
partyless or independent candidates represent an anti-party option in electoral politics and can 
thus safely be assumed to be indicative to some extent of the lack of institutionalization of a 
party system, since they are more than anything individual politicians without the usual ties 
that bind candidates to parties even in SMDP electoral systems. 
 
4.2.2 Organizational Continuity. 
We will analyze the level of organizational continuity in party politics for our four cases in 
two distinct ways. The first indicator “entry rate” describes the component labeled “electoral 
availability”. This refers to the share of newly entrant parties (most often formed in the course 
of an election cycle), i.e. parties contesting a specific State assembly election while not having 
contested the last election at the same level in that State. A higher value on this indicator, 
which ranges logically from 0 to 1, would therefore signify a higher share of parties 
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competing which did not compete in the previous election, i.e. a lower level of 
institutionalization.  
The second indicator we will use to measure the level of organizational continuity is that of 
the “weighted relative age” of a given party system i (WRA). The indicator is calculated as 
follows: 
∑
=
n
i
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1
)/*( = WRAi  . 
 
 
In the equation, tij stands for the time during which party i has been competing in State j, Vij 
for the vote share of party i in State j, while Tj indicates the time during which this political 
territory (in our case the Indian States) has existed as a separate electoral arena without any 
major changes in its external boundaries or the extent of the franchise accorded to its 
population. In the present case, Tj counts the years since the founding of the respective State 
under investigation, with the exception of Andhra Pradesh (constituted under that name in 
1956), where the year is assumed to be 1953, the year of the first State election in the new 
territory under a different name. This indicator is similar to, though not exactly the same as 
the one developed in Schneider’s study of partisanship in India (Schneider 2009) and it builds 
furthermore on Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) in that it also uses weights to discriminate 
against the undue influence of small and insignificant but long-established parties in assessing 
the level of institutionalization of a party system from this particular angle. Table 4.1 (below) 
illustrates the idea of the weighted relative age in the context of other party system 
characteristics. It becomes clear that the simple average relative age of parties in the 
respective country would give us quite a different numerical impression of the relative levels 
of institutionalization thus measured compared to the weighted relative age.  
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Table 4.1: Fragmentation and Institutionalization of Russian and British Party Systems 
 
First 
Election 
Current 
Election 
Age of 
Political 
System 
EP Avg. RA WRA 
Russia 1993 2003 10 5.14 5.83 0.44 
U.K. 1950 2005 55 3.59 26.38 0.79 
 
A lot of the old but small parties in the U.K. drive up the value for the average relative age 
(the average age of parties divided by the age of the political system), making the UK appear 
to be many times as institutionalized as Russia. In Russia, which seems extremely fluid by 
that standard, the influence of the larger vote shares of parties established shortly before or 
after the first democratic legislative elections mitigates to some extent the still relatively short 
life span most parties had enjoyed so far until the year 2003. Thus, depending on which 
indicator one prefers, Russian party politics will still seem less institutionalized, but with the 
WRA, the gap to the U.K. seems less dramatic. Due to the work involved in measuring this 
indicator for all elections under investigation, we will do this only for the four case studies, 
thus limiting our investigation in that regard. 
 
4.2.3 Rootedness.  
The third dimension of party system institutionalization which we termed “rootedness” will be 
operationalized through the use of measures of volatility at the aggregate and individual level. 
At the aggregate level we will use the average rates of inter-election volatility (TNC, total net 
change) as developed by Mogens Pedersen (Pedersen 1979) to contrast volatility rates in the 
Indian State elections in the late 1970s with those of the late 1990s, both as averages across all 
States as well as individual values for the four States in our case studies. Secondly, we will 
briefly discuss the results of Oliver Heath’s study on individual-level volatility in the Indian 
States (Heath 2005), since the World Values Surveys do not contain questions relating to past 
voting behavior which would allow us to estimate the extent to which voters switch parties 
between two elections.  
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4.3 System-level Perspectives 
4.3.1 Partyness – The Role of Independents 
The first approach to evaluating institutionalization in this study is that of assessing the 
partyness of politics in India. At the macro-level this concerns the extent to which being 
backed by a political party is indispensible for candidates in winning support from voters or 
not. Winning support in this case does not mean winning seats, but rather convincing voters to 
give their votes to independent rather than party-affiliated candidates. One way of assessing 
this is by looking at the vote share of independent candidates in elections. Independent 
candidates can pose a challenge to institutionalization of party politics if and when they are an 
expression of distrust in established or new political parties and a desire to repudiate party-
based politics despite the fact that party-based politics is the norm in a given political system. 
Common sense would dictate that over time, as voters become more acquainted with political 
parties and their goals and mobilization techniques, they would tend to prefer “known 
quantities” to unknown ones, i.e. party-backed candidates to independent candidates. This 
logic is based in the intuitive notion of voters that independent candidates are a) likely to not 
win the constituency they are running in and b) even if they win are not likely to be able to 
wield much influence in the legislature since they often stand on their own in a parliamentary 
system where so much depends on being able to be part of a majority coalition of legislators 
to bring about decisions in the form of policies or patronage. Table 4.2 (below) illustrates the 
levels of vote shares for independent candidates across India’s States. It shows that there is, 
particularly before 1990, considerable variation on this dimension. 
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Table 4.2: Independent Candidates’ Average Vote Shares in State Elections (1977-2000) 
 
State Vote, Pre-1990 Vote, Post-1990 Abs. Difference % Difference 
Andhra Pradesh 20.22 6.72 -13.50 -66.77 
Arunachal Pradesh 24.03 19.45 -4.58 -19.06 
Assam 38.73 19.42 -19.31 -49.86 
Bihar 17.86 14.53 -3.33 -18.65 
Delhi 7.50 7.31 -0.19 -2.53 
Goa 18.93 12.45 -6.48 -34.23 
Gujarat 9.63 11.46 +1.83 +19.00 
Haryana 24.57 15.37 -9.20 -37.44 
Himachal Pradesh 14.54 6.68 -7.86 -54.06 
Karnataka 10.14 10.83 +0.69 +6.80 
Kerala 16.44 6.90 -9.54 -58.03 
Madhya Pradesh 12.14 8.23 -3.91 -32.21 
Maharashtra 13.19 15.57 +2.38 +18.04 
Manipur 36.05 5.03 -31.02 -86.05 
Meghalaya 22.30 16.72 -5.58 -25.02 
Mizoram 34.21 16.60 -17.61 -51.48 
Nagaland 22.36 34.78 +12.42 +55.55 
Orissa 12.25 9.51 -2.74 -22.37 
Pondicherry 7.71 9.12 +1.41 +18.29 
Rajasthan 13.65 14.05 +0.40 +2.93 
Sikkim 10.37 3.93 -6.44 -62.10 
Tamil Nadu 7.05 2.67 -4.38 -62.13 
Tripura 5.33 4.73 -0.60 -11.26 
Uttar Pradesh 15.07 6.92 -8.15 -54.08 
West Bengal 6.29 2.81 -3.48 -55.33 
Average 
(unweighted)       16.82 11.27 --         -27.28 
Source: Election Commission of India, Election reports in State Assembly Elections, various years. 
 
 
Quite in line with our expectation that over time one should see a decline in the levels of 
support for independent candidates, in most States support for independents does decline 
between the two time periods. Notable exceptions to the rule are Gujarat, Maharashtra, 
Pondicherry and Nagaland which actually see increases in support for independents. The 
steepest absolute decline in support for independents occurs in Manipur, Assam and Mizoram. 
In terms of decline as a share of the original base value, Manipur, Andhra Pradesh, Sikkim 
and Tamil Nadu register the sharpest decline rates. Noteworthy is the fact that the top-5 States 
supportive of independents before 1990 and the top-4 after 1990 are all located in Northeast 
India, which underscores the often mentioned claim that the Northeast is somewhat apart from 
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regular Indian political trends. Overall, however, there is an average decline of support across 
States for independents by 27 percent over the two time periods which points to an ongoing 
process of institutionalization or increasing “partyness” of elections in the States. 
 
4.3.2 Rootedness - Volatility 
As with the other indicators, the Indian States vary widely with regard to the rates of volatility 
between elections and with regard to the trends in these volatility rates over time as table 4.3 
(below) shows. Prior to 1990, the highest volatility rates occur in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Delhi, Haryana and Nagaland. Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Bihar, Orissa and 
Meghalaya display the highest levels of electoral volatility immediately after 1990.  
 
Table 4.3: Changes in Volatility across the Indian States 
State TC, Pre-1990 TC, Post-1990 Abs. Difference % Difference 
Andhra Pradesh 46.12 15.65 -30.47 -66.07 
Arunachal Pradesh 72.46 62.11 -10.35 -14.28 
Assam -- -- -- -- 
Bihar 49.66 55.67 +6.01 +12.10 
Delhi 54.36 19.45 -34.91 -64.22 
Goa 45.99 19.14 -26.85 -58.38 
Gujarat 56.69 9.58 -47.11 -83.10 
Haryana 51.22 42.50 -8.72 -17.03 
Himachal Pradesh 49.06 10.45 -38.61 -78.70 
Karnataka 45.64 43.12 -2.52 -5.52 
Kerala 28.49 12.01 -16.48 -57.85 
Madhya Pradesh 49.78 4.50 -45.28 -90.96 
Maharashtra 36.48 28.31 -8.17 -22.40 
Manipur 30.68 52.43 +21.75 +70.89 
Meghalaya 31.39 43.27 +11.88 +37.85 
Mizoram 36.97 37.92 +0.95 +2.57 
Nagaland 51.07 33.69 -17.38 -34.03 
Orissa 47.67 43.36 -4.31 -9.04 
Pondicherry -- -- -- -- 
Rajasthan 46.37 11.74 -34.63 -74.68 
Sikkim 84.36 17.16 -67.2 -79.66 
Tamil Nadu 16.94 39.40 +22.46 +132.59 
Tripura 20.20 6.69 -13.51 -66.88 
Uttar Pradesh 50.66 19.15 -31.51 -62.20 
West Bengal 21.56 7.61 -13.95         -64.70 
Source: Election Commission of India, Election Reports on State Assembly Elections, various years. Pre-1990 
refers to TNC for the first two elections between 1977 and 1989; post-1990 refers to the first two elections from 
1990 to 2000. Independents were treated as a group instead of as individuals for the sake of simplicity. 
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Interestingly, most States’ volatility rates decline after 1990 in line with our general 
expectation that with time, support should generally become more stabilized. There are 
differences across States though. The greatest absolute decreases in volatility are observable 
for Gujarat in the West, as well as Sikkim in the Northeast and for States in the “Hindi-Hindu 
heartland” of India’s North (Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh). This consolidation of political support for parties (rootedness) in the North is 
explicable in view of the meteoric rise of the BJP in North India since the 1980s and before 
the advent and growth in importance of new smaller parties such as the BSP from the 1990s. 
To some extent the stark contrast in the North between the late 1970s and the early 1990s is 
also attributable to the anomalous situation of the Congress losses in the post-1977 elections 
after the end of Indira Gandhi’s 19-month emergency government and the volatility-
increasing rebound of the Congress Party from 1980 onwards. There are noticeable increases 
in volatility as well, however in Tamil Nadu and Bihar as well as in Manipur, Meghalaya and 
Mizoram in the Northeast. What stands out from this analysis is the fact that the Northeast 
seems to be a place with some discernible trends running counter to the national trend of 
declining volatility. In the Northeast, parties have found it difficult to survive over longer 
periods of time. Party labels change more frequently and independent candidates’ stronger 
support is another indicator of the low level of institutionalization. Secondly, two types of 
trends exist simultaneously in the larger States of India. While the Northern heartland moves 
closer to more or less stable national party competition in the 1990s (only for the BSP to 
disturb this balance in the late 1990s), States like Bihar and Orissa see greater volatility after 
the breakup of the Janata Dal, a national party into several constituent regional parties. Thus, 
overall there is considerable variation in the volatility scores of the different States caused by 
the relatively strong role which independents play overall in the Northeastern States, the rise 
of a second national party competing with Congress in North-central India and due to the 
breakup of the former major third national party, the Janata Dal in the 1990s. 
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4.4 Individual-level Perspectives 
4.4.1 Partyness – The Role of Trust 
A second side to measuring partyness in a given political system is, as described above, the 
level of trust or confidence people have in parties (also as compared to other institutions). By 
focusing our attention on this we will be able to gauge in how far voters in general have really 
embraced parties as the primary mediators of political participation and interest articulation. 
Thus, if trust in political parties is high, we will see this as an indication that parties have 
successfully carved out a place for themselves in the minds of voters regarding the tableau of 
participatory avenues available to voters to achieve their political goals. Table 4.4 (below) 
outlines some of these trends in Indian public opinion. 
 
Table 4.4: Confidence in Political Parties and Other Institutions 
 1990 1995 2001 2006 
Political Parties 53.0 39.4 28.1 37.0 
Government 43.4 48.3 48.5 44.0 
Parliament 65.1 53.4 41.6 46.9 
Civil Service 71.0 53.2 37.9 38.2 
Judicial System 62.8 66.8 n.a. 58.0 
Source: World Values Surveys, Waves I to IV. For question wording see Appendix D.  
 
It is fairly obvious that political parties in India, much like in many Western democracies (see 
for example Dalton/Weldon 2005), suffer from an inherently bad reputation even when 
compared to other political and administrative institutions. Compared to the image of parties 
which are often seen as self-interested and inherently biased, the judiciary in India enjoys a 
comparatively high regard in the minds of citizens. In fact, over time the confidence in 
political parties has actually declined, a trend which was only partly reversed in 2006. 
Overall, however, institutions dealing with political issues have suffered declining confidence 
throughout the 1990s and beyond, some more, some less so. Seen in that light, parties are not 
unique, although the level of confidence is quite low and reminiscent of the view of political 
parties frequently held by conservative critics of parliamentary democracy such as the older 
 113
George Washington, theorists like Carl Schmitt or Mahatma Gandhi himself, who saw 
parliamentary democracy and political parties increasingly critically throughout his life. 
Taken together with the results provided by deSouza, Palshikar and Yadav (2008) regarding 
support for democracy in India overall, it appears that Indian citizens take the shortcomings of 
political parties in their stride as a necessary corollary or “necessary evil” (Dalton/Weldon 
2005) of democracy, which they generally support. Ostensibly non-partisan institutions like 
the Supreme Court, which during their more activist years have frequently reined in bad 
governance and thus neutralized some of the negative effects of party democracy, are not 
surprisingly held in higher esteem, as they are in Western democracies. 
 
4.4.2 Rootedness – Assessing Individual-level Volatility 
Individual-level volatility refers to the percentage of people stating in a survey that they 
changed their vote between two elections et and et-1. It is frequently, though neither logically 
nor empirically always, linked to aggregate level volatility in parties support as measure in 
vote shares over time. The figure below (cf. Heath 2005) illustrates the range of volatility 
scores across the different Indian States as measure through two national election studies in 
the late 1990s. The variation is quite noticeable. By European standards, the volatility scores 
are on average rather high, especially given the fact that the time between the first and the 
second election surveyed here was only one year.  
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Figure 4.2: Individual-level Volatility across 15 Indian States (1998-1999) 
Total Volatility Rate (Level and Ranking): 
>  0.60:  1. Tamil Nadu 
0.40 – 0.60: 2. Haryana 
   3. Punjab 
0.20 – 0.40: 4. Karnataka 
   5. Maharashtra 
   6. Orissa 
   7. Bihar 
   8. Assam 
   9. Uttar Pradesh 
   10. Andhra Pradesh 
   11. Gujarat 
<  0.20:  12. West Bengal 
   13. Rajasthan 
   14. Kerala 
   15. Madhya Pradesh 
 
Source: based on Heath 2005, p.182. 
 
Three factors might help us understand better why individual-level volatility is comparatively 
high compared to many Western democracies. The first is the fact that, despite growing 
evidence that partisanship is growing slightly and has at least some relationship to voting 
behavior (Schneider 2009; Mitra 2005), overall partisan attachments are relatively weakly 
developed, which is one of the reasons why the organizers of the India component of the 
World Values Survey did not even find it necessary to include the customarily asked question 
regarding partisanship in their India-specific questionnaire so far. This low level of 
attachment falls in line with the comparatively low level of trust in parties in general as well. 
The second reason why volatility might well be as high as it is the effect of an “incumbency 
malus” or anti-incumbency effect which has been amply documented in previous studies 
(Uppal 2009; for a contrasting view see Kumar 2004). This malus disadvantages incumbents 
since a significant share of them is regularly voted out of office in State elections after just 
one term. This empirically established de facto term limit leads many legislators to focus on 
short-term pork barrel politics and the fulfillment of their own material needs instead of on 
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long term good governance. Since “pork”, however, is limited, a significant share of their 
potential voters will not benefit from it, rendering the incumbents’ chances for re-election 
doubtful again. Due to the large turnover of incumbents, voters will naturally find it 
problematic developing long-standing ties to parties since in India’s SMDP electoral system 
combined with an emphasis on ethnicized voting patterns (Chandra 2004), the link between 
candidate and voter is crucial to the formation of partisan attachments. The third reason for 
comparatively high volatility might be the continuous supply of new parties and candidates 
(in part a result of the politics of factionalism and a corollary to the anti-incumbency 
phenomenon). With permanent renewal of the tableau of political choices, voters face a 
continuous struggle to determine their preferred party or candidate if and when they do not 
automatically vote in line with their fellow caste members. We will return to the issue of 
“electoral availability” and its connection to party system institutionalization again below. 
 
4.5 A Panorama of Party System Institutionalization: Four Cases 
 
4.5.1 Background 
Before examining more closely the state of party system institutionalization in Andhra 
Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and Karnataka, we will outline some pertinent trends and historical 
developments in the politics of each of these four States since the 1970s. This information will 
serve as background for our later comparative analysis of the determinants of levels of 
institutionalization in these regions. 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh is a comparable “latecomer” in terms of statehood in the Indian Union. It 
became independent from Madras State (now Tamil Nadu) in the South of India in 1953 and 
was constituted in its current borders as Andhra Pradesh in 1956. This means, of course, that 
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it has a slightly shorter history as a political entity and less pre- and post-independence 
experience with democracy and parties since prior to Indian independence, Hyderabad state 
was ruled by a Muslim ruler, the Nizam of Hyderabad, without any form of party-political 
types of participation. Also, Andhra Pradesh is really a conglomerate of sub-regions 
(Telengana, Ryalseema and Andhra), some more arid than others and hence culturally 
somewhat different and economically distinguished from each other. Immediately after 
independence, Brahmins were initially powerful in Andhra politics in the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, kammas and reddis (both middle caste, middle class and often landowner farmers) 
rose to prominence in Andhra Pradesh soon (Gray 1968: 403). Andhra Pradesh had one of the 
highest rates of government instability in India between 1967 and 1991 (Chhibber 1999: 122). 
Caste politics and Telengana secessionism transformed the region in the 1970s as these 
became dominant themes in politics. Even in the watershed 1977 general elections caste 
politics trumped class concerns as well as concern with the preservation of democracy against 
dictatorial rule, which was the theme pitched by the conservative opposition in the 1977 
elections (The Statesman, “The Andhra Lineup”, 6 March 1977). Ideology took a secondary 
role to tactical jockeying for seats between parties, e.g. through an alliance between CPI and 
CFD to make seat adjustments in order to avoid splitting the respective alliance vote (The 
Hindu, “Vengal Rao Asks CPI to Withdraw from Field”, 11 March 1977). This did not 
happen however, and the opposition vote, though improved was once again divided among 
too many opposition candidates in most cases (The Hindu, “Andhra Pradesh: The Decisive 
Factor”, 3 March 1977). The Congress Party preserved its preeminent position in that State, 
unlike in many other States that year which witnessed an overall decline of the INC, by 
capitalizing on the support of small peasant groups and dalits, girijans and Muslims (ibid.). In 
the early 1980s, a new party, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) emerged as a leading regional 
contender, albeit without overly regionalist slogans. The TDP government merged policy with 
populism which was aimed at welfare measures and administrative reform and was largely 
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perceived by voters as being pro-poor and pro-peasant unlike the platform and record of the 
Congress Party (Srinivasulu 2007: 183-184). The explicit orientation of the TDP governments 
towards economic reform in the 1990s re-focused the debate in Andhra Pradesh from caste-
related to policy-related issues and signaled a move from the film stardom-based populism of 
N.T. Rama Rao to Vankaiah Naidu in the 1990s. Two group-level socio-demographic 
characteristics stand out in Andhra Pradesh and set it apart somewhat from other regions. The 
first is the high level of group fragmentation of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and 
dalits into many distinct, but smaller groups (Harriss 1999: 3372). This impacts the extent to 
which lower caste alliances are able to dominate politics as the counterexample of several 
North Indian States, notably Uttar Pradesh, illustrate. Secondly, noteworthy are also the 
relatively sizeable share of Muslims and the experience of Muslim rule over a predominantly 
Hindu population. Muslims have traditionally favored the Congress party. As a consequence 
of all this, the INC has been able to hold on to some of its former glory in Andhra Pradesh 
unlike many other States. In A.P., however decimated it may be, the Congress has declined, 
but not as dramatically as elsewhere.  
 
Bihar 
Bihar is India’s third-largest State and in many ways an important bellwether entity and a 
trendsetter in politics. Unfortunately for the people of Bihar, unlike in the 1950s, Bihar today 
is a trendsetter mainly in a negative sense. It is a laggard when it comes to good economic and 
social governance as well as overall development and it is also a State rife with high crime 
rates and a creeping criminalization of the political process and institutions (Mitra 2006: 103). 
Seen from the political angle, in recent decades the criminalization of politics has essentially 
contributed to the erosion of confidence in the democratic process and to an increase in extra-
democratic forms of political participation, such as political violence. The Naxalite movement 
is a case in point along those lines. Bihar is second among India’s major States only to Uttar 
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Pradesh between 1967 and 1991 in terms of its levels of cabinet instability (Chhibber 1999). 
Caste and identity politics in general are nowadays at the very forefront of the political debate 
in Bihar (Mitra 2006; Kumar 2007b: 207). In no small measure this trend toward a much 
greater emphasis of identity and self-respect issues of socially disadvantaged groups is 
associated with the name of Laloo Prasad Yadav, the undisputed leadership figure in the 
Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), a party which, like the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi 
Party in North India has capitalized on the high caste-low caste divide over the years. Bihar 
can be divided into several sub regions and party support tends to vary widely between 
regions except in the case of the RJD which in recent years has emerged as a party with 
significant support across various sub regions within Bihar. More volatile are the support for 
the Congress party (concentrated in the Mithila, Magadh and Bhijpur regions) and the JD(U) 
(strongest in Tirhur, Mithila and Magadh) in the more recent 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The 
new multiparty constellation in Bihar politics is essentially a result of the breakup of the 
former Janata Dal in the 1990s which produced the cross-State JD(U) and the Bihar-based 
RJD. Another contributing factor was a sharp Congress decline under Indira and then Rajiv 
Gandhi in the 1980s (Blair 1993: 52) which essentially led to a disintegration of the INC’s 
electoral machine in Bihar due to the neglect of organizational campaign infrastructure in 
favor of more overt populism to reach out to a broader audience. In the 1990s two additional 
circumstances exacerbated these already detrimental trends in Bihar for the Congress party. 
The first was the lukewarm reception by the INC leadership of the demands of tribal leaders 
for an independent State of Jharkhand carved out of Bihar (Fickett 1993: 89). The second one 
was the spillover of communal strife into Bihar from Uttar Pradesh between Hindus and 
Muslims in the early 1990s in the aftermath of the Ayodhya riots in 1991 and the way in 
which that antagonism was handled by the Congress leadership. Both factors worked against 
the INC and in favor of the two Dals in Bihar since both tribal and Muslim opinion leaders 
were ready at that time to re-think their political loyalties which had been with the Congress 
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party before. An aspect rather unique to Bihar in the minds of many observers is the fact that 
despite its poor performance on most development indicators, counter intuitively development 
issues and the satisfaction with the government’s performance on these does not seem to be at 
the top of the priorities list mentioned by Biharis in surveys. On the contrary, caste and 
identity seem to trump material welfare in Bihar (Kumar 2007b: 219). The fact that the RJD 
government, which was overwhelmingly viewed as failing to deliver on development-related 
promises, was still able to win the Lok Sabha elections in Bihar in 2004 yet was trounced in 
the State Assembly elections of 2005, speaks to this ambiguity of voters in Bihar between 
hard policy and soft symbolic issues. Nonetheless, class or income does matter for voters in 
Bihar (Kumar 2007b). The poorer the voters surveyed were, the more favorable Laloo Yadav 
and his promises seemed to them. The same holds mutatis mutandis for Muslims as well. The 
merger of populist promises to the poor and the emphasis on demanding the respect owed to 
the downtrodden castes and classes on account of their numerical strength in Bihar seem to 
have been a successful campaign tactic for a long period of time now. The picture in 
Appendix C shows Laloo Yadav in a typical pose: Combining a rustic outfit with an elevated 
seating position when receiving (especially upper caste) visitors asking for guidance and 
favors. This style signals to his support groups that even as a lower caste man, Yadav will 
demand respect (“izzat”) from members of higher-ranking caste groups, an idea unthinkable 
in politics, or daily life for that matter, fifty or a hundred years ago in Bihar. And it is also a 
relatively affordable signal to send to potential voters, as compared to the alternative of 
shoring up enough financial resources to finance an expensive election campaign based on 
doling out jobs and monetary favors to local powerbrokers willing to organize the vote of 
their respective group for a given candidate. In that sense Bihar is again at the forefront of this 
new electoral strategy in India’s Northern region. 
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Gujarat 
Gujarat, the home State of Mahatma Gandhi has been among the more successful States in 
terms of economic development over the past six decades. The State was an early developer 
by Indian standards and has bases in fishing, agriculture, chemical industry and shipbuilding. 
Politically, the State has remained relatively solidly within the camp of two-party national 
competition (type I) for most of the last decades. As far as governmental stability is 
concerned, the State enjoyed above average cabinet stability from 1967 to 1991 (Chhibber 
1999: 122). Since then, however, Gujarat saw considerably more instability with numerous 
Chief Ministers entering and leaving office, often with terms of less than a year. In terms of 
support group configurations, it is notable that the Muslims’ vote has increasingly become 
marginalized in the State. The Congress party depends on it, but it itself has been 
outperformed by the BJP for a number of years now, giving Muslims in the State not much 
actual leverage in politics. Unlike in some other Northern Indian States, the INC has not 
suffered progressively worse electoral results in recent years and even earlier, during the 
1980s. In part this may well be due to the lasting impact of the transformation which the party 
underwent in the 1970s when the Congress leadership in Gujarat sought to build its KHAM 
(Kshatriya, harijan, adivasi, Muslim) coalition. This appeal to all socially disadvantaged 
groups in the State allowed the Congress to remain comparatively more successful in 
subsequent years at maintaining support, especially when compared to Uttar Pradesh or Bihar, 
in the face of the “silent revolution” from below, i.e. the increasing vocalness of the poor and 
uneducated masses. This responsiveness, however, was not only in rhetoric unlike in some 
other States like Bihar. It was also reflected in the changed recruitment patterns for party 
offices. When looking at the representation of different case groups in the Legislative 
Assembly of Gujarat, Subrata Mitra found that as a whole, Congress MLAs were much more 
representative of the population as a whole in 1980 compared to 1967 (Mitra 1987: 157). The 
INC went from an upper middle caste party to one building heavily on lower caste strata, 
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while the other parties actually morphed into a much less representative group almost half of 
which are from the same upper middle caste background. Thus, in all the INC weathered the 
changes in the socio-demographic structure of power in Gujarati society and the new 
assertiveness of lower and scheduled castes better in Gujarat than in other States. 
 
Karnataka 
Karnataka has traditionally been a Congress party stronghold. In terms of cabinet stability 
between 1967 and 1991, Karnataka ranks sixth-lowest among major States (Chhibber 1999) 
with eight Chief Ministers alone during that period. Before the start of our investigative 
period, in 1971, the INC won all 27 seats in the elections to the Lok Sabha that year. 
Likewise, in the general elections of 1977, while the party lost seats in the Lok Sabha by a 
landslide, it held on in Karnataka (27 out of 28 seats). It did so in part by distancing itself 
from the central government which appeared tainted at the time due to the dictatorial excesses 
under Emergency rule (Manor 1978). Also helpful was the fact that the State government 
targeted poor and lower caste voters by instituting affirmative action measures such as access 
to public sector employment through quotas just before the general elections (The Statesman, 
“Concessions to the Backward”, 23 February 1977). In the 1970s the Congress-led Devraj Urs 
government instituted successful land reforms, a pressing issue all over India in rural areas, 
which bound poorer voters to the INC and led to rather positive performance-based pro-
Congress voting in an environment where politicians were often voted into office based more 
on their unrealistic promises than an actual evaluation of incumbents’ and candidates’ past 
performance records. In Karnataka, unstable cabinets have been and issue from 1978 to 2000. 
In part this was due to the prevalence of factional in-fighting in the Congress party. Karnataka 
with ten Chief Ministers in 22 years set a near-record by Indian standards. While in the 1970s 
Congress still dominated the State’s party system this changed in the 1990s and the Janata Dal 
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and later, after a split, the BKD became the other main parties, together with the BJP and 
Congress making Karnataka a multiparty system today.  
 
4.5.2 Partyness – The Role of Trust and of Independents  
In the four chosen cases, there are no uniform trends regarding the performance of 
independents. In the initial period (1977 to 1989), Bihar shows above average support for 
independents. This trend persisted throughout the 1990s as tables 4.3 and 4.4 show.  
 
Figure 4.3: The Independent Vote Share in Four States (1977-1989) 
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Source: Own calculation based on reports on electoral participation from the ECI over time and across States. 
See table 4.2 for original source material. 
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Figure 4.4: The Independent Vote Share in Four States (1990-2000): 
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Source: Own calculation based on reports on electoral participation from the ECI over time and across States. 
See table 4.2 for original source material. 
 
 
In the case of Andhra Pradesh in the 1970s and 1980s, the high share of votes for independent 
candidates astonishes, but is easily explained. In 1983 prospective candidates for the not-yet 
registered Telugu Desam Party registered their candidacy to run in the upcoming State 
elections as independents and only later joined the Telugu Desam after its registration had 
been completed. It was that year 1983 which brought the Telugu Desam into the limelight in 
Andhra Pradesh politics. Similar circumstances may help explain the outlying elections in 
Gujarat in 1995. It would thus be easy to dismiss the vote for independent candidates as 
artificially inflated and thus irrelevant to our understanding of the level of party system 
institutionalization in these States. In so far as we do regard the distinction between 
candidates with and without a party label important, the fact that large numbers of candidates 
ran as independents and still won substantial shares of the vote, however, does indicate the 
 124
comparable irrelevance of party affiliation and hence points to a lower level of partyness in 
the electoral process. 
 
Table 4.5: Vote Share of Independent Candidates and the Effective !umber of Parties 
State Vote, Pre-1990 Vote, Post-1990 EP Pre-1990 EP Post-1990 
Andhra Pradesh 20.22 6.72 4.508 2.895 
Bihar 17.86 14.53 5.060 7.360 
Gujarat 9.63 11.46 2.865 3.463 
Karnataka 10.14 10.83 3.205 4.370 
Group Average 14.46 10.88 3.91 4.52 
Source: See table 4.2, own calculation. 
 
As table 4.5 indicates there are differences between our cases both in terms of the vote for 
independents as well as the trend in that vote over time as well as cross-case and also in over-
time differences in the level of fragmentation of the electoral landscape as measure through 
Laakso and Taagepera’s measure (ENP). Just as Andhra Pradesh’s independent vote share 
declined over time, so did the level of party system fragmentation (both are of course linked 
to some extent). For both Gujarat and Karnataka the trend points towards a greater or at least a 
stable role for independents as well as towards greater fragmentation over time. Bihar shows 
high levels of voting for independents as well as high levels of fragmentation over time. The 
converse trend in Bihar (decreased vote share of independents despite increased 
fragmentation) compared to the other three States is indicative to some extent of the particular 
dynamics in party politics of that State. While independents play a role in driving ENP in the 
other three States, while party organizational factors in the form of splits play a more 
important role for fragmentation in Bihar. All of these render party system institutionalization 
in Bihar in the near future doubtful. 
 
4.5.3 Organizational Continuity 
Turning to the issue of organizational continuity, we will examine first the weighted relative 
age of the four party systems in question. What is striking about figure 4.5 (below) is that on 
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average none of the four party systems appear more institutionalized than the very similar 
Russian national party system which had a comparatively short lifespan so far, high turnover 
of party labels and comparatively high fragmentation of the vote. The 1985 election in Gujarat 
and the 2000 election in Andhra Pradesh, however, come within reach of the 0.7-level which 
would make them comparable to the British party system’s level of institutionalization in 
2005.  
 
Figure 4.5: The Weighted Relative Age of Party Systems in Four States (1977-2000) 
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Source: Own calculation based on reports on party electoral participation over time and across States. See table 
4.2 for original source material. 
 
By this standard of institutionalization, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh stand out to some extent. 
Gujarat, with its continued two-party national competition between BJP and INC, is notable 
since it is the most institutionalized party system as measured in terms of its weighted relative 
age across the entire time period since 1977 (type I). Andhra Pradesh, with a national-regional 
configuration of party competition between TDP and Congress party (type II) is remarkable 
due to the almost unbroken trend of steadily increasing levels of institutionalization since its 
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low in 1983 at the advent of the newly founded and instantaneously successful Telugu Desam 
Party as represented by then-independent candidates, which deflated the WRA for that 
election year. Bihar a case of unstable national-regional mixed party competition (type V) is 
clearly the case with the lowest and still decreasing levels of institutionalization in terms of 
age of the party system. Another interesting aspect of party systems concerns the share of new 
parties competing in each election, i.e. the share of parties who did not run candidates in the 
previous election, but are doing so in the present election. Table 4.6 details this share or 
“entry rate” for each of the four States under investigation. An interesting counterintuitive 
finding is that although the share of new entities competing at an average election has gone up 
dramatically since the pre-1990 period in Gujarat, but at the same time, the WRA index has 
gone down. This essentially indicates that most of the new entities did not win sizeable vote 
shares in the first few elections after their first appearance in Gujarat and most likely died, 
much in line with Pedersen’s theoretical expectations (1982) typical of small parties’ 
performances. Karnataka, though still high, has the lowest entry rate over time, while Bihar, 
much as expected has the highest both before and after 1990. 
 
Table 4.6: Electoral Availability in Four States (1980-2000) 
State Entry Rate 1980-2000 Entry Rate Pre-1990 Entry Rate Post-1990 
Andhra Pradesh 38.56 33.90 45.55 
Bihar 50.68 39.10 58.39 
Gujarat 42.53 16.67 51.15 
Karnataka 36.10 35.71 36.68 
Group Average -- 31.34 47.94 
Source: See table 4.2, own calculation. 
 
4.5.4 Rootedness – System-level Volatility 
 
The final dimension of PSI and our four cases concerns system-level volatility trends. Table 
4.7 (below) shows the net inter-election volatility Vt (Pedersen 1982: 4) for two pairs of 
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elections respectively across the four States. Logically, Vt  can range from 0 to 100. 
Empirically for the time period from 1948 to 1977 the average was 8.1% across 103 elections 
in 13 European countries (ibid.). For both time periods under investigation here only Gujarat 
shows a comparable pattern of vote stability. Andhra Pradesh shows a decline in volatility 
when we compare the two chosen electoral periods, while Karnataka, its neighbor, saw an 
equally impressive increase in volatility. As with most dimensions of party system 
institutionalization, Bihar comes in a clear last with close to or more than 50% volatility in 
both time periods and an actually upward rather than downward trend.  
 
Table 4.7: Inter-election Volatility in Four States 
State Volatility Pre-1990 Volatility Post-1990 
Andhra Pradesh (1978-83, 1994-99) 46.12 15.65 
Bihar (1977-80, 1995-2000) 49.55 55.67 
Gujarat (1983-85, 1995-98) 5.65 9.58 
Karnataka (1978-83, 1994-99) 13.21 43.12 
Group Average 28.63 31.01 
Source: See table 4.2, own calculation. 
 
As with the other indicators, no clear trend emerges from simply looking at this one 
dimension of institutionalization. Instead it seems that all three States look quite different 
from each other in terms of the level of institutionalization we find in each. In the following 
section we will discuss these findings from a comparative perspective to arrive at a clearer 
understanding of the cross-currents of relative institutionalization of party politics in India’s 
States. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
From the overview of various indicators tapping the different dimensions of PSI (partyness – 
rootedness – organizational continuity) it has become clear that there are different trends 
throughout India and in individual States regarding the different dimensions of party system 
institutionalization.  
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On the one hand, trust in political parties declined substantially and rebounded only to a 
limited extent more recently, according to survey data, indicating either a certain frustration 
with party political processes or the performance of party government or a more general and 
deeper skepticism of parties as institutions. On the other hand, the logical alternative – party-
less elections – seems no more popular as the overall decline in voting support for 
independent candidates shows. One might be able to reconcile these seemingly contradictory 
trends by assuming that part of the decline in trust expressed in the survey data is less 
systemic frustration or apathy toward politics, but rather very specific frustration about the 
failings of particular politicians which is couched in terms of skepticism towards parties 
which these politicians represent. 
Secondly, there does not appear to be one good single explanation for the sometimes opposing 
trends of institutionalization and de-institutionalization of party politics as measured for 
example by the weighted relative age of party systems or the rate of entry of new parties into 
the electoral fray or the levels and trends in volatility between elections. Instead of seeking the 
magic bullet we need to be prepared to use multiple avenues to tackle PSI.  
Taking stock of the levels of institutionalization in the group of four States over the different 
indicators, table 4.8 sums up the different dimensions of institutionalization. The 
institutionalization scores in column four are obtained by assigning a “0” on an indicator 
when a State displays an above average level on that indicator and “1” if it displays below 
average levels. This means that the higher the total institutionalization score is the higher is 
the level of institutionalization. 
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Table 4.8: Levels of Institutionalization Across Four States 
State Independent 
Vote 
WRA Electoral 
Availability 
Volatility Total 
Pre-1990:      
Andhra 
Pradesh 
0 1 0 0 1 
Bihar 0 0 0 0 0 
Gujarat 1 1 1 1 4 
Karnataka 1 1 0 1 3 
Post-1990:      
Andhra 
Pradesh 
1 1 1 1 4 
Bihar 0 0 0 0 0 
Gujarat 0 1 0 1 2 
Karnataka 1 0 1 0 2 
 
Based on this scoring for the pre-1990 period, Gujarat has the highest overall level of 
institutionalization within this group, followed by Karnataka in second place, Andhra Pradesh 
in third with Bihar in fourth place. For the post-1990 phase, Andhra Pradesh leads the group 
with the highest level of institutionalization, followed by Karnataka, Gujarat and a distant 
Bihar in last place. Bihar’s, but also Karnataka’s comparatively less institutionalized party 
systems appear so, in no small measure in the second half of the 1990s because of the breakup 
of the Janata Dal into several new parties (among them the RJD and the Samata Party in 
Bihar). This split influenced our indicators heavily, e.g. the weighted relative age for Bihar in 
the 1990s and the volatility scores as well. Some might argue that volatility should be 
assessed not by looking at individual parties, but rather by looking at ideological groupings of 
parties instead and the inter-group volatility since it supposedly would not matter how many 
voters changed parties as long as the respective groupings remained relatively stable over time 
(Bartolini/Mair 1990). What has also been advocated is the treatment of splinter parties from 
the same precursor party as if they were still one party, in particular in countries where such 
fractures and mergers of parties are a frequent occurrence. For India, these views have also 
been advocated (see Betz 2008: 623 for example), but with the caveat that the groups to be 
investigated should be seen as loose alliances or fronts constituted more out of political 
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expediency than ideological cohesion. Looking at the party landscape in India in particular, 
but also other countries more broadly, this approach seems unconvincing. What we see in 
States like Bihar is an extremely fluid electoral arena in which numerous new party labels are 
frequently tried out and then abandoned, organizations such as the Janata Dal splinter across 
India and even into several new formations within Bihar in 1992, and voters voluntarily or 
because they have no alternative, choose to vote for a new party’s candidate or for an 
independent at election time. To mask this fluidity by artificially re-constructing erstwhile 
existing parties out of new smaller and more parochial successors defeats the very purpose of 
an inquiry into the relative level of institutionalization of party politics. What research needs 
to do instead is to embrace the notion that these very splinterings of organizations are not 
coincidental or somehow irrelevant to our understanding of an otherwise stable political 
system. Instead, they are at the very core of an understanding of the relative importance (or 
not) of parties as autonomous intermediaries between voters and the leadership personnel of 
politics. This realization will enable us to understand that the relative lack of 
institutionalization of party politics is as much a function of the population and its lack of 
attachment to individual political parties and by extension to parties in general as it is a 
function of how parties which come and go in large numbers, which build ad hoc coalitions of 
voters based on caste groups and patronage of the day, and which splinter over incompatible 
personalities of party leaders, reinforce the trend away from a deeper institutionalization of 
parties and from their autonomy as organizations rather than as just electoral machines of 
individual candidates. 
Lastly, the divergence of our four cases from overall national trends as well as their relative 
difference to each other should caution the student of Indian politics against adopting overly 
simplistic arguments which generalize in broad strokes across all of India’s regions. This 
differentiation along the dimensions of PSI as well as that along the issue of regionalization of 
party politics as we shall see in chapter five underscore the idea that India’s States have 
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become political arenas in their own right and that the intensive study of regional variations in 
political phenomena is a worthwhile undertaking. 
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The Regionalization of Party Systems 
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5. The Regionalization of Party Systems 
 
This chapter provides a broad overview of a range of indicators of regionalization of State 
politics since the 1970s. It is firstly a descriptive account of the scope and the extent of the 
growing importance of regional political parties across India's States over time. It also 
provides an analysis of opinion data on the views on politics and a social profile of voters 
preferring regional rather than national parties in India. 
 
5.1 Regional Identity in the Mirror of Public Opinion 
 
Before assessing the regionalization of party politics a logical point of departure seems to be 
to assess the overall loyalty Indians feel towards different real or imagined communities they 
live in and the relative importance of regional and national identities, as well as loyalties to 
regional versus national parties in India on the basis of responses to a sample survey 
conducted in 1990, 1995 and 2001 as part of the World Values Survey project. This will later 
allow us to develop a profile of typical supporters of regional parties based on their personal 
backgrounds and also to assess the link between affinity to regional rather than national 
political parties and other characteristics of voters relevant to political life.  
When studying regional political parties in Europe, the idea that regional parties are 
necessarily regionalist often underpins the approach to the subject (see chapter one for an 
overview of the relevant literature). In three waves of a global survey (see appendix D for 
details), respondents were asked about which entity they felt they belonged to first and 
foremost. Figure 5.1 charts the changes over time in the Indian responses to this question. 
What is remarkable is the surge in identification with local and regional rather than national 
identities in the mid-1990s and the relative reversal of this trend until 2001.  
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Figure 5.1: Territorial Frames of Belonging 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This general trend in the direction of a closer attachment to subnational rather than national or 
supranational communities coincides with the period of unprecedented expansion of electoral 
success across the Indian States. This naturally begs the question whether these two trends are 
coincidental or whether a convergence exists between a general trend toward what Almond 
and Verba (1953) might have called “parochialism” and the message of regional political 
parties and their success in pitching this message to the Indian people in the 1990s. 
The questions this chapter will seek to answer are as follows: To what extent have 
regional parties been able to win votes and seats across the Indian States? Which social, 
economic and political contextual factors have contributed to the increasing electoral support 
for and success of regional parties at the State level over time? Which characteristics 
distinguish supporters of regional parties from other people? Is the trend towards greater 
support of regional parties indicative of a fragmentation process in Indian society and public 
opinion which distinguishes supporters of regional parties from other partisans? Before 
answering these questions in turn, we should revisit the issue of measuring the phenomenon 
we have referred to as “regionalization”. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1990 1995 2001
WAVE OF THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY
P
E
R
C
E
N
T
 F
IR
S
T
Locality Region India South Asia World
 135
5.2 Measuring Regionalization of Party Politics 
 
This analysis of regionalization as a phenomenon in Indian politics will have to have two 
broad perspectives: a macro and a micro perspective. As already stated in chapter two, we 
assume that processes of regularization (institutionalization) crucially link organizational and 
social factors in leading to higher or lower levels of regionalization of party politics. Unlike 
other studies (e.g. Basedau/Stroh 2008), we are not immediately concerned with the electoral 
successes of individual regional parties which are part of this manifestation of the 
phenomenon, since these successes are crucially influenced by the nature of India’s single 
member district plurality (SMDP) voting system. We are also less concerned with the policy 
or other consequences which might be seen as indicative of the regionalization of politics in 
India. Rather, we are interested in a the question of why support has shifted increasingly 
toward regional political forces and away from national political parties and in whether this 
shift is part of a larger drift away from national political debates, concerns and attachments.  
As outlined in chapter two, at the aggregate level we will take as our yardstick of 
“regionalization” one characteristic of the party systems under investigation, namely the 
combined relative strength of electoral support for candidates of national parties as defined by 
the Election Commission of India versus those of non-national parties and independents. Our 
real focus is, therefore, the electoral support for all “non-national” candidates. In order not to 
focus exclusively on the aggregate subnational perspective, we will also analyze the 
regionalization levels over time based on opinion data gathered on a variety of social and 
political issues. Thus, regionalization will be seen not only as a trend in actually observable 
behavior (voting), but also as one found in opinions voiced by voters in surveys. This 
combined approach will allow us to gain insights as to whether there are differences between 
supporters of national versus those of non-national parties and candidates. It will also allow us 
to see whether or not the respective characteristics have changed over time. This view should 
also yield insights into how far support for national parties and candidates and for non-
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national parties and candidates are incompatible or not and what the determinants of such 
preferences might be. Before formulating some hypotheses to be tested, the following section 
will provide an overview of the extent of the regionalization and regional differentiation of 
politics across the Indian States. 
 
 
5.3 Regional Differences in Regionalization of Party and Electoral Politics 
 
One of the rationales for undertaking this study of regionalization and institutionalization was 
the notion that considerable regional differences exist between States and time periods in the 
development of Indian politics. Chapter three already outlined some of the differences in 
terms of socio-demographic variables which we will use in this chapter to analyze 
regionalization’s underlying causes. Before doing so, however, it seems prudent to continue 
this inquiry first with a look at the extent of the regional differences or similarities in the 
levels of regionalization itself. 
As figure 5.2 shows, the greatest levels of regionalization in the pre-1989 phase could be 
found in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and a number of States in the Indian Northeast. The 
lowest levels could be found in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka and, unsurprisingly 
for the capital, in New Delhi.  
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Map 5.1: Avg. Vote Shares for !on-national Parties and Candidates (1977-1989) 
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Map 5.2: Avg. Vote Shares for !on-national Parties and Candidates (1989-2001) 
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For the post-1989 period Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Sikkim, the Northeast 
and Haryana show high levels, while Karnataka, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh constitute the low end of the spectrum. 
 
 
5.4 Hypotheses 
 
Based on the literature on regional party proliferation and the general literature on 
partisanship and voter preferences, we can formulate a number of hypotheses for both the 
micro-level and the macro-level analyses. All of these will be discussed now in turn, 
beginning with the hypotheses regarding the aggregate level of electoral support for non-
national candidates. 
 
5.4.1 Macro-level Hypotheses 
Due to the tendency of regionalist parties to adopt sons-of-the-soil type positions, migrants, 
especially economic migrants from other States can provide the convenient backdrop for 
regionalist messages. This may lead voters with isolationist views to support such regionalist 
forces.  H1: The greater the share of migrants the greater the support for regional parties. 
 
High levels of turnout indicate a mobilization of both moderate, less committed and partisan 
voters, while low turnout usually means that the more partisan voters carry greater weight 
since they tend to be equally likely to turn out to vote in high or low turnout elections (Müller-
Rommel 1998). H2: Low turnout correlates with high levels of support for regional parties. 
 
The logic behind assuming that populations with high shares of illiterates would lead to higher 
support for regional candidates lies in the assumption of modernization theorists like Verba 
Nie and Kim (Verba et al. 1978) that low educational attainment typically leads to a more 
localist outlook and less sophistication in evaluating political messages. This supposedly 
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benefits parties building their appeals principally on locally-geared messages and networks 
such as regional parties, in particular regionalist parties, do. H3: The higher the literate share 
of a State’s population, the lower the share for non-national candidates (and parties).  
 
Other studies premise their accounts on the contention that relative deprivation will lead 
voters in poorer States to vote for regionalist or even secessionist parties in larger numbers. 
The reasoning behind this assumption is that disaffection with the way national parties are 
delivering on developmental or economic goals for a particular region might provide an 
opening for new non-national parties and candidates to capitalize on this fact and shore up 
political support. H4a: The poorer the population of a State, the higher the vote shares of 
non-national candidates. 
 
As an alternative reasoning to hypothesis no. 4a, one might formulate an antithesis which 
states, based on the literature on secessionism (e.g. Hale 2000) and on our own model in 
chapter two, that it is known that political elites in richer regions of a country have incentives 
to adopt hard-line positions concentrating on the interests of the region they claim to 
represent. On the other hand, elites and voters in poorer regions have incentives to opt for 
conciliatory positions regarding center-state relations. This kind of environment would hence 
seem less conducive to the success of regional parties and candidates than that of a wealthy 
State. Consequently, one should expect to see more parties and candidates successfully 
competing which are regional in nature in those regions with above average levels of 
economic wealth. H4b: The richer the population of a state, the higher the support for non-
national candidates and parties. 
 
In chapter four we posited the link between levels of fragmentation, institutionalization and 
regionalization. If this link is theoretically sound, we should see an empirical link between 
 141
levels of fragmentation and the levels of support for non-national candidates and regional 
party candidates. H5: The higher the levels of fragmentation the higher the levels of 
regionalization of elections. 
 
Assuming that established national parties benefit disproportionately from brand and name 
recognition of parties and candidates which are easier to achieve and maintain in the less 
anonymous and impersonal environments of urban areas, more urbanized States make for less 
ideal working conditions for national parties. Conversely, the less structured urban 
environments where ties of politicians to voters through caste or long-standing clientelist ties 
should open more opportunities for non-national candidates who are (at least initially) at a 
disadvantage compared to national party candidates in terms of social clout and patronage 
resources. H6: The higher the level of urbanization, the higher the share of votes for non-
national candidates or parties. 
 
In Indian States the media market in general and the newspaper market in particular, has 
undergone a fundamental transformation over the recent decades. The Indian market as a 
whole used to be dominated in the early post-independence decades by newspapers and 
magazines published in English or Hindi and to a much lesser extent a few of the other main 
regional languages. Since then, a multitude of new entrepreneurs have fundamentally altered 
the structure of the market and shifted it to one in which regional language media (of which 
Hindi could be considered one, as will be discussed subsequently) predominate in most States. 
This shift to more numerous and increasingly regional outlets will likely open up new 
opportunities for new regional political entrepreneurs to utilize the new greater availability of 
newspapers, intelligible even to voters who only speak and read the regional language, to get 
their more regional message out. H7: The higher the share of regional language newspapers 
of all newspapers in the State, the higher is the share of support for non-national candidates.  
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Previous theories of party competition and regionalization have stressed the importance of the 
relative levels of social heterogeneity for the level of regionalization of party politics (see 
chapter two). If the support for non-national or regional parties and candidates were indicative 
of some sort of disaffection with the larger national political community and of more or less 
overt regionalist tendencies, one would assume that regionally concentrated subpopulations 
would be more easily mobilized on the basis of such a message. Hence, greater social 
heterogeneity should in principle mitigate such mobilization by dividing regional 
subpopulations along caste, class or religious lines. H8: The greater social heterogeneity of a 
State the lower the support for non-national candidates and parties. 
 
We also believe, based on the model developed in chapter two and on the implications drawn 
from it that the economic wealth of a region will affect regional party support in conjunction 
with time in the sense that elections after 1989, the watershed year in which a coalition of 
regional parties came to power in the central government, will produce different results 
compared to elections until 1989. We will thus control for economic wealth levels and split 
the analysis into two parts, of which one will cover the period until 1989 and the second one 
the period from then until 2000. In order to not only investigate possibly misleading aggregate 
relationships we will also use opinion data to test another set of hypotheses regarding support 
for regional parties. 
 
5.4.2 Micro-level Hypotheses 
At the individual level we will investigate the relationship between ages of respondents, 
assuming that if parochialism is a form of conservatism and parochialism leads to support for 
regional parties, older respondents should be more likely to be supporters of regional parties 
(H9). Secondly, we will test the idea that urbanization mitigates regionalism and thus support 
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for regional parties by creating a broader outlook on life in urban dwellers and minimizing 
parochial views on politics. Hence urban respondents should be less likely to support regional 
parties (H10). Thirdly, we will assess the notion that higher education leads to lower support 
for regional parties (H11) since more educated respondents would be more concerned with 
broader national issues than less educated respondents and would hence be less likely to favor 
regional parties who often are portrayed as concerned only with regional and local rural 
issues. Another issue we wish to explore is the proposition that lower class status makes 
respondents more likely to favor regional parties (H12) as lower class status in India is usually 
correlated with non-urban residence. The last proposition to be tested is that of a possible 
relationship of Hindu versus non-Hindu status being related to the propensity of supporting 
regional parties (H13). Conceivably, regional parties might be more sensitive to ethnic and 
religious minority concerns if they themselves prioritize group rights demands vis-à-vis the 
State or central government for example. 
The following section will briefly detail the operationalization of the independent variables 
measuring regionalization and its determinants at the aggregate level and outline the sources 
from which the data on the variables were obtained before conducting the aggregate analysis. 
Section 5.6 will then do the same for the micro-level analysis. 
 
5.5 Correlates of Regionalization of Elections: The Aggregate Picture 
 
The question at hand is which of the characteristics of the Indian States as arenas of electoral 
politics are particularly conducive to a regionalization of elections in terms of the vote shares 
recorded for non-national candidates and the parties they represent. To answer this question at 
least partly, this section will measure the strength of the association of the vote shares 
received by all candidates not running on national party tickets and in a second step of those 
candidates running on regional party tickets in the State Assembly elections prior to and from 
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1990 onwards with a number of indicators operationalizing the concepts contained in 
hypotheses one through eight. 
 
5.5.1 Data and Measurement 
The respective sources for the data used in the aggregate data analysis are listed in the table in 
Appendix D. The dependent variables are the vote shares (in %) of candidates not running on 
national party labels (NNV) and secondly the partially overlapping vote shares of all 
candidates contesting explicitly under the labels of regional parties (RPV), i.e. NNV minus 
the vote share of independent candidates. Since we expect the effects to be conditioned by 
both time (pre-1990 versus post-1990) and economic wealth, we attempt to control for these 
two factors by a) splitting the analysis of the 1977 to 2000 period into two separate analyses, 
namely the pre-1990 and the post-1990 period (1990 and later), and b) by controlling for the 
level of economic development in the partial correlations. The economic control variable in 
the correlation is based on the dichotomous scoring of the States as above (“1”) or below 
(“0”) the period averages of States in terms of the per capita Net State Domestic Product at 
Factor Cost (constant prices, 1980-1989, 1990-2000). A description of the range and coding 
of the various independent variable-related indicators can be found in Appendix D.  
 
5.5.2 Analysis 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (below) detail the correlates of the support for all non-national candidates 
and regional party candidates in particular. Immediately, differences in the relationships 
between variables between the two time periods become visible in table 5.1. Both the vote 
shares of all non-national candidates as well as those of specifically regional party candidates 
seem to improve in State elections when turnout is particularly high throughout both time 
periods under investigation seeming to confound hypothesis 2. 
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Table 5.1: Bivariate Correlations of the !on-national Vote 
 Pre-1990 (N=81) Post-1990 (N=62) 
 
V RPV V RPV 
Migrant Population (H1) 0.063 0.148 0.004 -0.007 
Turnout (H2) 0.466** 0.414** 0.341** 0.292* 
Literacy (H3) 0.244* 0.286** 0.200 0.240 
Poverty (H4a/H4b) -0.117 -0.025 
-0.080 
(N=58) 
-0.078 
(N=58) 
ENP (H5) 0.301** -0.032 0.325* 0.255 
Urbanization (H6) -0.041 0.075 
0.068 
(N=60) 
0.104 
(N=60) 
Regional Media Strength (H7) 
-0.486** 
(N=65) 
-0.381** 
(N=65) 
-0.338 
(N=60) 
-0.342 
(N=60) 
Hindi Media Strength (H7) 
-0.255 
(N=65) 
-0.258 
(N=65) 
-0.254 
(N=60) 
-0.278* 
(N=60) 
Religious Fragmentation (H8) 0.290** 0.202 0.035 -0.025 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,  * p<0.05 . NNV=Non-national vote share. RPV=Regional party vote share. 
 
Table 5.2: Partial Correlations of the !on-national Vote (controlling for per capita 
economic wealth) 
 Pre-1990 (N=61) Post-1990 (N=51) 
 V RPV V RPV 
Migrant Population (H1) 0.011 0.053 -0.236 -0.267 
Turnout (H2) 0.569*** 0.493*** 0.442** 0.389** 
Literacy (H3) 0.399** 0.470*** -0.007 0.078 
Poverty (H4a/H4b) -0.104 0.035 0.011 0.005 
ENP (H5) 0.392** 0.048 0.461** 0.381** 
Urbanization (H6) 0.025 0.201 -0.184 -0.087 
Regional Media Strength (H7) -0.560*** -0.457*** -0.361** -0.357** 
Hindi Media Strength (H7) -0.230 -0.225 -0.226 -0.277* 
Religious Fragmentation (H8) 0.391** 0.204 0.117 0.033 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,  * p<0.05 . NNV=Non-national vote share. RPV=Regional party vote share. 
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On the other hand, according to the data in table 5.1, due to rather small and insignificant 
correlation coefficients, urbanization rates, shares of migrants and shares of poor people in the 
States’ population seem unrelated to the strength of State-wide vote shares of non-
national/regional party candidates throughout. On the other hand, the more literate the overall 
population of a States was between 1977 and 1989, the higher the vote shares for candidates 
who were not affiliated with national parties generally were in State elections during that time 
period. Although the association is not particularly strong, it stands out as one of the 
significant relationships which, however, disappears during the latter time period. At least for 
the vote shares of independents and regional party candidates taken together (NNV), the level 
of fragmentation of the party system based on the distribution of votes (ENP) is somewhat 
moderately and significantly related to it throughout both time periods. 
Table 5.2 (above) shows us how the relationships between the variables change when we 
control for the levels of wealth in the States under investigation as our model from chapter 
two calls for. According to the partial correlation analysis, when controlling for below or 
above average per capita economic development, the poverty rates, urbanization rates and 
shares of inter-State migrants in the State population still do not appear to have any significant 
association with the support for non-national or regional party candidates in State elections 
during any of the two time periods, although interestingly share of migrants and urbanization 
rate change their signs between the time periods. Literacy, holding the level of economic 
development constant, has a significant association to both NNV and RPV during time period 
one. The same is true for religious fragmentation as a proxy for social heterogeneity and the 
broader non-national vote (NNV). According to this perspective, candidates not running on a 
national party ticket (NNV), or on a regional party ticket (RPV) fare particularly well between 
1977 and 1989 in those States with literate and religiously fragmented populations. Both these 
findings contradict the hypotheses three and eight. On the other hand, turnout is clearly 
positively and significantly related to the level of support (NNV and RPV). This relationship 
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is significant and positive irrespective of the control for levels of per capita economic 
development which suggests that economic development does not impinge very much on it. 
The share of regional language newspapers in the total number of newspapers in the States is 
negatively and significantly associated with higher levels of NNV and RPV. In part, this 
association is enhanced because of the strength of Hindi language newspapers in the North as 
for example the weakening of the correlation between regional media strength and NNV and 
RPV in the post-1990 phase with partial correlation coefficients of -0.297 (p<0.05) and -0.304 
(p<0.05), respectively, shows when controlling for the strength of Hindi newspapers in the 
States. This relationship is also stable irrespective of the control for level of per capita 
economic development, again suggesting that that variable only has a limited and merely 
enhancing effect on this relationship. Nevertheless, the fact that a greater share of regional 
language newspapers leads to lower vote shares (NNV and RPV) beyond the effect that Hindi 
language media have (the regional language in many North Indian States which are often 
dominated by INC and BJP, and earlier the then-national Janata Dal, national party 
competition), is somewhat surprising, given the well-established notion that cultural 
nationalism mediated by the media is supposed to have contributed to the success of regional 
parties particularly in the South and West of India. What is more expected is the fact that the 
fragmentation of the vote is positively and significantly associated with higher levels of NNV 
and RPV. Since there are only a limited number of national parties, and only two of them are 
truly national in their reach across most of the States, a fragmentation of the vote almost 
invariably means that regional party candidates and independent candidates must have 
received substantial shares of the vote in order for ENP to be driven higher. What is 
interesting to note about these aggregate data-based findings is the fact that even the 
relationships which turned out to be significant (and mostly running counter to the hypotheses 
postulated, except in the case of fragmentation levels), weaken between the first and second 
time periods, suggesting that these correlates are less appropriate in the post-1990 period for 
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understanding the support for non-national or more specifically regional party candidates 
during that time period. 
In view of the results of the partial correlation analysis (controlling for levels of per capita 
economic development), table 5.3 (below) summarizes the findings regarding the preliminary 
validation or rejection of the macro-level hypotheses (H1 to H8).  
 
Table 5.3: Summary of Aggregate Findings 
 
Hypothesis Pre-1990 Post-1990 
 V RPV V RPV 
1 - - - - 
2 A A A A 
3 A A - - 
4a - - - - 
4b - - - - 
5 + - + + 
6 - - - - 
7 A A A A 
8 A - - - 
“-“/”+” = hypothesis rejected/preliminarily validated based on the aggregate data; “A” = alternative hypothesis 
preliminarily validated. 
 
 
We will now turn to the individual-level analysis and return in part to the aggregate data-
based findings as part of the discussion of the results of the survey-based analysis to help us 
understand the connections between individual- and aggregate-level phenomena. 
 
 
5.6 Who Wants to Regionalize? A Profile of Regional Identity and Party Support 
 
5.6.1 The Social Characteristics of Regional Party Supporters 
In table 5.4 (below) we can find a social profile of respondents who stated that they would 
vote for a regional party if elections were held the following weekend. For the 1990 data we 
find that as we expected older respondents were slightly more likely to name a regional party 
rather than a national party as their preference. This very small though significant effect 
however disappears in subsequent waves of the survey being conducted through the 1990s 
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and into the new millennium. Likewise, for the 1990 survey we see respondents from urban 
areas responding in smaller shares that they would vote for a regional party as opposed to 
their rural counterparts. Again, though, the effect size is already small in 1990 and in the 2001 
and 2006 waves there is almost no noticeable effect anymore based on the residence of the 
respondents. As regards education, a similar picture holds. In the first wave of the survey, 
respondents with more education were slightly less likely to support regional parties than 
respondents with lower levels of education. Non-Hindus are consistently more likely to state 
that they would vote for a regional party. This is not surprising since often smaller, and 
thereby by definition regional parties are more likely to appeal to aggrieved sections of 
society on the one hand which might conceivably include especially Muslims and since 
secondly many national parties have become the playground of Hindu caste rivalries to an 
even greater extent than is the case in smaller regional parties. Upper class respondents are 
initially less likely to be in favour of regional party voting, but in subsequent surveys this 
distinction also becomes blurred and a clear relationship also eludes us. With regard to the 
social class self-placement variable there also seems no clear relationship to exit to regional 
party support. The only variable which is highly significant and has at least a moderate effect 
on support for regional parties in the first two waves of the WVS is the variable tapping the 
territorial loyalty or feelings of belonging. Respondents voicing an affinity foremost to a local 
entity like a city or a region are indeed more likely to be willing to vote for regional parties. 
But, again, the effect size is rather small and overall we have to say that our hypotheses, 
perhaps with the exception of that regarding territorial loyalty leading to regional party 
support can be discarded.  
There is, however, an interesting finding in the social profiles of these regional party 
supporters, i.e. those who would vote for a regional party. And this finding concerns the time 
trend of change in these profiles. The fact that through the successive survey waves the 
potential voter for regional parties become less and less distinguishable begs the question of 
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whether this does not indeed support the idea that as regional parties expand their support 
bases throughout the 1990s, their support bases are becoming increasingly undistinguishable 
from those of other parties since these regional parties are trying to build more moderate, 
middle-of-the-road voter coalitions to win or maintain power in successive elections in the 
1990s. This would be in line with ideas about parties trying to, and in the case of many 
regional parties in the 1990s successfully trying to win over new voters for their platforms by 
appealing to median-type voters instead of very distinct subsets of society.  We will take this 
idea up again in section 5.6.3.  
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Table 5.4: Social Backgrounds of Regional Partisans (entries are percentages of 
respondents stating a preference for a regional party) 
 
Variable Category 1990 1995 2001 2006 
Age Group 
15-29 years 9.8 14.2 30.4 24.6 
30-49 years 12.8 15.6 25.8 24.1 
50 years and 
older 
16.2 10.1 25.3 24.6 
Correlation 0.067 
(p<0.05) 
   
Level of 
Urbanization 
Up to 10,000 26.2 19.7 26.1 24.6 
10,001 to 
50,000 
12.9 20.1 30.0 25.5 
More than 
50,000 
11.9 6.6 27.2 20.7 
Correlation 0.086 
(p<0.01) 
   
Level of 
Education 
Lower 16.7 14.4 27.8 26.0 
Middle 11.0 14.9 27.9 23.8 
Upper 11.5 13.0 24.4 22.0 
Correlation 0.062 
(p<.05) 
   
Social Class 
(subjective) 
Lower class n.a. 12.9 26.4 23.8 
Working class n.a. 22.7 26.9 30.2 
Lower middle 
class 
n.a. 16.1 28.5 21.3 
Upper middle 
class 
n.a. 10.5 27.2 26.1 
Upper class n.a. 0.8 14.3 17.3 
Territorial 
Loyalty 
Locality 8.5 14.6 24.4 n.a. 
Region 20.5 16.7 39.4 n.a. 
Country 12.9 9.1 26.9 n.a. 
Continent 7.7 0.0 22.2 n.a. 
World 6.7 0.0 20.4 n.a. 
Correlation 0.133 
(p<.000) 
   
Religious 
Affiliation 
Hindu 11.8 13.2 21.6 19.8 
Non-Hindu 16.8 20.6 32.6 30.2 
Correlation 0.045 
(p<0.1) 
   
Correlation: Phi coefficient of association. 
 
 
Therefore, it appears almost as if supporters of smaller regional parties do not have a very 
distinct social profile as opposed to supporters of national parties. Although the small effects 
which are discernible and are all significant do not contradict our hypotheses, the effect size is 
somewhat too small to really forcefully claim to have found our hypotheses vindicated. 
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5.6.2 The Views of Regional Party Supporters on Politics 
 
In table 5.5 (below) we see the views of regional party voters on a range of issues. In 1995, 
when the regional electoral wave was in full swing, respondents who said they would vote for 
a regional party in the next election if one were held soon were also slightly more likely to 
voice negative rather than positive views on democracy. By 2006 this had changed, however, 
and they were likely to voice more positive views rather than negative views. As far as the 
idea is concerned that voting for regional parties is an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
politicians currently in office (protest vote), that notion can also be dispelled on the basis of 
the data shown below. In fact by 2001 voters satisfied with national office-holders were 
actually a little more likely to be regional party supporters compared to dissatisfied 
respondents. This could, however, have two reasons, either a) because they genuinely felt that 
there was nothing to complain about, or b) they realized that the representatives from the 
regional parties they were likely to support were actually by then sharing in national policy 
making which might either prompt them not to complain about them or to see national 
policies in a more positive light. Which one is the case, though, cannot be decided on the basis 
of the available data. As regards interest in politics, initially respondents less interested in 
politics are more likely to be supporters of regional parties than respondents who are 
interested in politics. This finding from the 1990 survey data seems to relate strongly to the 
finding that turnout was a variable strongly related to aggregate support levels for NNV and 
RPV in the previous section. It appears, then, that contrary to our initial hypothesis high 
turnout levels brought out even the least interested voters which might explain the positive 
overall association of turnout as well as lack of interest with regional party and non-national 
candidate support levels. Throughout the 1990s until 2006 a striking reversal took place and 
in 2006 those more interested in politics are actually more likely to be supporters of regional 
parties than those less interested in politics. Similarly, by 2006 those who thought politics was 
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important were more likely to be regional party voters than those who thought politics less 
important. 
 
Table 5.5: Political Views of Regional Party Supporters (cell entries are row percentages 
of respondents stating a preference for a regional party) 
 
Variable Category 1990 1995 2001 2006 
Support for 
Democracy 
Very bad n.a. 13.0 40.0 17.1 
Fairly bad n.a. 27.3 24.6 24.4 
Fairly good n.a. 10.5 30.9 23.7 
Very good n.a. 18.0 26.3 26.4 
Satisfaction 
with People in 
!ational Office 
Very dissatisfied n.a. 18.0 29.0 n.a. 
Fairly 
dissatisfied 
n.a. 12.6 27.1 n.a. 
Fairly satisfied n.a. 15.5 25.1 n.a. 
Very satisfied n.a. 12.9 34.5 n.a. 
Confidence in 
Political 
Parties 
None at all 9.5 16.5 26.3 22.8 
Not very much 13.0 16.4 28.2 19.3 
Quite a lot 13.8 15.2 28.7 30.3 
A great deal 9.5 6.7 26.7 31.7 
Interest in 
Politics 
Not at all 
interested 
15.7 11.8 30.8 19.3 
Not very 
interested 
12.4 12.6 22.8 23.4 
Somewhat 
interested 
12.0 16.3 26.5 24.8 
Very interested 6.9 22.4 31.2 35.0 
Importance of 
Politics 
Not at all 
important 
10.7 11.0 29.0 17.8 
Not very 
important 
13.1 17.2 29.0 25.4 
Rather important 14.3 14.1 28.3 30.2 
Very important 5.1 17.3 23.5 22.1 
 
 
 
As Figure 5.4 (below) illustrates, survey respondents who state that they feel primarily drawn 
to local or regional identities, support national and regional parties in almost equal measure 
throughout the 1990s until 2001. This subverts the often-heard claim that loyalty to regional 
identity precludes support for national parties or vice versa. 
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Figure 5.2: Differences in Party Support by Regionalists (1990-2001) 
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Source: World Values Survey, 1990, 1995, 2001. See Appendix D for details on the wording of the question. 
The data in the three figures contained in Appendix D (p. 203) clearly demonstrate the 
similarity in political views of national party and regional party supporters as well. In 
consequence, it seems that the often stated claim that the trend towards increased support for 
regional parties des not necessarily hail an era of erosion of democratic political norms or 
concern for politics as some, especially national party proponents, would have voters believe. 
The supporters of regional parties have quite the contrary found their place in the democratic 
political arena of India and are not likely to advocate secession, authoritarian leadership or 
intolerance towards other social groups in overwhelming numbers. 
 
5.6.3. One-way Ticket? The Compatibility of Regional and ational Party Support 
One of the questions already touched upon is that regarding the incommensurability of 
support for regional and national parties. As tables 5.6 through 5.9 show, the answer to that 
question may necessitate different answers at different times. The most striking result is that 
regarding 1990. At that time, 87.9 percent of respondents stated that they had a preference for 
a national party. None of these named a regional party as their second choice. In 1990 there 
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was a perfect division between regional and national party supporters with cross-level first 
and second preferences existing. This clear-cut division disappeared throughout the 1990s, as 
table 5.6 and 5.7 show. 2001 saw a considerable level of compatibility of having a first 
preference for one type of party and a second preference for another type. 2006 saw a minor 
reversal of this trend, driven mainly by an increase in the absolute number and relative share 
of national party supporters who also prefer national parties as their second choice. 
To some extent this points again to the change towards greater complementarity of regional 
and national political forces, identities and arenas. Research on the related topic of the 
compatibility of loyalties to regional versus national identities seems to point in a similar 
direction (Mitra/Singh 1999: 161). 
 
Table 5.6: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (1990) 
  Second Party Preference 
  National Regional 
First Party 
Preference 
National 
1469 0 
87.9% 0% 
Regional 
0 202 
0% 12.1% 
N=1671. χ2= 1671.0 (p < .000). 
 
 
Table 5.7: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (1995) 
  Second Party Preference 
  National Regional 
First Party 
Preference 
National 
719 99 
76.7% 10.6% 
Regional 
98 22 
10.4% 2.3% 
N=938. χ2= 3.616 (p < .057). 
 
 
Table 5.8: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (2001) 
  Second Party Preference 
  National Regional 
First Party 
Preference 
National 
548 239 
48.6% 21.2% 
Regional 
238 102 
21.1% 9.1% 
N=1127. χ2= 0.015 (p < .000). 
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Table 5.9: The Relationship between First and Second Party Preference (2006) 
  Second Party Preference 
  National Regional 
First Party 
Preference 
National 
872 238 
58.5% 16.0% 
Regional 
248 133 
16.6% 8.9% 
N=1491. χ2= 27.52 (p < .000). 
 
 
 
On the other hand, however, when asked which party they would never vote for, increasingly 
national party sympathizers state that they would never vote for a particular regional party. 
This trend continues to grow throughout the 1990s as tables 5.10 through 5.12 indicate. 
Likewise, sympathizers of regional parties increasingly state that they would never vote for a 
particular national party as we can see from the same tables. Does this indicate a growing 
polarization along the regional party-national party cleavage? The answer is “yes” and “no”. 
That the aversion between the camps is becoming more pronounced though not hostile is 
undeniable based on the data below. But, in 2006 it was also much more likely that the 
national party which a respondent preferred in State X would have to compete mainly with a 
regional party than it was in 1995. Hence it is also simply statistically more likely that the 
“other” party which a respondent would not vote for in a State is a regional party and hence 
the least preferred out of all parties would be a regional party. As such, this trend indicates 
more a natural response or quasi-normalization in the face of much greater visibility of 
regional parties in India today as compared to 15 years earlier.  
 
 
Table 5.10: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (1995) 
  Party Aversion 
  National Regional 
First Party 
Preference 
National 
454 153 
62.5% 21.1% 
Regional 
63 56 
8.7% 7.7% 
N=726. χ2= 23.177 (p < .000). 
 
 157
 
Table 5.11: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (2001) 
  Party Aversion 
  National Regional 
First Party 
Preference 
National 
327 172 
47.0% 24.7% 
Regional 
165 32 
23.7% 4.6% 
N=696. χ2= 22.643 (p < .000). 
 
 
Table 5.12: The Relationship between First Party Preference and Party Aversion (2006) 
  Party Aversion 
  National Regional 
First Party 
Preference 
National 
431 351 
39.7% 32.4% 
Regional 
177 126 
16.3% 11.6% 
N=1085. χ2= 0.966 (p < .326). 
 
 
In sum, therefore, it seems that the supporters of regional parties are no inherent threat to the 
democratic process or culture of India, but rather a valuable addition to it since they have 
increasingly become more inclined to support democratic norms, as we saw above than in the 
early 1990s. Instead of a radicalization or balkanization of India indicated by the increasing 
levels of support for regional party/independent candidates at the aggregate level or by the 
greater support voiced for regional parties or greater concern for regional issues and 
institutions, it appears that regional parties and issues have been mainstreamed rather than 
opinion or behavior radicalized. The connection existing between turnout and NNV/RPV 
prior to 1990 and weakening after that, mirrored by the trends in political interest and its 
relation to regional party support voiced in the surveys after 1990 echo this process of a 
mainstreaming of regional parties and their candidates throughout the 1990s. 
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6. An Extension: The Consequences of Party System Change at the !ational Level 
 
Although this approach is not likely to be the only feasible one, any discussion about the 
consequences of shifting balances in the power configurations between political parties in 
parliamentary democracies on their respective bargaining positions for government offices 
will usefully depart from the point of the relative numerical strengths of parties in the 
legislature.  
The influence of those regional parties now extends beyond the governments of those States 
in which they originate to the national level as well. The question of whether smaller, often 
regional parties or larger national parties are enjoying disproportionate influence over 
conflictual bargaining issues at the national level, such as portfolio allocation, has received 
comparatively less systematic treatment in the study of Indian party politics.20 The goal of this 
article is to analyze and to illustrate the different dynamics which underlie the relative 
distribution of government offices in coalition and minority governments in a multi-party 
setting, such as that of India. Departing on this thematic trajectory, it will address the issue of 
whether formateur parties or regional parties benefit disproportionately from bargaining over 
the distribution of government office. Before commencing with that analysis a broader 
overview will provide the background of national-level party politics for an investigation of 
the questions relating to bargaining success over government office. This will be followed by 
a discussion of an index for measuring bargaining power based on numerical strength of 
legislative parties, the so-called Banzhaf index. After this, an analysis of three cases of 
coalition government since 1998 will yield insights into the extent to which smaller, often 
regional parties have been able in the recent past to utilize their new-found numerical strength 
at the national level to out bargain larger national parties in one of the most important issues 
at stake for any party, that of winning political office at the government level.  
 
                                                
20 See Nikolenyi (2004) and McMillan (2005) for a previous contribution on the issue of government formation 
and portfolio allocation in India. 
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6.1 The Context of !ational Elections 
 
To understand the influence of different types of parties at the national level of government, 
the government formation process should be put in the context of parliamentary elections in 
Indian politics more generally. For the first two decades after independence in 1947, the INC 
dominated Indian politics in almost all regions of the country and at all levels of political 
participation (Kothari 1964; Spiess 2002). In 1967, the INC for the first time lost power at the 
State-level, when it lost its majorities in elections to eight State assemblies to a variety of 
coalitions, securing only a bare majority nationally in the general elections of the same year. 
In 1971, the Congress Party (I) secured a large majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, following 
the war with Pakistan over the secession of East-Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh). Seen in the 
context of other general elections in India, the electoral result of 1977 is remarkable for a 
variety of reasons. As table 6.1 shows, the level of turnout had declined substantially between 
1967 and 1971 before increasing equally substantially again to 60.5 percent in 1977, i.e. to a 
comparative level as in 1967.  
 
Table 6.1: Turnout in the General Elections (1952-2004) 
 
Election ‘52 ‘57 ‘62 ‘67 ‘71 ‘77 ‘80 ‘84 ‘89 ‘91 ‘96 ‘98 ‘99 ‘04 
Turnout 44.9 45.4 55.4 61.0 55.3 60.5 57.0 63.6 62.0 55.9 58.0 62.0 60.0 58.1 
Sources: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Elections (various issues, 
www.eci.gov.in) and Mitra et al. (2001). 
 
This fact should not disguise the considerable level of variation among the States in terms of 
turnout. Among the States and Union Territories (U.T.s), Kerala, Delhi, Haryana and Punjab 
had some of the highest turnout rates in 1977 (all over 70 percent). Others, such as Orissa in 
the East and Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Mizoram in the Northeast were among those 
with the lowest rates (24 to 49 percent) in 1977. Considerable variation in turnout rates 
persists to this day and is reflective to some extent of the individual character of the States as 
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political arenas in Indian politics. The all-India breakdown of results for the five national 
parties is shown in table 6.2 below.  
 
Table 6.2: Party-wise Breakdown of the 1977 General Election  
 INC BLD CPI CPM NCO State 
Parties 
Other 
Parties 
Independents 
All-India Vote 
Share (%) 
34.52 41.32 2.82 4.29 1.72 8.80 1.03 5.50 
All-India Seat 
Share (%) 
28.41 54.43 1.29 4.06 0.55 9.04 0.55 1.66 
All-India 
Success Rate 
(%) 
31.30 72.84 7.69 41.51 15.79 57.65 4.29 0.74 
Note: Success Rate refers to the percentage of party candidates who won their contests in their respective 
constituencies. See table 4 for abbreviations of party names. 
Source: Election Commission of India. Statistical Reports on General Elections (Sixth General Election, 
www.eci.gov.in) 
 
As table 6.3 (below) indicates, the INC suffered the single greatest loss in the share of votes it 
received nationwide and in the share of seats it was able to win in 1977. However, while the 
losses in vote share for the Congress are also clear and significant, the losses in terms of the 
seat share are staggering, the INC dropping from 68 percent of seats in 1971 to 28 percent of 
seats in 1977. Until 1977, the Congress had benefited almost exclusively from the distorting 
effect of the simple plurality electoral system by being able to cash in the reputation earned as 
the driving force behind the anti-colonial struggle, by being able to cast itself as a broad based 
catchall party, building its support on a diverse range of social groups, programmatically 
amorphous policy agendas and effective electoral machines covering all areas of the country. 
It was thus able to crowd out other smaller, ideologically more cohesive parties from the 
center of the political space and to relegate them to the status of ‘parties of pressure’ (Morris-
Jones). In 1977, this distortive effect of the electoral system was turned against the INC for 
the first time, giving it a smaller seat than vote share at the aggregate national level. Equally 
remarkable is the fact that in the 1980 election the INC was again able to reverse this 
development, gaining 65.1 percent of all seats on the basis of a nationwide vote share of 42.7 
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percent. From the late 1980s onward, however, the INC has no longer been able to achieve 
comparable success regarding votes or seats at the national level.21 
 
Table 6.3: Electoral Success of the Indian !ational Congress (1952-2004) 
Election ‘52 ‘57 ‘62 ‘67 ‘71 ‘77 ‘80 ‘84 ‘89 ‘91 ‘96 ‘98 ‘99 ‘04 
Vote % 
(V) 
45.0 47.8 44.7 40.8 43.7 34.5 42.7 48.0 39.5 36.5 28.8 25.9 28.3 26.5 
Seat % 
(S) 
74.4 75.1 73.1 54.4 68.0 28.4 65.1 76.6 36.3 42.7 25.8 26.0 33.5 26.7 
S-V 29.4 27.3 28.4 13.6 24.3 -6.1 22.4 28.6 -3.2 6.2 -3.0 0.1 5.2 0.2 
Sources: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Elections (various issues, 
www.eci.gov.in) and Mitra et al. (2001). 
 
As table 6.4 indicates, the 1977 elections were the only elections since India’s independence 
in which the INC, at the all-India level, did not win the largest vote share out of all parties 
competing. Instead, the Janata Party (competing under the label of one of its constituent 
parties, the BLD) outdid the Congress by almost seven percent.  
 
Table 6.4: Main Competitors for Power in the General Elections (1952-2004) 
Election ‘52 ‘57 ‘62 ‘67 ‘71 ‘77 ‘80 ‘84 ‘89 ‘91 ‘96c ‘98c ‘99c ‘04 
Firstb INC INC INC INC INC BLD INC INC INC INC INC INC INC INC 
Secondb SOC PSP CPI BJS CPM INC JNP BJP JD JD BJP BJP BJP BJP 
F-Sa 34.4 37.4 34.8 31.5 33.3 6.8 23.7 41.6 21.7 24.7 8.5 0.2 4.5 4.3 
a F-S refers to the difference in the national vote share of the national party winning the largest vote share (‘first’) and the 
runner-up national party (‘second’) (rounded figures). The official term “national party” refers to parties recognized by the 
Election Commission of India and competing in three states or more, i.e. only to the parties vying for more than regional 
influence. 
 b INC = Indian National Congress (1971, 1980 INC-I); BLD = Bharatiya Lok Dal (Label used by the electoral coalition 
Janata Party in 1977);  
c  Despite its largest vote share the INC captured fewer seats than its direct competitor and hence did not form the government 
after the 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections. 
Sources: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Elections (various issues, www.eci.gov.in) and Mitra 
et al. (2001). 
 
 
In the 1977 elections, and again in the 1990s, the gap in vote share between the two largest 
parties also narrowed considerably, demonstrating the almost equal status in electoral appeal 
of the two main competitors for political support at the national level in that election. Again, 
                                                
21 For a detailed examination of the change of India’s national party system refer to Chhibber/Kollman (2004). 
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this trend was sharply reversed in the 1980 elections, and subsequently it took until the mid-
1990s for a more or less permanent two-party competition at the nationwide level between the 
center-left INC and the Bharatiya Janata Party on the nationalist right to emerge. 
 Significantly, also, the 1977 elections were the general elections at which the 
cohesiveness of the opposition in terms of 'opposition unity' (Butler/Lahiri/Roy 1997) was the 
greatest, as table 6.5 demonstrates below. The index (IOU), developed to measure unity (or 
fragmentation) of the vote of the opposition parties in a one-party-dominant situation, is 
calculated as follows: 
 
IOU = 
Vote share of the largest opposition party 
Sum of vote shares of all the opposition parties 
x 100 
 
The index, which was conceptualized primarily to analyze one-dominant party systems, 
captures visibly the effect of the fact that in 1977, several formerly independent, and often 
competing parties combined to form a single, loosely-bound umbrella party, the Janata Party 
(running under the label of one of its constituents, the Bharatiya Lok Dal/BLD)22. The 
constituent parties were: the Bharatiya Lok Dal led by Charan Singh, the Congress for 
Democracy led by Jagjivan Ram (an INC minister until just before the elections), the 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Swatantra Party and the Socialist 
Party. This enabled the pooling of organizational and financial resources of these different 
organizations to the advantage of that new party’s candidates against Congress candidates. It 
also enabled those parties to select one most electable candidate from their ranks for each of 
                                                
22 IOU is best used to analyze one-dominant-party systems, but does not tell us much when analyzing and 
comparing a number of changing party systems in which different parties won the elections at the previous time 
point. The index used in this analysis (ACUI, see Appendix II) instead, is inspired by but differs from IOU in 
that it measures the cohesion of the vote for anti-Congress parties rather than opposition parties (which would 
include the INC in some States in the 1977). This better captures the cohesion in the anti-Congress vote. in th 
special case of Tamil Nadu, where the INC had entered into arrangements with regional parties since 1971 to 
effect seat adjustments, the values for ACUI measure the total vote for the INC and its respective regional ally 
(DMK in 1971, AIADMK in 1977), which may explain this States position as a statistical outlier. 
 164
the constituencies in which the Janata Party contested, based on an arithmetic of sharing out 
constituencies among the constituent parties, allocating 'safe seats' or 'likely wins' first. 
Additionally, the Janata Party engaged in seat adjustments with the Congress (O), led by 
Morarji Desai and the Communist Party of India (Marxist, CPM). 
 
Table 6.5:  Index of Opposition Unity, Lok Sabha Elections 1962-1991 
 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 Average 
All-India 67 67 71 90 65 74 77 66 72 
Source: Butler/Lahiri/Roy (1997: 164). 
 
The effect of this unification of opposition parties under one party label, as well as of the seat 
adjustments to avoid many triangular candidate contests against the INC and the consequent 
fragmentation of the anti-Congress vote, will be further discussed below. The unification, 
however, seems inconceivable given an absence of the catalytic experience of the oppression 
of the opposition parties during the state of emergency from June 1975 to January 1977.  
 
6.2 Wagging the Dog: The Impact of Regional Parties at the !ational Level 
One of the consequences of the ascent of regional parties over the last three decades has been 
the slow erosion of national party preeminence in the national party system. This erosion has 
led regional parties to become viable if volatile coalition partners in national coalition 
governments between 1977 and 1979 and again after 1989 in a number of minority coalition 
cabinets. With the shift from the old "Congress system" to a competitive multi-party 
democracy at the regional, as well as at the national levels, the once dominant Indian National 
Congress (INC), has mostly become relegated from the dominant to a mere formateur status 
in the process of government formation after regional or national elections, like its main 
competitor, the center-right Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, BJP). The 
concomitant rise of regional parties needs to be seen in the context of this overall change of 
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the Indian party systems at the national and regional levels. Recent research (Ansolabehere et 
al. 2005) on coalition governments in Western Europe has shown that such formateur parties 
enjoy a significant advantage in the bargaining over government office allocation. The same 
research has found that parties' shares of cabinet posts in coalition governments are better 
predicted by their respective voting weights than by their shares of seats in the legislature. 
Whether this finding and others about the relationship between voting weights, seat shares and 
cabinet posts is consistent with dynamics found in the highly fragmented setting at the 
national level in India, will be the question which this article seeks to answer. 
 The fact that coalition governments are the norm and no longer the exception in Indian 
national as well as regional-level politics, is by now well known and documented in current 
research (Singh 2001; Sridharan 2003; Nikolenyi 2004). Likewise, the reasons for the shift 
from a system of one-party dominance of the Indian National Congress (INC) to a multi-party 
system with numerous regional parties have been discussed extensively (Chhibber 1999; 
Mitra/Singh 1999; Singh 2001; Palshikar 2003). As the erstwhile dominance of the Congress 
Party at both levels of party politics in India has declined rapidly in the past two decades, a 
trend towards an increased regionalization at the same levels has taken firm root. This trend 
and its effects are apparent in a number of characteristics of India's national and State party 
systems. Beginning with the formation of a number of non-Congress-led State governments in 
1967, politics at the State level has over time, particularly since the 1980s, increasingly 
become an arena in its own right and is today somewhat separated from all-India dynamics, 
both as far as electoral behavior as well as public opinion are concerned (Mitra/Singh 1999).  
 At the Union level this cotemporaneous decline of Congress dominance and a rise of 
regional parties can be seen in a number of indicators. When assessing the fragmentation of 
the national party system over time, it becomes obvious that the effective number of parties, 
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as measured by the Laakso-Taagepera index,23 has increased significantly in the last 18 years 
(see figure 6.1 below).  
 
Figure 6.1: Effective !umber of Parties (!Seats) in the Lok Sabha, 1952 to 2004 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Election Commission of India’s Election Reports for various years 
(http://eci.nic.in, accessed February 2008). 
 
As figure 6.1 shows, the number of parties which competed successfully remained around 1.8 
(measured by seats; 4.3 when measured on the basis of votes) for a longer period in the 1950s 
and early 1960s in the lower house of the national parliament, the Lok Sabha.24 This number  
increased noticeably in the last six national elections.25 Secondly, the new-found importance 
of regional parties can be seen from the declining share of votes and seats in the national 
parliament which national parties have been able to win over time (see table 6.6 below).  
 
                                                
23 The index (N) is calculated based on the equation 
∑
=
=
n
i
ip

1
2
1
.  The pi indicates the respective seat or vote 
share of party i. Independents were counted as separate legislative parties with one member each. For critical 
evaluations of this measure see Dumont/Caulier (2003), Dunleavy/Boucek (2003), Diwakar (2005), Blau (2008). 
24 The difference between Nseats and Nvotes is caused by the distorting influence of the simple plurality voting 
system employed in India. 
25 See the discussion in Chhibber/Kollman (2004: 39-47) about this phenomenon, who also point out that the 
higher effective number of parties at the national level masks the continuation of two-party competition in many 
of the district level electoral contests. 
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Table 6.6: Lok Sabha Elections: Vote/Seat Shares of ational Parties and the !umber of 
Parties (1952-2004) 
Election Year Seat Share (%) Vote Share (%) !o. of Parties 
1952 82.6 67.8 54 
1957 85.2 73.0 15 
1962 89.0 78.4 27 
1967 84.6 76.3 25 
1971 85.1 77.8 53 
1977 88.7 84.6 34 
1980 91.7 85.1 36 
1984 85.4 77.8 35 
1989 89.0 79.3 113 
1991 89.5 80.8 145 
1996 76.6 69.6 209 
1998 71.2 68.0 176 
1999 68.0 67.1 169 
2004 67.5 63.1 230 
2009 69.2 62.9 220 
Sources: 1952 to 1998 are based on data from Butler, Lahiri und Roy (1997) and the Election Commission of 
India, cited in Mitra/Singh (1999), p.159. 1999 and 2004 were calculated on the basis of information from the 
Press Information Bureau of India. The results for 2009 are based on the Election Commission of India’s 
website (http://eciresults.nic.in , accessed May 15th). The number of parties refers to the raw total number of 
participating parties, both national and other parties, according to various issues of the Election Commissions 
Election Reports. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Vote/Seat Shares of !ational Parties and Absolute !umber of Parties in Lok 
Sabha Elections 
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Source: see table 6.1. 
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Quite visibly, figure 6.2 (above) demonstrates that the weight of national parties has declined 
over time, more so, if one takes into account the specific notion of "national" and "regional" 
or State parties which here follows the definition of the Election Commission of India. Thus, a 
party is considered a national party if it wins at least six percent of the votes State-wide over 
successive elections in four or more States. If one measure parties' national or regional 
character by employing an indicator of the regional distribution of votes, most if not all Indian 
parties would look more like regional parties than national parties.26  
 Beyond these numerical indicators of smaller regional parties' success in electoral 
contests, the trend towards a regionalization of politics are also apparent in the themes which 
have come to define campaigning and other forms of mobilization in the elections to national 
as well as regional legislatures. Increasingly, topics which do not necessarily have a direct 
connection to national level policymaking, such as poverty and development (which are State 
government domains), or topics which are specific to a certain region, like longstanding caste 
competition in Uttar Pradesh27 or political issues concerning internal migration in 
Maharashtra, have become salient even in national elections. Examples such as the 1998 
victory of the then-BJP newcomer candidate Ila Pant over the veteran INC politician N.D. 
Tiwari in the Nainital district of Uttar Pradesh in North India due to her vociferous support of 
the movement for the creation of a new State, Uttharakhand (separated from Uttar Pradesh in 
2000 as Uttaranchal) and due to her husband's local electoral machine can serve to illustrate 
the new importance which local and regional issues have attained even in national elections. 
Similarly, the poor results of the respective governing parties of the State governments in 
Orissa, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Rajasthan underline how much the negative evaluation of 
                                                
26 See chapter 2 for a problematization of this and Ziegfeld (2008) for such a less context-sensitive definition 
based on a modified Herfindahl index of vote concentration. For the purpose of this limited inquiry, the 
definition of the Election Commission will suffice, since most previous research employs it and since the 
alternative based on the concentration of vote shares is not without its own disadvantages. 
27 See Chandra (2004) for a comparative assessment of mobilization of the caste cleavage. 
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regional governments can impact parties’ performance in national elections. This is equally 
true for the impact of the Union government's evaluation impacting on results in State 
assembly elections.28  
 On the other hand, this emphasis on a generally visible trend toward a regionalization 
of politics in India should not obscure the fact that local and regional issues have always been 
important in determining election outcomes at the district level (Bueno de Mesquita 1978). 
The Congress Party has always sought, especially during its time as the dominant party, like 
other parties to speak to local and regional issues to mobilize its support groups. While this 
has in the past sometimes led to the conclusion that Indian politics is almost exclusively 
concerned with local and regional issues and to the conclusion that the INC is united across 
regions by little more than a common name, a national leadership level and a common logo 
(Brass 1991: 164-165), mobilization patterns are slightly more complex than that. In reality, a 
candidate (especially the incumbent, who needs to take into account voters' as well as the 
party leadership's preferences) will have to offer a mixed array of promises on regional as 
well as local issues, while the challenger will likely be able to concentrate much more on 
mobilizing voters at the district level on the basis of local grievances. Thus, in India the trend 
of an increasing dominance of national over regional issues and the homogenization of parties 
and party systems most often associated with federally organized political systems, 
paradoxically seems to be absent or even reversed. The national and regional levels of 
government in India are increasingly coequal arenas of political articulation and mobilization, 
as well as entities which demand political loyalty and attention from citizens.29 
 
 
 
                                                
28 For a brief discussion of both trends see Kumar (2003: 304-305).  
29 Refer to Mitra/Singh (1999: 155-156) for a treatment of nation and region as coequal evidenced in public 
opinion data. 
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6.3 !umerical Strength, Power and Influence of Parties in Coalitions 
Intra-coalition bargaining is inextricably linked to the question of the distribution of power as 
well as influence in multiple dimensions. While a more detailed analysis of the concepts of 
power or influence would be desirable in this context, we will not attempt such an extensive 
discussion here in the interest of brevity and efficiency with regard to the empirical goal of 
analyzing Indian cases. Nevertheless, we will take political influence to be a wider concept 
which includes the concept of power as a more specific concept.30 Political influence will not 
be understood as necessarily restricted to the interaction with others. Political power will be 
understood to mean the possible or actual change in decision outcomes, and therefore as a 
strictly relational concept (in view of collective decision-making) involving other actors. It 
therefore describes a subset of what is meant by political influence. Since this chapter deals 
with coalition politics, in particular with government formation and portfolio allocation in 
coalitions, the phenomenon of political power will primarily be understood to mean the 
capacity to change a non-winning into a winning coalition. Hence, political power rests with 
those actors who are capable of changing a group of legislative actors (irrespective of whether 
they are individual or collective actors), through joining that group, from a minority into a 
majority in a yes/no decision situation. Likewise, actors obviously are also powerful when 
they have the capability to reverse this process from a winning to a losing coalition (such as is 
the case in a vote of no confidence in the legislature as stipulated in Article 198 of the Rules 
of the Lok Sabha in conjunction with Article 75 (2) of the Constitution of India). It is clear 
that this is a nominal definition of power and influence respectively, and more importantly a 
definition of potential power since in reality, no tall actors possessing the said characteristics 
                                                
30 For a differing view consult Arts/Verschuren (1999: 413), who define political power in a Weberian tradition 
as the possibility of influencing political actors, and influence as the actual use of that capability. Such a 
distinction along the lines of a possibility of a certain action (here: the changing of the behavior of others) as 
opposed to its actualization, however, seems neither theoretically or logically necessary nor empirically 
warranted. Riker (1964: 342), on the other hand does not go as far as to distinguish clearly between power and 
influence in his analysis of different conceptions and operationalizations of power, although he does mention the 
fact that others had done so (for example March 1955). 
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are viable partners in all coalition configurations due to mutual ideological or personnel 
incompatibilities. However, in principle, an actor with such political power can influence 
decision-making processes in a legislative organ provided she is able to become a member of 
a winning coalition. Actors (such as individual legislators or legislative parties in the Lok 
Sabha for example), who are not a part of the actual coalition, thus only possess indirect 
power, which is, however, not based on their numerical strength in the current legislature but 
rather on the threat potential they may have by way of veto positions they might occupy in 
other institutions or the continuing competition for votes in future elections. 
It will be shown below in how far smaller, regional parties in the three most recent legislative 
periods of the Lok Sabha (1998-1999, 1999-2004, 2004-2009) have been able to 
systematically win a larger share of government offices than a just allocation based on their 
share of seats in the government-supporting legislative coalition would warrant. In order to 
investigate this, a number of variables are identified, operationalized and calculated alongside 
a conventional index measuring power in yes/no decision-making processes, the so-called 
(normalized) Banzhaf index (Banzhaf 1965). This index has been used extensively to evaluate 
how bargaining power based on the numerical strength of political parties or individuals is 
distributed in a decision-making body such as a legislature. It determines the relative power in 
any situation by ascertaining in how many cases the vote of an actor would change a decision 
and compares that power to that of other actors in the same body.31 
Despite the somewhat warranted reservations against the careless use of power indices in 
many contexts, some of which will be mentioned in connection with the evaluation of the 
actual results, a thus formalized inquiry into bargaining power has its legitimate use. Often it 
is a formalized index like the Banzhaf index which will illustrate why smaller parties in 
certain situations can have just as much threat potential in a government coalition as much 
                                                
31 For a theoretical discussion of this index see Banzhaf (1965) and Taylor (1995: 78-80). 
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larger parties.32 Based on an admittedly simplifying real-world example this usefulness, 
especially for comparative studies can be understood relatively easily. The Banzhaf index for 
each actor Pi with a weight wi from a set of actors S={P1, …, Pn} is calculated as follows: 
∑
=
=
n
i
i
i
i
PBP
PBP
PBI
1
)(
)(
)(
 . 
BP(Pi) denotes the number of winning coalitions in which Pi is critical, i.e. in which Pi’s 
leaving the coalition would turn it from a winning coalition into a losing coalition. This means 
that the quota which must be met for turning a losing into a winning coalition has to be more 
than half of the total weights wi of all the parties Pi. In legislatures wi equals the number of 
legislators united by the same party label. It therefore represents Pi’s bargaining power.
33 In 
1969, the German Bundestag consisted of three parties (the fourth party with an overall 
national vote share of 4.3 percent, the NPD, failed to pass the electoral threshold of five 
percent), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU, who are 
treated as one legislative party) and the Free Democrats (FDP). Based on the above formula, 
the seat distribution and its conversion into the three parties’ Banzhaf values are listed in table 
6.7 below. 
 
Table 6.7: Seat Distribution and Banzhaf Values in the Sixth Bundestag (1969-1972): 
Party: CDU SPD FDP 
Seats 242 223 30 
Normalized Banzhaf Value (%) 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Note: The 22 indirectly elected delegates from West-Berlin are not included here. 
 
In the example above, all parties are potential members in four winning coalitions, including 
an all party coalition, leading to a Banzhaf value of one third for each of the three parties.  
                                                
32 For an application to the Israeli case see McGann/Moran (2005: 3-5).  
33 The overall possible winning coalitions in this example are C1 (CDU-SPD-FDP), C2 (CDU-SPD), C3 (CDU-
FDP), C4 (SPD-FDP). However, in C1 none of the parties is individually critical, which leads to a BI of 2/6 or 
33.3 for each of the three parties. 
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The use of formalized stylizations and models such as that underlying the Banzhaf index in 
the analysis of coalition governments entails a number of problems in the context of the 
Indian party system since these models are built on assumptions regarding the characteristics 
of political systems, which are even less realistic in the Indian context than in other countries. 
One such example is the unrestricted exchangeability of political support between parties by 
way of cohesive block voting of legislators in the legislature. Deep-seated antipathies of 
political actors vis-à-vis each other, such as that between the INC and the Bharatiya Janata 
Party are not considered in this model which lessens the proximity of the theoretical model to 
ground realities and might impact the applicability of any findings based on it. However, not 
all characteristics of these formal stylizations are meant to be entirely realistic.34 Their worth, 
according to their proponents, lies in the prognostic capacity of the models. In how far the 
Banzhaf index can be used heuristically to understand the subsequent three Indian cases ex 
post will be the topic of the following sections. 
For the purpose of the subsequent analysis we will follow a modified notion of the term 
advanced by Schüttemeyer (2002) and define coalitions as “temporary alliances of political 
actors with the aim of achieving common [and separate, author’s note] goals”. In 
parliamentary democracies these alliances often refer to the banding together of a number of 
parties (or individual legislators) which support a government in legislative voting. This can 
be the case for prolonged periods of time, when parties unite as a majority coalition and 
collaborate in government decision-making or in a minority coalition, which supports a 
government and is supported more or less ad hoc from the outside by other parties or 
legislators. This latter case best describes the situation in the three cases of Indian national 
coalitions which will be analyzed below. Members of a coalition often act under the stress of 
a conflict within their own preferences. They have to try and combine two requirements in 
                                                
34 For a successful application of a formal model to Indian coalition games and for a justification of that 
application, see Nikolenyi (2004), who, however, follows a different approach based on van Roozendaal (1992) 
which already integrates ideological positions into the model. 
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their actions: forging compromise with other parties/legislators and yet satisfying their own 
constituencies (Lupia/Strøm 2005).  
In the subsequent analysis, the emphasis will be merely on one single aspect of coalition 
politics, namely that of the allocation of portfolios in the government or office-seeking. Other 
aspects of coalition dynamics, such as policy-seeking and the implementation of policy by 
administrative institutions have to be excluded from the analysis for the sake of brevity. 
Another aspect which is important in the context of Indian politics, but which has to be 
neglected here, is the relative importance of individual politicians compared to party 
organizations. In the Lok Sabha as well as in the State Assemblies many groupings exist 
which are splinter groups carved out of other existing parties and depend heavily on the 
personal charisma of individual leaders. As far as the present question of the disproportionate 
influence of regional parties in coalition politics at the national level is concerned, the 
linkages between these splinter parties and local (or regional) interests is of lesser concern. 
However, it would be reasonable to assume that there will be a difference between national 
and regional parties and between parties competing at the subnational level in party systems 
which are characterized by multi-party competition and those competing in two-party systems 
with regard to their office-seeking behavior at the national level. These differences due to 
electoral strategies will concern for example the types of offices or portfolios which certain 
parties strive for at the national level compared to those chosen by others. The linkage with 
local or regional interests will be even stronger in those highly fragmented party systems with 
small and personality-driven parties than is already the case in India anyway.35 
In the analysis of possible explanations for the portfolio allocation in the three Indian 
coalitions under investigation a modified version of office-seeking, or instrumental office-
seeking will be taken up to stress that for different parties and their constituencies certain 
portfolios have a greater value than others (for example ministries which deal with locally 
                                                
35 See Chhibber/Nooruddin (2004) for a detailed study of the consequences of consequences of party competition 
on government policies in the Indian States. 
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concentrated branches of the economy or natural resources). This instrumental behavior and 
the individually different subjective values attached to offices especially by regional parties 
on the other hand has offered the larger parties INC and BJP the chance to compensate 
smaller parties in difficult bargaining situation. This principle of instrumental office-seeking 
therefore is particularly useful as a heuristic tool for understanding the actions of smaller, 
regional and personality-driven parties. 
 
6.4 Power, Office and Government Formation Since 1998 
 
Overall, there has been a visible trend towards a more diversified party system at both levels 
of government which plays out in campaign issues as much as in the electoral successes of 
explicitly regionally oriented parties in State as well as national elections. The minority 
governments at the Union level, led by the United Front, a coalition of regional parties, and 
supported from the outside by the Congress party, underscore the growing importance of 
smaller regional parties in Indian national politics. The regionalization of electoral campaigns 
in national and regional elections, as well as the growing importance of regional parties as 
evidenced in public opinion data have been discussed extensively (instead of many see 
Palshikar 2003). It is important, however, to assess how regional parties and their larger 
coalition partners have fared since the fall of the United Front government and the elections of 
1998. It is far less clear in how far the growing electoral success of smaller parties has led to a 
significantly greater, and perhaps even disproportionate bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
formateur parties in the process of government formation. In the process of converting 
numerical strength into real influence distortions are likely on account of the different levels 
of skills in bargaining, the possibility of compensation through side payments in the form of 
satisfying a coalition partner's demands in an area unconnected with the issue at hand, or on 
account of the ideological distance of the parties involved. In a federally organized system, 
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such as that of India, the issue of a possible competition of smaller parties with the formateur 
parties in one of the federal units will have an impact on whether parties will actually form a 
coalition and on which terms. If such a competition is likely, as the case of the Congress party 
and the Communist Party of India (Marxist; CPIM) at the Union and State levels 
demonstrates, cooperation in a coalition or minority government at the Union level becomes 
more problematic.  
 The following sections outline the dynamics of government formation in the last three 
parliaments since 1998. The narratives take into account the seat shares in the legislature of 
the coalition partners and supporting legislative parties, their seat shares relative to the size of  
the coalition, as well as their bargaining power as measured by the Banzhaf index (see 
appendix for the method of calculation). 
  
6.4.1 The Twelfth Lok Sabha Period, 1998 to 1999 
  
The elections of 1998 produced a plurality of seats for the BJP. Together with parties in its 
pre-electoral coalition it was able to form a government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee. Table 6.8 (below) details the election outcome and the government composition in 
the twelfth Lok Sabha immediately after the formation of government. The composition of 
this government coalition, like in the case of the other government coalitions discussed later, 
changed in the course of its duration. For the purpose of assessing the relative success of 
formateur parties and smaller parties in bargaining over government office, however, these 
subsequent changes have no immediate bearing. The focus will lie on the bargaining 
processes directly following the three elections and on the distribution of cabinet and other 
ministerial posts.  
 The Bharatiya Janata Party won a plurality of seats in the general election 1998 and in 
consequence was asked to form a government after Prime Minister Vajpayee was sworn in. It 
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held 33.6 percent of the seats in parliament and its share of the total seats of the government-
supporting coalition was 65.8 percent. Nevertheless, the party was able to claim 58.1 percent 
of all ministerial posts (cabinet ministers and ministers of state) in government. Of the more 
prestigious cabinet minister posts, the BJP was able to claim a share of 52 percent. Both are 
significantly higher than what would be expected based on bargaining models which center on 
assumptions about the underlying distribution of bargaining power as measured by the 
Banzhaf index. The value for the BJP in 1998 for this index was 34, indicating that the party 
held 34 percent of the bargaining power in the Lok Sabha. The formateur's share also included 
the prestigious post of Prime Minister, as in the cases of the other two governments to be 
discussed below, and other important ministries such as the Home, Industry, Labor, Energy, 
Finance and Textile ministries. On the other hand, those smaller regional parties which were 
formally included in the government coalition fared slightly better than what their seat shares 
in the legislature, in the total number of coalition supporters or what their Banzhaf values 
would have predicted. This is due to the fact that 24 members of parliament from five parties 
chose to informally lend their support to the coalition without joining the government. 
Especially the All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) from Tamil Nadu under 
the leadership of J. Jayalalitha, the Bihar-based Samata Party of veteran union leader George 
Fernandes and the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) from Orissa were able to win office beyond what 
would have been expected. 
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All three of the mentioned coalition partners received a larger share than the conventional 
indicators would have lead one to expect (which is partly due to mathematical effects because 
each additional post adds an additional share to their share in posts which is not an integer 
value). Moreover, all three parties received control over ministries which were of particular 
strategic value for their respective leadership, Justice (AIADMK), Defense and Railways 
(Samata) and Steel and Mining (BJD). The Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), which has its only 
stronghold in the mainly agriculturally-oriented State of Punjab, received an especially 
valuable office in the form of a combined ministry of Chemicals, Fertilizers and Food. The 
Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena with only one Ministry of State performed worse at winning 
office than its share in the number of coalition supporters, its relative ideological proximity to 
large sections in the BJP or its Banzhaf value would have predicted.  
 Overall, the BJP was able to claim a more than proportionate share of offices (cabinet 
and total number of ministries) when measured against its share of seats in the Lok Sabha and 
against its Banzhaf value. When compared to its share in the total number of members 
supporting the government formally and informally, however, it received a less adequate 
share (58.1 and 52 instead of 65.8 percent). In no small measure this underperformance must 
be attributed to the fact that after a failed attempt to put together a coalition government in 
1996, the BJP had to be more accommodating if it wanted to succeed at government 
formation in 1998. While it thus had to compromise on the distribution of ministerial posts 
(for example by giving the AIADMK the additional Ministry of Justice portfolio), it was able 
to initially fend off key demands by smaller regional partners, such as those of the AIADMK 
to allow the small Janata Party of Subramaniam Swamy to join the government and to dismiss 
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the DMK-led State government of Tamil Nadu by invoking President's Rule in accordance 
with article 356 of the Indian constitution.36 
 
6.4.2 The Thirteenth Lok Sabha Period, 1999 to 2004 
 
In 1999, the AIADMK left the coalition and in April of that year, Prime Minister Vajpayee 
lost in a vote of no confidence in the Lok Sabha which led to early elections.37 As table 6.9 
below demonstrates, the bargaining position and outcomes paradoxically improved for the 
BJP due to the early elections. Although the party's share of seats in the Lok Sabha (the 
largest of all parties) remained constant and its share in the legislative coalition even declined 
noticeably, its bargaining power as measured by its Banzhaf rating improved markedly due to 
the increased fragmentation of the parliament. The BJP was able to win 60 percent of cabinet 
posts and 68.7 percent of all ministerial posts with only 33.6 percent of seats in the Lok Sabha 
and 60.4 percent of seats in the legislative coalition. As in 1998, the President of India had 
invited the leader of the BJP's legislative party to form the government, which also led to its 
winning the office of Prime Minister for Atal Bihari Vajpayee again.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 For a description of the difficult negotiations over government formation, refer to India Today 16 March 1998, 
23 March 1998 and 30 March 1998. 
37 See Kapur (2000: 195-96) for a description of the circumstances which led to the vote of no confidence and the 
AIADMK's exit from the government coalition. 
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This more than proportionate level of success at winning office can likely be attributed to a 
number of factors. As in 1998, some parties pledged their support to the government without 
formally joining the portfolio coalition, but rather refusing to join on a more formal basis. 
Secondly, the BJP benefits from its role as the official formateur since it can outbid the 
Congress party in the formation and bargaining phase for minor party support by pointing to 
this official role assigned to it by the President and exert greater pressure than in 1998 on 
smaller parties by threatening to take up negotiations with other small parties in the event that 
they should not be willing to give in to the BJP's demands.38 Another potential explanation 
may lie in the fact that empirically the bargaining over government office at the Union level in 
India is not a zero-sum game, but rather a variable sum game. Between the 1998 and 1999 
government formations the total number of ministerial posts was increased from 43 to 67, 
mainly through the addition of Minister of State positions which were given to BJP 
legislators. But, despite this flexibility, it is still remarkable that the smaller partners in the 
legislative and portfolio coalitions did not demand a larger number of posts as well, but 
allowed the BJP to exercise its influence in such a one-sided way for its own benefit instead, 
which points again to the BJP's increased bargaining power after the 1999 elections. In 
contrast to the previous election, the Congress party was no viable alternative as a potential 
formateur of a government in 1999 due to its decreased share of seats in the Lok Sabha and its 
decreased Banzhaf bargaining power rating. While in 1998 the INC had still attempted to 
form a legislative coalition of its own to form a government, this was not the case in 1999 and 
the BJP was able, under the leadership of A.B. Vajpayee and L.K. Advani, to negotiate from a 
much stronger position and play out smaller parties against each other in the portfolio 
coalition. The contrast of the indicators for the BJP and the INC in table 4 (below) illustrates 
this situation. 
                                                
38 Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) have extensively discussed the types of advantages which the formateur 
enjoys in the government formation phase vis-à-vis other larger and smaller parties. 
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 As in 1998, the BJP as the formateur was able to occupy the most important and 
prestigious ministerial posts, like those for Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance and 
Justice. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy in this context that the Janata Dal (United, 
JDU)/Samata Party under George Fernandes was successful at winning posts far in excess of 
what its share in the legislative coalition or its Banzhaf rating would have indicated. This 
discrepancy will remain puzzling as long as the surrounding circumstances of this merely 
structural view of relative power are not taken into account. During the negotiations the future 
members of the portfolio coalition had actually agreed on a formula for the allocation of 
portfolios (per six seats of each party in the portfolio coalition one Cabinet position would be 
allocated to that party, for each additional five seats one additional Minister of State office 
would be granted). In the case of the JDU, however, it became clear in the course of the 
negotiations that four out of its 22 legislators would demand a position in government 
(George Fernandes, Sharad Yadav, Nitish Kumar and Ram Vilas Paswan fom Bihar).39 When 
Fernandes offered to withdraw his candidature for a government office, this threatened to 
remove one of the most important interlocutors between the different coalition partners and 
one of the most visible politicians of the important North Indian State of Bihar from the inner 
circle of government. To avoid this, the other partners agreed to grant the JDU an additional 
post beyond what the prior compromise would have stipulated. This then prompted other 
small partners again to also demand an additional post for each of their parties, explaining 
their respective bargaining successes. Overall, however, the BJP was again able to retain the 
lion's share of ministerial positions, at the cabinet as well as at the subordinate levels. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 See India Today of 18 October 1999 and 25 October 1999 for a description of the difficult allocation process. 
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6.4.3 The Fourteenth Lok Sabha Period, 2004 to 2009 
 
Since 2004 the Indian National Congress has been governing alongside other parties in the 
United Progressive Alliance with additional outside support from the Communist and some 
regional parties. Table 6.10 (below) shows the parties' position on the various indicators along 
with the BJP's ratings for comparison. Despite the INC's lower share of 50.1 percent of its 
legislative coalition's seats, in comparison with the BJP as the previous formateur, and its 
much lower Banzhaf value of 22, it was still able to win 65.5 percent of the Cabinet minister 
posts and 63.2 of all ministerial posts. Even when comparing the INC performance at winning 
office in 2004 to the improved performance of the BJP in 1999 (as compared to 1998), the 
INC's success is remarkable. With worse ratings on all of the seats, votes and power ratings, it 
was able to outperform the BJP at winning the more Cabinet ministries, while trading a larger 
share of those for a smaller share of all offices. The INC seems to have been able to pay off 
smaller parties in the coalition for their legislative support with less prestigious, less 
patronage-rich and less policy-relevant minister of state positions. This was possible since the 
portfolio coalition in 2004 was considerably smaller than in 1999. While the 1999 outside 
support made up 11.88 percent of the seats of the legislative coalition, the figure for 2004 was 
22.13 percent. In effect, therefore, the INC was able to draw on outside support to a much 
larger extent and find other ways of compensating outside supporters without having to share 
the portfolios with them. Like the BJP since 1998, the INC was also able to have the most 
important portfolios allocated to it. Congress politicians held, among others, the home, 
finance, foreign affairs, energy and defense ministries, besides the office of the prime 
minister, held by Manmohan Singh.  
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In return for the agreement to become a member in the legislative, but not the portfolio 
coalition, the Left Front (CPIM, CPI, RSP, AIFSB), among other things, successfully asked 
for its longstanding and experienced legislator Somnath Chatterjee to be elected Speaker of 
the Lok Sabha. This arrangement of a division into a portfolio coalition under the leadership 
of the INC and a larger legislative coalition in which the INC shares the leadership with the 
CPIM, also illustrates the growing importance of electoral competition at the subnational level 
for the building of coalitions at the Union level. The INC and the CPIM traditionally are 
competitors for votes and power especially in West Bengal. For the CPIM the role of outside 
supporter of Union governments has proved beneficial several times before, since it can 
influence policy formulation at the national level to benefit its key constituencies without 
having to take responsibility for shortcomings, thus allowing it to pursue a strategy of blame 
avoidance. Strategically, the continuation in power in the state of West Bengal is more 
important to the CPIM than a formal share in the portfolio coalition. At the same time through 
its inclusion in the legislative coalition it was able to exert pressure on the government to 
introduce the ational Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which guarantees 100 days of paid 
work to each household in 200 rural districts in India, of which West Bengal's population was 
one if the key beneficiaries.  
 In 2004 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the main rival of the BJP-allied 
AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, benefitted disproportionately from the portfolio allocation. Despite 
its lower share of seats in the legislative coalition and its lower Banzhaf rating than the 
Rashtriya Janata Dal under the leadership of Laloo Prasad Yadav from Bihar, the DMK was 
able to win a higher share of the cabinet posts and the total number of ministries. Partly, this 
may be attributable to reasons of geographic proportionality since the North Indian parties, 
including the RJD, are generally overrepresented in the coalition, and the DMK succeeded at 
winning votes and seats for the UPA electoral coalition in the South. On the other hand, the 
RJD was able to win the patronage-rich railways portfolio for its most prominent member of 
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parliament, Laloo Yadav, who was initially seen as a burden for the coalition due to his 
notorious eccentricity and his controversial past as Chief Minister of Bihar, as well as the 
rural development portfolio, which is highly relevant for the party in its home base in rural 
Bihar. 
 The relatively new regional party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) which has its base 
in the resource-rich state of Jharkhand which was carved out of Bihar in 2000, successfully 
bargained for the coal and mining portfolio for its leading legislator Shibu Soren. 
Simultaneously, the Telengana Rashtriya Samiti (TRS), the RJD and CPIM demanded special 
funding for West Bengal, Telengana in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, although these demands 
were thinly disguised as demands for a special fund for additional support of disadvantaged 
regions of India. Thus, while the portfolio coalition reflects only partially the relative 
strengths of regional representatives, the INC was able to place its own candidates in the most 
important offices. At the same time, smaller regional parties and the Communist allies were 
compensated through the allocation of strategically important portfolios or by the introduction 
of patronage-rich or programmatically important policies, such as welfare to work schemes 
benefitting in particular States like Bihar and West Bengal. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
Despite the undeniable trend throughout recent decades towards an increased strength and 
growing importance of regional parties in Union politics, the respective numerically largest 
and, according to the formalized index criteria most powerful legislative party (BJP, then 
INC) has been able in two out of the three coalitions to actually form a coalition and to 
outperform regional and other national coalition partners in terms of the office allocation. It 
has also always been able to claim the most important portfolios for itself to document its 
claim to national preeminence.  
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The analysis undertaken here showed that smaller parties, which are regionally rooted and 
primarily based on regional identity and support have increased in importance in recent years. 
This is especially true in contrast to the first three decades of Union politics which were 
dominated by the Congress party. At the same time one should not make the mistake of 
confusing growing importance with a systematic disproportionately large influence of 
regional parties at the national level. The fact that regional parties have become indispensable 
at the national level as coalition partners does not necessarily imply that their clout in 
influencing national politics is excessively large. Judged by their seat share and their formal 
bargaining power in the Lok Sabha, the two main parties have been able (1998 and 1999 with 
minor qualifications) to claim a disproportionately large share of all offices for themselves. At 
the same time, they were able to claim the most important portfolios for themselves as well.  
The allocation of and striving for political office (office-seeking) as well as office patronage is 
not the only, and perhaps not even the most important goal for some parties for seeking power 
in the Lok Sabha. However, as a rough indicator for the relative power within a government 
coalition at the beginning of a legislative period the portfolio allocation in all three cases of 
minority coalitions in India since 1998 is a relatively useful indicator. In the course of the 
inquiry it has also become clear that heuristically, the probability-theory based Banzhaf index 
has only limited use for the three cases regarding any prognosis of expected portfolio 
allocations within a coalition. Its best use in our cases was as an indicator for the likelihood 
that a particular party would be able to form a coalition government. However, due to 
institutional constraints, other indicators, like the seat share of legislative parties could have 
been just as easily used for that purpose. The actual allocation within the BJP- and INC-led 
coalitions reflects the respective strength of the largest legislative party in the Lok Sabha 
according to the Banzhaf index. However, the respective party has been able to convert its 
numerical strength into strongly disproportionate portfolio allocations. A more reliable 
indicator for the conversion of numerical strength into portfolios is the respective share of 
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each legislative party in all government-supporting legislators. In the composition of 
government in 1999 this indicator is quite accurate. However, for 1998 and 2004 this is, 
again, the case only with some qualifications. 
As a conclusion, therefore, it can be said that one of the key findings of comparative research 
on government formation holds in the Indian case as well. Due to the complexities of 
institutional design such as for example the prerogative of the largest party to normally act as 
the formateur, the largest party is still able to secure for itself power and influence (as 
measured by success in bargaining over office allocation). The power and influence of 
regional parties depends in no small measure, at least in the first phase of government 
formation and bargaining, on the bargaining skills of the respective parties’ chief negotiators. 
For them their bargaining position is particularly problematic since they have relatively small 
individual shares in power as measured by the Banzhaf index and is since they often have to 
negotiate at the national level under the threat of being passed over for their main competitor 
regional parties at the subnational levels instead. Only in the course of a legislative period 
when all partners in a coalition have become used to the exercise of political power and have 
come to appreciate the spoils of office, the sometimes remarkable criticality of smaller 
regional parties can become evident, as in the case of the AIADMK, which toppled the first 
Vajpayee administration through a vote of no confidence in 1999. 
The apparent difference between a numerically grounded and formally modeled arithmetic 
expected power calculus and actual power based on portfolio allocation and influence over 
cabinet and ministry policies holds three distinct lessons. The first is the context dependence 
and restricted prognostic quality of abstract models. At the same time it points to its 
usefulness (for example in the calculation of the likelihood of the successful coalition 
formation by certain parties in the Lok Sabha). Lastly, it highlights the importance of 
institutions and actor constellations for the actual observable conversion of numerical strength 
into real influence by regional parties and national parties in the Indian Union. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
In the course of this study we have seen a number of things related to the institutionalization 
and regionalization of party politics in India at the State and national levels. Some of the 
findings have been counterintuitive, others were mainly in line with established prior research. 
One of the myths this study was able to dispel was that regional parties wield undue influence 
in the government formation process at the national level since the advent of coalition 
governments there. The formateur parties BJP and INC are still able to outmaneuver smaller 
coalition partners or even keep them out of the portfolio coalition altogether buying their 
support through other side payments instead.  
It was also possible to show that voters who prefer regional to national parties are by no means 
very different from mainstream voters in India in terms of their social profile. They are 
actually increasingly mainstream themselves. Also, their views on politics, in particular on 
democracy are not much different, if not more democratic in nature than those of their national 
party supporter countrymen. In addition to this insight we could also see that preferring one 
type of party as the first choice and another as a second choice was by no means impossible 
and in fact became increasingly prevalent among respondents in the survey throughout the 
1990s. This corresponds largely also with the messages nowadays conveyed by regional and 
formerly regionalist political parties across India’s States. As the excerpts from the election 
manifestos of the fairly typical regional parties, the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam, Tamil Nadu), the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD, Uttarakhand), and the 
Sikkimese Democratic Front (SDF, Sikkim) show (see Appendix C), their goals are by no 
means extremist or overly ethnicist in tone or content. To the contrary, they have actually 
rhetorically embraced the mainstream goals of the “good governance” debate, such as 
economic growth, technological and developmental progress, attracting investment and control 
of corruption. On the other hand, as the image of the then-BJP president L.K. Advani (App. C) 
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illustrates, nationalist imagery based on mythological symbols and caste identity has by no 
means been reserved for regionalist or parochialist parties in India at least since the arrival of 
the BJP and the Shiv Sena in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In short, the study has illustrated that: 
 Contrary to some of the literature on party system change in India, there is no uniform 
trend towards de-institutionalization across the States,  
 Different types of de- or non-institutionalization are observable different regions of 
India,  
 Loyalists of regional and local rather than national political identity tend to support 
national and regional parties relatively equally,  
 In terms of social characteristics (except for religion), voters’ age, place of residence, 
level of education and social class become less and less predictive of support for 
regional parties,  
 In terms of confidence of political parties, support for democracy, interest in politics 
and satisfaction with politicians, regional party supporters are likewise becoming 
increasingly indistinctive over time and are not at all extremist,  
 Regional parties are still by and large numerically outmanoeuvred by larger national 
parties in terms of converting seats into offices in national government. 
 
This study thus contrasts with some of the more exaggerated claims about the meteoric rise of 
regional parties and the regionalization and deinstitutionalization of parties and party systems 
in India on the one hand. On the other it was able to show that regional parties are indeed 
playing a more important role overall which is also a consequence of the fact that parties 
initially always start out as regional organizations rather than national ones, in particular in a 
large and diverse country as India. This finding is fairly diametrical to the claims by Caramani 
(2008: 337), for example, who states that India over time becomes more and more uniform in 
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its patterns of party competition, which is not borne out empirically, but also misinterprets the 
findings of Chhibber and Kollman (2004) in this regard, whose definition of nationalization 
and regionalization differs from that used in the present study and merely addresses the 
numerical aspects of regionalization in terms of national party systems mirroring sub-national 
ones in terms of the levels of fragmentation of party competition which is slightly different 
also from Caramani’s operationalization of these ideas which implies a uniformity of the 
competing parties as well as similar levels of fragmentation of party systems. It has also 
become clear that institutionalization and regionalization are sometimes linked to each other, 
but that aspects of institutionalization (e.g. high levels of volatility) can persist despite the 
strong presence of national parties in sub-national party systems and that regionalized party 
systems do not always equal deinstitutionalized party systems. An investigation of relative 
levels of institutionalization can therefore only illuminate parts of the picture with regard to 
the regionalization of party politics in India. If nothing else, however, it is clear, that, contrary 
to Caramani’s view, India’s party landscape, in many ways (e.g. levels of institutionalization, 
regionalization and fragmentation) is not becoming more uniform, but more differentiated. 
This should ensure that the student of party systems and party system change will have 
enough material and puzzles to ponder for years to come and that the case of India will remain 
an interesting and important one to study in order to test theories of party system change and 
persistence. 
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8. Various Appendices 
Appendix A: 
Two-Level Structure of Appointment Powers and Accountability Indian Government 
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a. Type refers to the current constitutionally defined status of the respective political territory as a state, Union Territory 
(UT), or the National Capital Territory (NCT). 
b. Year refers to the year in which the respective unit acquired its current status as a separate state, Union Territory or 
National Capital Territory, which may or may not coincide with its last territorial revision or name change. 
c. Population figures are the projected March 2008 figures based on an extrapolation of the 2001 Census of India and 
were taken from the Census of India website 
(http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Projected_Population/Projected_population.aspx). 
d. NSDP is the 2005-2006 Net State Domestic Product at current prices and was taken from the Government of India’s 
Union Budget and Economic Survey 2008-2009, http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2007-08/chapt2008/tab17.pdf (accessed 
May, 13th, 2009). 
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Appendix C: Party Advertisements and Manifestos 
Portraits of Party Appeals: 
Europe: 
 
Source: www.vlaamsbelang.org 
 
 
India: 
 
Above: Picture of Laloo Prasad 
Yadav in “audience” 
 
Above: Lal Krishna Adani posing as the mythical 
hero and deity Lord Rama from the epic Ramayana 
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Examples of Election Manifestos: 
 
AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Tamil !adu) 
 
Election 2006 (Source: http://www.electadmk.com/flash_news.php) 
 
Title: “AIADMK Election manifesto, Released by Amma“ 
 
Some salient features of the manifesto  
• 5 lakh IT Jobs in 5 years  
• Opening a Engineering colleges equivalent to IIT Chennai in more then [sic!] 5 major 
cities of Tamilnadu  
• Ensure Tamilnadu is a garden of peace  
• Develop new technology for more growth  
• Take the states economy to new heights  
• Introduce more development schemes for people’s welfare  
• Eradicate illiteracy  
• Improve the lot of women  
• Attracting foreign companies to invest in Tamilnadu  
• Works towards prosperity of farmers, weavers, fishermen, students,  government 
employees, teachers, workers and other sections of people.  
• Control prices  
• Snuff out communalism, extremism, and separatism  
• Deal with inter-state issues in amicable manner “ 
 
 
Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD, Uttarakhand) 
 
Assembly Election 2007 (Source: Assembly Election 2007, mimeo) 
 
“[…] 
• We will return rights to the people over water, forests and land.  
• We will oppose the recommendations of the Delimitation Commission.  
• We will put a check on corruption and probe all scams.  
• We will support universally accessible education for poor and rich alike.  
• We will formulate effective policies on horticulture and agriculture.  
• We oppose giving land in the Terai region to industrialists at cheap prices.  
• We want to place emphasis on setting up industry in every district of the state.  
• We are against residents of the state having to provide domicile certificates, rather we 
believe in acknowledging those who have had property here for the last 30 years as 
domiciles of the state.  
• We want reservations for the poor among upper castes.  
• We favour reserving 85 percent of jobs in industry in the state for the local people.  
• We want to connect every part of the state down to the tehsil and block level with good 
roads to promote tourism. Rail and ropeway connections will also be promoted.  
• We will establish 23 districts in the state for more effective governance closer to the 
people.  
• We are also pained by the neglect of those who were part of the Uttarakhand movement. 
We promise to honour and appreciate this section of society. “ 
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Sikkimese Democratic Front (Sikkim) 
 
Election Manifesto (Source: 12th Lok Sabha Election, 1998, mimeo) 
 
Title: “Our Vision : 2015” 
 
• We shall make Sikkim as the best performing state  
• We shall make Sikkim poverty-free state  
• We shall make Sikkim a fully literate state  
• We shall make Sikkim as a pollution-free and disease-free state of India  
• We shall make Sikkim corruption free state  
• We shall make Sikkim a total organic state  
• We shall make Sikkim as the principal eco-tourism destination in South and South-east Asia  
• We shall make Sikkim a cradle of traditional practices with modern institutions  
• We shall make Sikkim as the zero unemployment zone of India  
• We shall make Sikkim a biodiversity knowledge centre of eastern Himalayas 
• We shall make Sikkim the best welfare state in the country  
• We shall make Sikkim the land of opportunity 
• We shall make Sikkim a producer state  
• We shall make Sikkim the state of peace and security  
• We shall make Sikkim naya and sukhi and a model state in the country 
• We shall make Sikkim a society based on knowledge, science and technology, 
• We shall transform Sikkim into an ideal state free from communal, anti-constitutional and 
other anti-national elements  
• We shall mobilize Rs. 1000 crores revenue by 2015. Rural economy shall be made self-
contained. This way, we shall make Sikkim into the most competitive and efficient 
mountain economy. 
• We shall bring down the Infant Mortality Rate to less than 20.  
• We shall endeavour to raise the net state domestic product to Rs. 2400 crores. 
• We shall endeavour to raise the per capita income to Rs. 1 lakh.  
• We shall achieve total literacy in the state.  
• We shall ensure compulsory enrolment of children between 4-10 years of age in the schools.  
• We shall set up 166 Community Information Centres in the state.  
• We shall make Sikkim a zero poverty state.  
• We shall focus on the initiation of second generation reforms.  
• We shall allocate 80 per cent of the development fund for rural economy. This means all the 
rural sectors will be totally reoriented and reinvigorated.” 
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Appendix D: Data Coding and Sources 
!B: For a full description of the surveys see the World Values Survey organization 
website: www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
 
Indicators Coding/Range Source 
I!DIVIDUAL LEVEL:   
Trust in Institutions (incl. 
Political Parties) 
Question A (below); 0= not very much or no 
confidence at all; 1= a great deal or quite a 
lot of confidence 
A) World Values Surveys, 
Four Waves (1990, 1995, 
2001, 2006) 
Support for Democracy 
Question E (below); 1=Very Good, 2=Fairly 
Good, 3=Fairly Bad, 4=Very Bad 
See A)  
Political Interest 
Question D (below); 
1=Very/2=Somewhat/3=Not Very/4=Not at 
all interested (Question D below) 
See A) 
Loyalty to Geographic 
Area 
Question H (below); 1=Locality, 2=Region, 
3=Country, 4=Continent, 5=World  
See A) without 2006 
Educational Level 1=Lower, 2=Middle, 3=Upper See A) 
Age Level 
1=15 to 29, 2=30 to 49, 3=50 and over years 
(Items: x003r2, V216>recoded) 
See A) 
Regional Party Preference 
(First) 
0=National; 1=Regional (based on various 
political parties) (Question B below) 
See A) (and B for 
classifications of parties) 
Regional Party Preference 
(Second) 
0=National; 1=Regional (based on various 
political parties) (Question C below) 
See A) (and B for 
classifications of parties) 
Party Aversion 
0=National; 1=Regional (based on various 
political parties) (Question G below) 
See A) (and B for 
classifications of parties) 
   
AGGREGATE LEVEL:   
Vote Share for Non-national 
Parties and Candidates (REGPV) 
0 to 1 (stand.) 
B) Statistical Reports on State Assembly 
and General Elections, Election 
Commission of India, various years 
Vote Share of Independents 
(VOTEIND) 
0 to 1 (stand.) See B) 
Absolute (Raw) Number of Parties 
(ABSNP) 
0 to ∞ See B) 
Effective Number of Parties ENP) ENP, Laakso-Taagepera (1 to ∞) See B) (own calculation) 
Relative Weighted Age of the 
Party System (WRA) 
0 to 1 See B) (own calculation) 
Religious Fragmentation of the 
Population (RELFrag) 
NREL , Laakso-Taagepera (1 to 
∞) 
D) Government of India, 
Census 2001, 1991, 1981, 1971,  
Chief Ministerships by Party 
Affiliation 
0 to 100 percent  
www.worldstatesmen.org, 
various websites of Indian 
States and political parties 
Turnout (TURN) 0 to 1 (stand.) See B) 
Urbanization Level (URBAN) 0 to 1 (stand.) 
C) Census of India, various 
years, linear interpolation 
Literacy  0 to 1 (stand.) See C) 
Share of Regional Language 
Newspapers (REGMED) 
0 to 1 (stand.) 
D) Press in India, various 
volumes; linear interpolation 
Share of Hindi Language 
Newspapers (HINDMED) 
0 to 1 (stand.) See D) 
Nationalization of Newspapers 
(NATMED) 
REGMED/NATMED (1 to ∞) See D) (own calculation) 
Share of Migrant Residents (MIG) 
0 to 1 (stand.), out-of-State 
migrants 
C) Census of India, various 
years, linear interpolation 
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World Values Survey – Four Waves (2006, 2001, 1995, 1990) 
!B: For a full description of the surveys see the World Values Survey organization 
website: www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
 
Questions: 
 
A. I am going to name a few organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence 
(2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4)? 
 
Response Item 2006  2001  1995  1990 
The armed forces V132 V148 E070 E070 
The press V133 V149 E072 E072 
Television V134 V150 E078 n.a. 
Labor unions V135 V151 E073 E073 
The police V136 V152 E074 E074 
The courts V137 n.a. n.a. E085 
The government 
(in your nation’s 
capital) 
V138 V153 E079 E079 
Political Parties V139 V154 E080 E080 
Parliament V140 V155 E075 E075 
The Civil service V141 V156 E076 E076 
Major companies V142 V157 E081 E081 
 
 
B. If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you 
vote? Just call out the number on this card. If you are uncertain, which party appeals to 
you most? 
Variable !o.:  2006=V231    2001=V220   1995=E179   1990=V714 
 
01 Party 1 
02 Party 2 
03 Party 3 
04 etc. 
 
C. And which party would be your second choice? If you are uncertain, which one 
appeals to you second most? 
Variable !o.:  2006=V232   2001=V221   1995=E179    1990=V715 
 
01 Party 1 
02 Party 2 
03 Party 3 
04 etc. 
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D. How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one 
answer):  
Variable !o.: 2006=V95  2001=E023  1995=V117   1990=V471 
 
1 Very interested  
2 Somewhat interested  
3 Not very interested  
4 Not at all interested  
 
 
E. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about 
each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?   “Democratic system” 
Variable !o.: 2006=V151   2001=117   1995=V157   1990=E117 
 
1 Very good 
2 Fairly Good  
3 Fairly Bad  
4 Very Bad 
 
 
F. For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it 
is: Politics 
Variable !o.:  2006=V7   2001=A004    1995=V7    1990=A004 
 
1 Very important 
2 Fairly important 
3 Not very important 
4 Not at all important 
 
 
G. And is there a party that you would never vote for? Answer:  
Variable !o.: 2006=V133   2001=E182   1995=V212   1990=E182 
 
01 Party 1  
02 Party 2  
03 Party 3  
04 etc.  
 
 
H. Which of the geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? 
Variable !o.: 2001=G001    1995=V203   1990=G001 
 
1 Locality 
2 Region 
3 Country 
4 Continent 
5 World 
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Average Responses: 
 
 
 
 
Confidence in Political Parties (1= A great deal, 4= None at all)
2,1
2,2
2,3
2,4
2,5
2,6
2,7
2,8
2,9
1990 1995 2001 2006
National Party Supporters Regional Party Supporters  
Support for Democracy
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
1995 2001 2006
National Party Supporters Regional Party Supporters  
Confidence in Government (1= A Great Deal, 4= None at all)
1,9
2
2,1
2,2
2,3
2,4
2,5
2,6
1990 1995 2001 2006
National Party Supporters Regional Party Supporters
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics of Aggregate Data (State-level Elections) 
1977 to 1989 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
URBAN 81 86,47 5,70 92,17 24,0526 15,12358 
ABSNP 81 40,00 1,00 41,00 9,0617 5,56405 
REGPV 81 77,10 7,35 84,45 37,1630 23,30136 
TURN 81 54,55 32,74 87,29 66,1264 12,13275 
LIT 81 64,16 21,27 85,43 49,0558 14,60854 
RELFrag 81 6,69 1,09 7,77 1,7677 1,19881 
REGMED 65 77,50 10,00 87,50 55,7754 21,06722 
HINDMED 65 87,50 2,50 90,00 42,2032 29,93521 
NATMED 65 34,89 ,11 35,00 2,9332 4,68716 
MIG 81 45,14 1,36 46,50 8,8932 8,79833 
POV 81 ,49 ,17 ,66 ,4233 ,11176 
INDVOTE 81 59,80 2,73 62,53 17,1243 12,50260 
ENP 81 15,11 1,87 16,98 4,5546 2,40296 
 
1990 to 2000 
 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
URBAN 60 83,51 8,58 92,09 28,7477 17,78536 
ENP 62 5,48 2,22 7,70 4,4184 1,44235 
ABSNP 62 74,00 1,00 75,00 24,3387 16,39066 
COMPETE 62 27,65 1,33 28,98 9,6923 6,01985 
REGPV 62 79,63 7,39 87,02 36,7332 22,16483 
TURN 62 43,02 48,51 91,53 69,5605 10,21836 
LIT 62 52,54 37,80 90,34 61,5455 12,41777 
RELFrag 62 5,12 1,09 6,21 1,7271 ,98979 
REGMED 60 90,72 7,74 98,46 64,9370 21,21336 
HINDMED 60 96,34 2,63 98,97 44,9425 34,70660 
NATMED 60 33,02 ,31 33,33 3,6255 5,94768 
MIG 62 40,25 ,93 41,18 7,9714 8,64713 
POV 58 ,43 ,14 ,58 ,3296 ,09955 
INDVOTE 62 47,69 1,58 49,27 11,2826 7,70352 
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Appendix F: Trends in Regionalization: Regional Party and Independents’ Vote Shares 
 
Consistently High:  
 
Mizoram
0
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share  
 
Tamil Nadu
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Indepdndents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium:  
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share
Meghalaya
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
MEGH78  MEGH83  MEGH88  MEGH93  MEGH98  
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Andhra Pradesh
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Medium (Continued):  
Assam
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share
Goa
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share
Haryana
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share
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Low:  
Bihar
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share  
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Karnataka
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share
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Low (Continued):  
Tripura
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Independents' Vote Share Regional Party Vote Share
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